THE COMING DECADE OF PEACELESSNESS / PROJECT SYNDICATE

The Coming Decade of Peacelessness

While Vladimir Putin remains beholden to nineteenth-century ideas and twentieth-century means, he has forced the rest of the world to consider what really matters in the twenty-first century. The decisions that European, American, and Chinese leaders make today will shape global power dynamics for many years to come.

Sigmar Gabriel

BERLIN – The world is probably at the start of a decade of jittery peacelessness. 

Though we are not necessarily entering a period of perpetual war, we should be prepared for more – and more intense – trade conflicts, economic and financial sanctions, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and the use of military force as an instrument of geopolitics. 

Russia’s war against Ukraine is not the beginning of a new era, but rather the consequence of an era that is ending.

Beyond his obvious desire to reconstruct the Russian Empire, President Vladimir Putin clearly does not want to leave the reorganization of the world to the United States and China alone. 

He wants Russia (or at least himself) to become a great power again, with a real say in determining European and Eurasian affairs.

For more than 30 years, Russia has had no significant role to play in Europe besides that of embittered spoiler. 

By the time it illegally annexed Crimea in 2014, the country had sunk in many Europeans’ estimation to the status of energy supplier whose threats against some of its immediate neighbors reflected weakness, not strength. 

And yet Putin needs to be able to influence the future of Europe if he is to have any chance of reconstituting Russia as a global great power. 

That means more is at stake in his war than Ukrainian sovereignty; in fact, Ukraine is just a means to Putin’s revanchist ends.

In his quest for geopolitical influence in the twenty-first century, Putin still thinks in nineteenth-century categories and fights with twentieth-century means. 

But Putin’s view of the world as a battlefield is of little relevance to the broader confrontation between Russia and the US-led alliance. 

That confrontation is between two views of world order. 

On one side is a rules-based system in which states mutually commit to the sanctity of territorial integrity and sovereignty; on the other side is the brute principle of might makes right.

With his attack on Ukraine, Putin has flagrantly broken the most basic principle of the rules-based order. 

If he gets away with it, he will have established a dangerous precedent for the rest of the world.

THE BIGGEST LOSER

For all the uncertainty that Putin has created with his contempt for international law, one thing is already clear: the big loser is Putin himself. 

With one decision, he transformed Russia into an international pariah, shattering any hope that Russians might have had for the future. 

Most United Nations member states condemned Russia’s attack, and those that abstained did so not because of loyalty to Putin, but because they are eager to remain neutral.

Similarly, instead of sowing divisions within NATO and the European Union, Putin’s war immediately united both in complete and dynamic solidarity. 

NATO is increasing its troop presence in Russia’s immediate neighborhood, and many of its members – most notably Germany – are boosting their defense budgets substantially. 

Even neutral Sweden and Finland are now considering joining the Alliance.

Moreover, within days of the invasion, Russia had been subjected to some of the toughest, most all-encompassing economic and financial sanctions ever imposed on any country. 

Abandoning its “Russia-friendly” stance, Germany has taken a leading role in shaping the new sanctions regime. 

The EU – and most importantly Germany – will now gradually become independent of Russian oil and gas. 

The clearest sign of this historic shift is the decision to suspend the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which would have delivered Russian supplies directly to Germany, bypassing – and thereby further isolating – Ukraine and Poland.

Even in military terms, the invasion has been a debacle for Russia. 

Russian troops are not being welcomed as liberators, as Putin promised (and maybe even believed) – not even by Ukraine’s Russian speakers, who are resisting the invaders courageously in besieged Kharkiv, Mariupol, Mykolaiv, and elsewhere. 

Instead of the quick victory that Putin had assumed, Russian troops have failed to advance on many fronts. 

Elementary errors in logistics and low morale have not helped, but the major factor has been the Ukrainian armed forces’ shrewdness in nullifying some of Russia’s military advantage by using their local knowledge of the terrain and nimble guerilla tactics.

Most important, the Ukrainians know what they are fighting for. In contrast, Putin appears to have deceived most of his own military about the nature and objectives of his “special military operation.” 

Russian soldiers did not actually think they would be going to war against their close neighbor; now that they are there, they have no idea what they are fighting for. 

There is no discernible goal beyond the wanton destruction of Ukraine.

Sadly, no quick end to the conflict is in sight. 

Even if Russia’s military superiority in terms of force size and equipment means that Russia ends up overwhelming Ukraine’s defenses and forces the government to surrender, it cannot feasibly occupy the country. 

Geographically, Ukraine is Europe’s second-largest country. 

It is home to 44 million people, most of whom have developed strong anti-Russian sentiments after ten years of Kremlin efforts to subjugate them.

A sustained Russian military presence would be met with a sustained guerrilla war. 

And all the while, sanctions would continue to strangle the Russian economy. 

Especially now that Russian forces have been widely documented committing war crimes, Europeans’ gradual emancipation from their dependence on Russian energy will not be easily reversed. 

Returning to the conditions prevailing before the invasion is simply out of the question.

THE NEW GEOPOLITICS

A strategic blunder as massive as Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine is a rare occurrence in world affairs. 

The question now is whether Putin, feeling cornered, will compound his error by enlarging it. 

Even though NATO’s overwhelming military superiority makes an outright Russian attack on any NATO member currently seem unlikely, the risk of escalation as Russia’s military continues to take heavy losses is very high. 

Consider the recent debate over whether Polish fighter jets should be supplied to Ukraine. 

If that had happened, the Kremlin might have interpreted the transfer of offensive weaponry as tantamount to an attack on Russia. 

NATO leaders have wisely done what they can to prevent such scenarios.

Still, Russia’s slow progress against Ukrainian defenses has increased the likelihood that the conflict will escalate. 

The Russian aggressors will step up their aerial attacks and indiscriminate shelling, inflicting heavy damage on Ukrainian cities, driving up the toll of civilian casualties, and flooding the EU with millions of refugees. 

In response to mounting atrocities, Europe will feel more pressure to end all imports of Russian oil and gas, even though the economic cost of this will be immense.

The other elephant in the room is China. 

Although Chinese President Xi Jinping has now described the situation in Ukraine as a “war” – a pointed rejection of the Kremlin’s official euphemism – the world must still assume, for the time being, that China will not take any concrete steps to exert pressure on Russia or to secure a ceasefire.

The appeals for peace coming from China remain merely rhetorical. 

Now that the Chinese leadership views all global events through the lens of competition with the US, strategic considerations trump all others – even China’s stated commitment to national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference in other countries’ internal affairs. 

Although Russia is neither historically nor currently a real ally of China’s, both regimes have been brought together by their opposition to the geopolitical West. 

The question for China, then, is whether continuing to indulge this shared antagonism is worth the economic and diplomatic price.

But, given these longer-term risks to its own well-being and global standing, China’s attitude toward the war in Ukraine could well change. 

After all, a lasting disruption to world trade and oil prices above $200 per barrel would pose a big problem for a regime whose power rests heavily on its ability to deliver consistently strong GDP growth to its citizens, particularly the hundreds of millions who remain mired in poverty.

European and US political leaders should pursue closer dialogue with China about these issues. 

Moreover, they should stop shying away from acknowledging economic reality: namely, that there will be no decoupling from China. 

Rather, the West’s relationship with China will feature unavoidable confrontations over human rights and Taiwan; competition in the field of business and technology; and cooperation on major global challenges such as climate change and securing peace.

Of course, if China did step in and mediate negotiations leading to a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, it could boast of one of its greatest political successes since the People’s Republic was founded. 

But China is unlikely to assume the role of an active mediator unless success seems certain. 

As such, we should expect the country to remain on the sidelines – at least for now.

STRENGTH THROUGH ADVERSITY

Lastly, some words about Europe: 80 years after the horrors of World War II, history has returned to the continent with a vengeance. 

Despite the initial shock of Russia’s invasion, Europe has shown itself to be determined and capable in the face of war. 

It now seems clear that the EU will emerge far stronger from this crisis. 

For all the tensions within the Union, the war in Ukraine and Putin’s broader challenge to the rules-based order have brought Europeans closer together. 

Even relations with Britain are improving again.

As with the fight against the pandemic, the EU will move to adopt a second, jointly funded initiative to help weaker member-state economies weather the storm. 

EU governments are also coming together on the critical issue of a common defense policy. 

Even the sudden and heavy inflow of refugees seems unlikely to divide Europeans in the way that it did in 2015.

All of this shows that democracies are anything but helpless in the face of autocratic challengers. 

If they trust in their own strength and embrace their diversity, they will be well positioned not only to survive the coming decade of peacelessness, but to emerge stronger. 

Western democracies have succeeded in such struggles before. 

They can, and they must, do it again.

Sigmar Gabriel, a former federal minister and vice chancellor of Germany, is Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke.