By: Jacek Bartosiak
In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, which compelled the U.S. Navy and other NATO countries to demonstrate their overwhelming land-attack capabilities in the Black Sea.
Their combined resources and capabilities frightened Russian decision-makers to the point that military officials informed President Vladimir Putin that the Black Sea Fleet would not be able to stop Western forces from destroying Sochi – southern Russia’s unofficial capital, where Putin (like Stalin before him) stays for up to six months each year – and striking any Russian targets throughout the Black Sea Basin.
The Russian leadership then set out to strengthen the Black Sea Fleet, including by restoring submarine-deployed cruise missiles and introducing a Bastion coastal defense missile system.
But the modernization efforts failed to alter the overall balance of power in the Black Sea that had been in place since the collapse of the Soviet empire, in part because Russia did not yet have full control of Crimea and in part because the Black Sea Fleet’s operations have expanded widely over the past several years.
The Soviets’ Foray Into the Mediterranean
To change the balance of power in the Black Sea region, the Russians would need to be able to block the passage of NATO ships through the Bosporus.
To achieve this goal, they need a forward sea presence at the southern European perimeter beyond the Bosporus in the Mediterranean. If this could be achieved, the Turkish Straits could be defended from Western navies, which could then be blocked from entering the Black Sea.
The Bosporus would then become the first bolted position on the outskirts of the Mediterranean, turning the Black Sea Basin essentially into an additional buffer against the West and shielding Crimea, the Don and Volga areas – the soft underbelly of Russia – and of course the southern capital, Sochi.
The Soviet Union tried to create such a buffer by establishing a Mediterranean squadron that would operate separately from the Black Sea Fleet. At its peak, the squadron numbered 30-50 ships.
Its primary task was to block the freedom of action of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea as well as to support Arab client countries. Essentially, its goal was to keep the Turks below the 43rd parallel (in the southern Black Sea) and the Americans behind the 23rd meridian (west of the British Isles).
When the Soviet Union, which was never a real naval power, collapsed, the Black Sea squadron’s escapades into the Mediterranean also ended. The Black Sea, like the Baltic, was no longer dominated by the continental empire. That opened these waters to U.S. influence and began the process of Western expansion into Eastern Europe that brought with it the establishment of democratic systems.
A Grand Return
The Russians used the civil war in Syria as a convenient excuse to make a grand return to the Levant and the Eastern Mediterranean. The focus was on securing the port of Tartus and providing air cover for land operations and sea communication to the air base in Hmeimim, Syria. Generally speaking, the Russian fleet coped poorly with the task set for it in Moscow.
This is evidenced by the fact that within the Russian armed forces, which are undergoing major organizational shifts, the navy does not wield sufficient influence among the top brass.
In Syria, the Russian navy has produced mixed results. Frigates, corvettes and submarines have been deployed and have launched Kalibr missiles at a number of enemy targets. Perhaps the navy’s most impressive strike early in the campaign came on Oct. 7, 2015, Putin’s birthday, when four flotilla corvettes in the Caspian fired 26 Kalibr NK 3M14 missiles with a range of 1,500 kilometers (930 miles) over Iranian and Iraqi airspace at targets in Syria.
A total of about 25 volleys and 140 missiles were fired, some by Black Sea Fleet frigates located in the Mediterranean approximately 160 kilometers from the Syrian coast. On average, one salvo consisted of 4-8 missiles.
Kilo-class submarines also fired cruise missiles – a total of about 40 pieces at an average distance of 400-900 kilometers deep into Syria. Though Kalibr missiles have proved to be a good weapon system, the Russians do not have enough of them in stock, a problem the French have also had to deal with in their operations in Libya and Syria.
It’s noteworthy, however, that the Syrian factions on which the Kalibr missiles were tested do not have anti-aircraft defense or modern radars, so the weapon has not been properly tested against a professional, sophisticated opponent.
They are also rather expensive, costing up to $6.5 million per piece. And although they are theoretically difficult to detect, their overall effectiveness, beyond demonstrating to the U.S. and other Western countries Russia’s capability to strike from a distance, is difficult to gauge.
The Fleet’s Shortcomings
The other traditional capabilities of the Russian fleet fared much worse. In 2016, the Kuznetsov aircraft carrier, accompanied by the Pyotr Velikiy nuclear cruiser, two rocket frigates and logistics ships, was sent to the Mediterranean Sea.
The squadron left from Severomorsk and while sailing along Europe’s northern rim, the Kuznetsov cruised at less than 10 nautical miles per hour and released plumes of smoke that indicated serious engine failure and poor propulsion. The ship has been waiting for repairs since returning to its home port in February 2017.
The Kuznetsov is able to carry up to 50 planes and helicopters, but when it passed Gibraltar, it had only 10 Su-33, four new MiG-29K and a few helicopters. The reason was the lack of pilots trained to fly aircraft stationed on a carrier and the lack of operational equipment.
Since the Kuznetsov has no catapult, the planes take off from the ramp with the help of afterburners, but in this case the low speed of the ship (it needs to sail at a minimum of 20 nautical miles per hour) prevented combat launch.
In total, on-board aircraft made only 420 combat flights over Syria, of which as many as two-thirds were from land bases in Syria. In addition, two planes crashed from the sea due to a chassis failure and poor pilot training.
Meanwhile, the Pyotr Velikiy battlecruiser participated in very few operations because it did not have the capacity to strike at land from the sea; with ongoing renovations, this is expected to change.
Russian maritime logistics performed better than the fighting fleet. Russian vessels sailed constantly from Russian ports across the Bosporus to Syria, mainly along the Novorossiysk-Bosporus-Tartus route, transporting up to 100,000 metric tons of cargo per month. This was done thanks to the mobilization of a landing fleet that included ships made in the PRL – the Toad 775 project, which can carry a Russian marine battalion and 12 tanks with supplies.
In addition, civilian ships carrying civilian crews were purchased in Turkey, Greece and even Ukraine and painted in the Black Sea Fleet colors so that they would not be stopped by the Turks on the Bosporus.
Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria and Libya could be a step toward achieving Moscow’s goal of shielding the Black Sea from Western influence.
But a number of other pivotal changes would need to be made before it can really alter the balance of power in its favor, especially as other powers grow increasingly interested in establishing a foothold in the region.
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