IN CENTRAL ASIA, A TIMELY OPPORTUNITY FOR RUSSIA / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

In Central Asia, a Timely Opportunity for Russia

With many of its other buffers secured, Moscow will turn its attention to the east. 

By: Ekaterina Zolotova

In our 2021 annual forecast, we noted that this year, like many years before it, Russia would try to add to its strategic depth by reconstructing its near abroad, particularly Central Asia. 

Having secured its southern borders by deploying peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh and making sure that the current government in Belarus will stay close to the Kremlin, Russia sees the need to create a buffer in the east, where former Soviet states have, since the fall of the Soviet Union, claimed statehood, nationality and neutrality.

Central Asia has an important strategic position. The historic Silk Road connecting East and West passes through the territory of modern Central Asian states, and the roads leading from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region intersect there. 

Since the early 1990s, the region has served as a barrier to less densely populated and less protected Russian lands from external threats, including China's rapid development and the spread of terrorism from Afghanistan. 

The economic potential of Central Asia, with its natural resources, significant gold and foreign exchange reserves, a growing population and potentially healthy consumer base, is important too. 

This could prove handy for Russia as it looks for new markets that can buy non-oil exports.

A Forgotten Buffer

Imperial Russia’s “claims” to Central Asia date back to the 19th century, when it fortified the region against the expansion of the British Empire, but it didn’t really bring it to heel until the Soviet era. 

Moscow deepened its ties to the fledgling republics through massive financial commitments, by constructing factories and by introducing Russian as the official language. Russia also supplied everything the republics’ economies needed.

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia embraced Central Asia as a buffer to protect its now-vulnerable borders, but it wasn’t Moscow’s top priority. The main threat to Russia came from the West, so it focused more on countries such as Belarus and Ukraine. 

And unlike the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe, Central Asian states were so closely tied to Russia that they couldn’t really separate from their former overlord even if they had wanted to.

Eventually, though, as global economies became more advanced and integrated, Central Asian states tried to adopt a more-multifaceted foreign policy to strike a balance between Russia and the rest of the world. They needed economic support that they believed Russia alone could not provide.

At the time, the Kremlin didn’t interfere too much; it understood that these states were too weak and immature to chart their own course. Indeed, years under Russian and Soviet governance left a lasting impact on these countries' political systems and economies, which maintained strong centralized governments well after the fall of the union, so they were unattractive to Western businesses. 

Central Asian states thus continued to orient themselves toward Russia, which continued to guarantee security to new countries. The Kremlin was confident that it had the means to manipulate them even more when the time came.

Even so, Central Asian states have had a taste of freedom, and their governments have begun to move away from Russia accordingly. Soviet identity is disappearing, and more politicians are coming to power independently of Russian influence. They are becoming more open to trade and investment and have joined more international organizations. 

More countries, including China, the U.S. and Turkey, are thus more willing to engage Central Asia, keeping a natural check on Russian influence. (It’s worth noting, however, that Russia still has the advantage here, since, for example, Russian loans are always on more favorable terms. 

There’s also less risk to do business with Russia, which usually doesn’t draw the kinds of negative reactions, say, Chinese companies do.)

Even so, each country has its reasons for cooperating or opposing Russia. Kazakhstan – the largest country in Central Asia and, considering the size of its shared border, likely the most important country to Russia – has changed dramatically. 

In the 1950s and 1960s, for example, Kazakhs were a minority, accounting for just 30 percent of the population. They now account for nearly 70 percent. Kazakhs are increasingly nationalist and increasingly skeptical of Russian behavior in its borders.

In Uzbekistan, the country’s president is implementing new reforms to make Uzbekistan more attractive for foreign investments. It is categorically neutral, much to the chagrin of Russia, and has proved difficult for Moscow to absorb into its Eurasian Economic Union. 

Russia is trying to prove that entry into the EAEU will give Uzbek producers equal access to other EAEU markets (primarily Russia and Kazakhstan), equal conditions for migrant laborers, and access to Russian investment resources and technologies. 

In this context, Uzbekistan, which needs additional markets, is having a hard time acting decisively.

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are mired in their own problems, and need too many resources that Russia cannot provide. Tajikistan lacks a foundation for economic restoration and is buckling more and more under the weight of its debt. 

It has asked investor countries to postpone its debt payments (and interest on them) until mid-2021; doing so would allow it to divert funds to the social sector, including health care, to combat COVID-19. Turkmenistan’s economy is in worse shape than usual, with a fair amount of food shortages to boot.

Acting Quickly

Indeed, the coronavirus pandemic has directly or indirectly affected all the republics of Central Asia. Social restrictions have hurt the economy, especially because of reduced remittances of migrant workers. This has presented an opportunity to Russia, which will try to win Central Asia over by economic rather than military means. 

The new approach reflects Russia’s long-term need to diversify its economy and aligns with Central Asia’s desire to modernize and grow its economies too. Moscow sees these interests as complementary and so has already begun to actively offer cooperation. 

For example, Moscow announced that it is ready to expand cooperation with Uzbekistan in power generation, to create joint oil and gas projects worth more than $75 million, and to coordinate production of a COVID-19 vaccine with Kazakhstan .

Helping Russia in this regard is the competition between China and the U.S. Central Asian economies that rely on both will have a hard time choosing between the two, lest they be subject to reprisals from either. That leaves Russia to pick up the pieces.

This all works so long as Central Asia is more or less stable. And the stability of the region will depend at least in part on Afghanistan. And Russia is the first country that will be happy to provide military support if the countries ask for help, as it can increase Moscow’s position in the region. Rumors persist that some in the Taliban intend to start hostilities in Tajikistan. 

In December, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow was concerned about the continuing degradation of the situation in Afghanistan. Islamic State militants are concentrating in the north of the country for expansion into Central Asia. 

Central Asia, already rife with ethno-religious tension and economic problems, could be fertile ground for continued violence.

Russia wants to be the major power in Central Asia. It’s well positioned to be just that, but it needs regional states not to rush from one strong ally – such as China and the U.S. – to another. It also needs to keep them from being too nationalist or economically competitive.

These countries are now more vulnerable than ever, but as they gradually recover, they will soon begin to define their interests more clearly – interests that may or may not align with Russia’s. 

Russia understands it must act quickly if it wants to balance the growing influence of the West and China, maintain its military presence and strengthen its economic influence.