WHAT RUSSIA EXPECTS FROM THE NEXT U.S. PRESIDENT / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

What Russia Expects From the Next US President

The current uncertainty benefits the Kremlin.

By: Ekaterina Zolotova

Though legal challenges remain, Joe Biden seems as though he will be the next U.S. president. Russia is in no hurry to congratulate him on his victory. For all its disagreements with President Donald Trump, Russia saw him as a known entity. It doesn’t feel the same way about Biden. But the uncertainty works in Russia’s favor. 

The Biden administration will be so absorbed in its own problems that it may have less time to be active in distant frontiers or to become embroiled in new foreign policy commitments and challenge Russia’s stance in foreign theaters. This gives Russia room to maneuver and strengthen its influence in some vulnerable post-Soviet countries before the inauguration.

The Kremlin believes relations with the U.S. will, at best, stay as frosty as they are now. More realistically, it expects Washington to be tougher on Moscow by, for example, activating NATO on the Eastern European frontier, which Russia considers as a threat to its security. 

Biden is likely to revive the U.S.-Germany defense relationship, too, and will increase operational presence in Eastern Europe. During the campaign, Biden even said he might put additional sanctions on Russia for the poisoning of Alexei Navalny.

But Russia knows Biden, like Trump, has limits, and it knows his primary objective will be to rehabilitate relations with Germany and NATO – hence why sanctions will likely not affect Russian finance or exports. Indeed, with winter coming at the heels of the lockdown in Europe, Russia is still one of the only viable sources of energy for much of the Continent. 

And until all U.S. legal issues surrounding the election are settled, Russia will have time to finish the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project. (Though the U.S. Congress recently agreed to include new sanctions against the project, Biden is unlikely to impose harsh sanctions against German companies so that he can salvage relations the Europeans, and besides, the project is so close to completion that there's not much the U.S. can do at this point.)

One thing the next U.S. president’s policy will do is pay closer attention to post-Soviet countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Belarus – anywhere in the Russian buffer zone Moscow wants to restore its influence. 

In the past five or so years, the U.S. has taken a relatively hands-off approach to these countries. (Even the financial support it has allocated to Ukraine hasn’t been enough to make much of a difference.) The status quo served U.S. interests, and there was no need (or appetite) to spend more resources. 

But as Russia’s influence in these areas grows, potentially shifting the strategic balance of power in Moscow’s favor, the US. will be compelled to act. Russia won’t stop on its own accord; the stability of its borders and the preservation of the buffer zone is too important. 

The obstacles that stood in Russia’s way – the frozen conflict in Donbass, the threat of a change of friendly government in Belarus, the strengthening of Azerbaijani-Turkish cooperation – may be less insurmountable for the next few months.

And there’s evidence to suggest Russia is starting to capitalize on the opportunity. In the South Caucasus, it is already enhancing its presence. After nearly three months of violent clashes, Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed to a Russia-brokered cease-fire over Nagorno-Karabakh, which has enabled Russia to deploy peacekeepers and equipment for five years, with the possibility of extension. 

The Defense Ministry also plans to set up 16 observation posts along the line of contact in the Lachin corridor and military police units to keep the peace. The agreement gives the Kremlin the right to bring in experienced military personnel to conduct a peacekeeping mission in one of the most unstable areas of the South Caucasus, restores Moscow's presence in the South Caucasus and reestablishes its position as the main player in the region. The ability to monitor Turkish activity in the Caucasus is certainly an added benefit.

In Belarus, Russia has been able to do nearly whatever it wants. After the contested presidential election in August, Russia was worried that it could lose its stalwart ally in President Alexander Lukashenko. With all the unrest that followed, Lukashenko had no choice but to strengthen cooperation with Russia to stay in power. 

In addition to its overt support for the government in Minsk, Moscow renewed its interest in the Union State project and is seeking to sign roadmaps for deepening integration. Until the U.S. decides whether it wants to support the opposition, Moscow will have time to enhance its presence.

Ukraine is more difficult. In the long term, the U.S. will likely intensify military assistance to the government in Kyiv, which is generally more pro-West than its predecessor. But in the short term, Russia can use a moment of silence in American administration and promote its interests. 

Moscow probably won’t be able to reach pre-revolution levels of influence in Ukraine, or resolve the frozen conflict in Donbass, or answer the lingering questions in Crimea, but it has a chance to promote the implementation of the Minsk agreements and reject Ukrainian plans for resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine – especially at a time when Ukraine itself is drowning in political scandal.

Washington will thus continue to support Ukrainian reforms and continue to put pressure on Russia. But while the United States is busy sorting out its own election results, and the transfer of power promises to be difficult, Russia has time for a subtle but extremely important maneuver. 

In some ways, the Kremlin even expects a more predictable foreign policy from the U.S. – meaning, the extension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, an agreement between Russia and the United States that limits their nuclear arsenals. 

The question is how much Russia is willing to risk while Washington is busy counting votes and transferring power.