No Break With the US After Colombian Election
But Bogota is mindful of the potential for a longer-term change in U.S. policy.
By: Allison Fedirka
Colombia has elected a new president, and the moment of truth has arrived.
The most remarkable thing about the Colombian election was not the result but the electorate’s rejection of the political mainstream.
Two anti-establishment candidates – leftist Gustavo Petro of Humane Colombia and Rodolfo Hernandez of the right-wing League of Anti-Corruption Governors – emerged from the May 29 runoff, signaling Colombian voters’ loss of faith in the political status quo.
Like much of the world, Colombia is undergoing a profound socio-political transition, with potential effects for the Caribbean region and U.S. foreign policy.
In the lead-up to the runoff, U.S. political and business leaders fretted over the impact a victory by the leftist Petro might have on economic relations or the impact a victory by Hernandez would have on U.S. security cooperation.
In both cases, there was concern the new leader in Bogota might pursue a rapprochement with Venezuela and distance itself from Washington.
Interestingly, Colombia itself worries that the U.S. and Venezuela might reconcile and leave it out in the cold.
In truth, all three states face constraints that will prevent either the U.S. or Colombia from straying too far from the other.
Bogota, however, remains mindful of the potential for a longer-term shift in U.S. policy.
Winds of Change
Colombia is vital for stability and security in the Caribbean and parts of South America.
Deeply rooted strategic interests have bound Bogota and Washington together since the early 19th century.
Three large mountain ranges and valleys make it difficult for the Colombian state to enforce its writ in every corner of the country, let alone connect them.
Lawlessness is rampant in rural areas, where local economies are underdeveloped.
To confront this challenge, Bogota needs a strong partner, and it has traditionally relied on Washington for security and financial support.
The U.S. priority is defending its place as the hegemon of the Caribbean.
Though the U.S. dominates the northern rim of the Caribbean on its own, having an ally along the southern rim helps it secure the sea.
Of course, Colombia benefits from a stable Caribbean as well.
Colombia also provides a strong foothold for the U.S. to engage with the rest of South America.
Most notably, it has proved to be an essential ally in the U.S. effort to counter and isolate Nicolas Maduro’s regime in Venezuela.
The war in Ukraine renewed U.S. interest in repairing relations with Venezuela.
Forced to expend more and more resources on the conflict and countering Western sanctions, Russia’s ability to continue to prop up the Maduro regime has waned, creating an opportunity the U.S. could exploit.
At the same time, the urgent U.S. interest in getting more oil onto international markets gives Washington an excuse to back down from its staunch anti-Maduro stance and engage with the regime.
Washington has held direct talks with the regime, supports the resumption of a national dialogue between the regime and the (skeptical) political opposition, and has loosened oil sanctions on Venezuela to permit limited exports to Spain and Italy.
Realistically, given the level of disrepair in Venezuela’s oil industry after years of mismanagement, a larger removal of sanctions would do little to immediately put significant additional quantities of oil on the market.
Additionally, Venezuelan crude oil is heavy and requires special refining capabilities.
Nevertheless, the current environment is the most conducive to a U.S.-Venezuelan reconciliation in years, and Washington’s interest in edging out Russia, China and Iran for influence in Venezuela compels it to cautiously move forward.
Colombia is understandably alarmed by indications of a U.S.-Venezuelan rapprochement.
Washington needs a strong partner on the southern rim of the Caribbean basin, and the two South American neighbors are both in valuable locations.
Colombia’s roughly 1,400-kilometer (870-mile) Pacific coastline and proximity to the Panama Canal give it the superior position, but it lacks reliable infrastructure connecting its Atlantic and Pacific areas, and the U.S. already has strong ties with Panama.
Bogota is also worried about having to compete with Caracas for public and private funding from the United States.
Any significant U.S.-Venezuelan rapprochement would eventually include costly humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and would open up attractive private investment opportunities in Venezuela.
As a major beneficiary of U.S. funding and investment, Colombia does not want competition, especially not from next door.
Domestic Agenda
In addition to these unfavorable international circumstances, President-elect Gustavo Petro also must address three interconnected regional and domestic issues: relations with Venezuela, peace agreements with narco-terrorist groups and an inclusive economic recovery.
As a candidate, Petro expressed his desire to restore diplomatic relations with the Maduro regime as a first step toward normalization.
(Relations soured in 2019 when Colombia threw its full support behind Juan Guaido, Maduro’s challenger for president.)
Both candidates recognized Colombia’s need to get Venezuela’s help controlling migration and combating illicit cross-border trade.
A new administration from a party outside the mainstream provides the opportunity for a political reset.
Both candidates also agreed on the need to fully implement the 2016 peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and to open negotiations with other armed groups, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN).
Even after the peace agreement with FARC, which ended a decades-long conflict and dismantled the group, organized crime, militancy and violence continue to plague the countryside.
Many armed criminal groups find refuge and a thriving illicit trade across the border in Venezuela, meaning Caracas’ support will be needed to combat them.
It’s essential for Colombia to reduce organized crime not only for security reasons but also to attract mostly U.S. investment, which is needed to help the economic recovery.
Petro’s economic agenda includes weaning the Colombian economy off natural resource exports and closing the wealth gap.
Tough Road Ahead
Colombia wants to shape the conditions under which any U.S.-Venezuelan reconciliation occurs, but its ability to affect U.S. policy in the region is limited.
At the peak of the 2019 opposition movement in Venezuela, Colombia played a critical role in the U.S. strategy.
But as that movement died out, so did Bogota’s immediate importance to Washington.
A worst-case scenario for Colombia would see the U.S. inadvertently empowering the Maduro regime or ushering in a violent political transition, either of which would be very threatening to Colombia’s security.
And yet Bogota can’t risk alienating Washington; the U.S. remains Colombia’s top trade partner, and U.S. private investors are its main source of foreign capital.
For its part, the U.S. can’t just swap Colombia for Venezuela.
Regime change in Caracas is still a U.S. priority, and every sanctions waiver it issues is a lifeline to the Maduro regime.
The U.S. can loosen the strings only so much before having to step back lest it empowers the regime it wants to see end.
There are currently no signs Maduro is willing to step aside or hold fair elections.
The foreign influence of non-U.S. powers in Venezuela has dipped, but it’s still a strategically valuable partner from which U.S. enemies like Russia and Iran can frustrate Washington.
The U.S. would pay a high price to convince Venezuela to break these ties.
Venezuela’s openness to improved ties with the U.S. will depend on how Russia emerges from the Ukraine conflict.
To a lesser degree, the outcome of Iran nuclear talks will also matter.
Venezuela’s critical need right now is market access so it can revive its economy.
Russia and Iran help facilitate Venezuela’s oil trade.
Russian and Venezuelan officials met during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum last week to discuss payment systems to circumvent sanctions, and Iranian ships have been providing regular crude shipments and some oil tankers.
While this helps Venezuela stay afloat, neither partner can provide enough support to help it repair its economy.
U.S. aid, investment and market access are currently the most promising options for Venezuela’s economic revival.
Improving relations with Colombia is one way the Maduro regime could secure U.S. help.
Colombia, too, would like to improve relations with Venezuela.
However, this conflicts with Bogota’s need to maintain good ties with Washington and continue receiving economic and security support.
Likewise, the U.S. has no good alternatives for its Caribbean strategy.
In other words, concerns over a U.S.-Colombia split are overstated.
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