TURKEY AND FRANCE: MORE THAN JUST A WAR OF WORDS / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Turkey and France: More Than Just a War of Words

For Paris, the latest tiff is about reclaiming its influence. For Ankara, it’s about distracting its citizens. 

By: Caroline D. Rose

Last month, a cartoon depicting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan lounging in his underwear graced the cover of French magazine Charlie Hebdo. The publication once again raised eyebrows in Europe, but it raised tempers in Ankara, especially following a quarrel between Erdogan and French President Emmanuel Macron that quickly escalated into personal insults, a diplomatic showdown and a boycott on French goods.

Direct military conflict is not in the cards, but the dispute is more than just a dramatic war of words. The latest spat has been co-opted by both France and Turkey as an opportunity to garner regional credibility and apply an ideological-religious dimension to their rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

For France, it’s about earning credibility in the EU and among Eastern Mediterranean allies. For Turkey, it’s about distracting its citizens from financial hardship and positioning itself as the leader of the Sunni Islamic world. And for both, the means to their respective ends is to broaden existing divisions.

Water and Oil

The row began with a debate over the role of political Islam in French society. After a string of terrorist incidents, Macron said that political Islam was "in crisis" all over the world and incompatible with stability, that France would fight Islamic separatism, and that the government would respond to the attacks with reform. 

Though the next presidential election isn’t until 2022, the fear over Islamic extremism and terrorism, combined with the stress of COVID-19, has put the president and his government under pressure to act. Within days of the attacks, the French government cracked down on Islamist groups such as the Turkish nationalist Grey Wolves and announced that later this year it would amend a 1905 law that will further prohibit outward displays of religious affiliation and increase oversight over Muslim communities to curb foreign funding and influence.

Turkey, which fancies itself as a leader of the Islamic community, was quick to respond. Erdogan criticized Macron for peddling Islamophobic narratives, saying Islam did not need to be “fixed” and that the French president needed “some sort of mental treatment,” and called on Islamic nations to condemn France for its treatment of Muslims and to boycott French-produced goods. 

Erdogan’s comment on mental health was apparently the final straw; Paris made the unprecedented move of recalling its ambassador and warned Ankara of its “dangerous” course of policy.

France and Turkey have locked horns over domestic issues before but share a deeper divergence on foreign policy – particularly throughout the Mediterranean region. Both countries have faced off there before, such as when Ankara and Paris backed opposite sides in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars. 

Turkey’s steadfast support of Sunni Islamism has led Ankara to fund, supply and back ideologically aligned factions like the Government of National Accord in western Libya and anti-government militia Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria. These stand in direct opposition to the French-supported Libyan National Government in eastern Libya and Kurdish militants operating in northern Syria.

Both countries also have incompatible strategies regarding the Mediterranean’s natural resources. France’s energy giant, Total, has a large stake in several energy projects in the Mediterranean’s “energy triangle.” 

Turkey, which has little proven hydrocarbon resources in its own waters, has turned its attention toward proven fields in disputed maritime zones – sites of projects in which Total operates and in which France has a strategic interest. 

France has sided with a burgeoning regional coalition – the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, comprising Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Italy, Israel and the Palestinian Territories – in opposing Turkish encroachment in Mediterranean waters. And within the past two years, Paris has become one of the most vocal to lobby against Turkish moves both inside and outside of the Eastern Mediterranean.

France’s Stake

To establish its influence in the Mediterranean and Europe, Paris has adopted an unforgiving position against Turkey. In May, it took a central role in a mission to uphold an arms embargo on Libya by deploying an anti-aircraft frigate and a La Fayette-class frigate to the region. French vessels were especially suspicious of foreign-flagged vessels suspected to be Turkish smugglers aiding Libya’s GNA.

But France believes the EU offers greater space to maneuver. Answering the calls of Greece and Cyprus, Paris has consistently lobbied for sanctions against Turkey and has called for European countries to join forces to create a “Pax Mediterranea.” In the long run, France means to reclaim influence the EU has lost in the Mediterranean and, in doing so, edge out its top European rival, Germany, for the role. 

(In the past, the EU usually deferred to France on most southern European issues. But as energy opportunities and fresh conflicts have come to light, Germany and the European Council have asserted more oversight, passing over more hardline French-Greek-Cypriot proposals in favor of mediation and de-escalation.)

All the while, France has tried to turn the EU against Turkey, and the most recent dispute with Ankara has given EU leaders a stronger case to do so. Erdogan’s comments against Macron, for example, were met with condemnation from EU allies. The EU’s top diplomat, the president of the European Council, and even the German foreign minister issued harsh statements condemning Turkey. 

An EU spokesman also hinted the EU would soon organize an emergency meeting to discuss a response, sending a message to Ankara that the EU expects “a change in action and declarations.” France has failed before in convincing its hesitant EU peers to sanction Turkey, but its latest tiff with Ankara has given it more ammunition for the next round of talks.

Turkey’s Intentions

For its part, Turkey has maintained the tempo of contested energy exploration missions and of gunboat diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, even as it sees an opportunity to turn this geopolitical dispute into an ideological-religious dispute that could help the ruling party maintain political popularity. 

Turkey’s deteriorating economy has prompted Erdogan to manufacture a series of foreign policy distractions that could at least temporarily shift domestic attention abroad, garner support among the party’s nationalist, conservative Muslim political base, and position itself as a leader of the Islamic world.

Erdogan is attempting to elevate Turkey as the inheritor of Sunni Islamic leadership. 

This year alone, Turkey converted the Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque and has adopted the Palestinian cause. The spat with France, then, plays into his hands – all part of his neo-Ottoman strategy. 

By criticizing Macron and calling for a boycott, Erdogan is brandishing his Islamic bona fides and whipping up enthusiasm among his supporters. It’s right out of his playbook for 2018, when he did something similar when the value of the lira went into free fall.

But this time, Turkey’s call among Muslim countries broadened the boycott’s effect, leading Qatari and Kuwaiti supermarket chains to drop French products in stores and pressure French supermarket chain Carrefour in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 

Turkey was also successful in getting Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and Malaysia to condemn France’s handling of its Muslim communities, even inciting dayslong anti-France protests in Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, India and Bangladesh.

The Justice and Development Party, or AKP, is still the most popular party in Turkey, but because of a weakening currency and domestic instability, its numbers are starting to slip. That gives Erdogan a smaller margin for error.

Recent polls have shown that the Turkish government’s strategy to retain political popularity is slipping. Short-term distractions can preoccupy Turkish citizens for only so long. Erdogan’s AKP continues to hold a majority, but smaller margins of popularity will dissuade the government from major missteps. 

While Turkey may try hard to shroud its rivalry with France as an unyielding clash of civilizations, the reality of EU sanctions, eagerly led by France, will increase the pressure on Ankara. 

The war of words may soon die down, but the Turkish-French rivalry is not going anywhere.