But if the purpose of the blockade was to squeeze Qatar into submission, it failed. As early as September 2017, Doha was sending $30 million in aid to victims of Hurricane Harvey in the United States. And as late as May 2019, Doha was sending $480 million in aid to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. And some of its import losses were mitigated by the opening in September 2017 of Hamad Port, which can handle nearly 8 million metric tons of cargo annually. The diplomatic aspects of the blockade are no more ironclad than the economic. Just last week, representatives from Doha were invited to attend the Saudi-led emergency meetings on May 30 to defuse tensions in the Middle East. This is hardly the fallout one would expect for a country under siege.
So why did the blockade fail? As with all things Middle East, the answers are many. First, there’s somewhat of a consensus that the quartet miscalculated how steadfast Washington’s support would be. It’s true that the Trump administration has been a much better friend to Saudi Arabia than had been its predecessor – the president’s first foreign trip was to Riyadh, where he pledged billions of dollars in arms sales – and it’s true that he immediately supported the Qatari embargo. But it’s also true that the U.S wants to maintain its access to the Al-Udeid Air Base, which hosts countless U.S. aircraft, including fighters, bombers, tankers and reconnaissance planes, and has played a central role in Washington’s air campaign against the Islamic State. It houses more U.S. troops than any other base in the Middle East and hosts the headquarters of Air Force Central Command. It’s little wonder that Doha pledged nearly $2 billion in January to upgrade the air base. (Not coincidentally, Qatar is also a major patron of the U.S. defense industry, buying $12 billion worth of F-15s last year.) In the end, practicality won out.
Second, Qatar was saved by what Qatar does best: being rich. After the blockade was imposed, Qatar had to scramble to find new trade partners to make up for the shortfall in imports. And so it reached out to nontraditional partners such as Germany in late 2018, promising to invest more than $11 billion in German energy and finance to encourage stronger bilateral commercial ties. It also had to dip into its sovereign wealth fund (to the tune of $50 billion as of May 2018) to offset the damage of the blockade, ramping certain domestic industries and creating others from scratch.
But after this early scramble, Qatar recovered pretty easily because it was still able to trade its oil and gas relatively unabated. It exported roughly 81 million tons of natural gas in 2017, accounting for roughly 28 percent of global gas trade that year. (It continued to export roughly 600,000 barrels of oil per day.) All told, Qatar’s economy actually grew after the imposition of the blockade, by 1.6 percent in 2017 and by an estimated 2.2 percent in 2018, according to the International Monetary Fund.
The third reason the blockade failed is Turkey. On June 7, 2017, just two days after the embargo’s imposition, the Turkish parliament ratified an agreement that allowed Turkish troops to be in Qatar and approved an accord on military training cooperation. These moves mean little in and of themselves, but recall that one of the quartet’s demands for lifting the blockade was the removal of Turkey’s military presence from Qatar. It was a signal to Doha that amid the GCC’s hostility and Washington’s ambivalence, Ankara had its back. In fact, Turkey was among the first to step in to replenish Qatar’s food supply. From 2016 to 2017, Turkish exports to Qatar increased 50 percent, and in 2017, Turkey was the eighth-largest destination for Qatari exports. (Some supply routes were also rerouted through Turkey.) Their friendship has remained relatively strong ever since. In August 2018, the Qatari emir pledged to invest $15 billion in Turkey’s economy, including a $3 billion currency swap, just as the value of the lira was plummeting. Bilateral trade between Qatar and Turkey reached approximately $2 billion in 2018, and Turkish and Qatari officials have said they want to raise that figure to $5 billion over the next few years.
Put simply, the quartet overplayed their hand by underestimating the extent to which certain allies would come to Qatar’s defense. And it may not have mattered in any case, because Qatar’s wealth enabled the government to absorb whatever blows came from the blockade and adjust its economy accordingly. (Kuwait’s efforts to mediate the conflict, which were rumored to involve a military invasion by the quartet, deserve an honorable mention.)
Complicity
The blockade of Qatar isn’t interesting because it failed. It’s interesting because of what its failure means for the region.
The U.S. hasn’t yet thrown the weight of its full support behind any one country. Its newly rekindled romance with Saudi Arabia was cooled by the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Its on-again, off-again relationship with Turkey remains largely unchanged; Washington and Ankara disagree on any number of issues, but their strategic relationship is too important to forego. Likewise, the U.S. is clearly not prepared to throw Qatar under the bus even if it wanted to, since doing so would deprive it of one of its most important military bases in the region. One issue that could pit the U.S. against Qatar, and promote even more cooperation between it and Qatar’s Arab Gulf neighbors, is Iran, whom Washington seems determined to confront. Even then, Doha is unlikely to side wholesale with either party.
Similarly, Qatar is unlikely to go all in on its relationship with Turkey. For all the newfound cooperation between the two, the economic deals signed so far mean more to Qatar than they do to Turkey, whose bilateral trade with Qatar accounts for just a small portion of its total trade portfolio. The deals were designed to be short-term solutions for short-term problems, leaving open the possibility of working more closely together in the future, or less if the circumstances so dictate. And Doha has plenty of reason to want the wiggle room. We at GPF are on record as saying we expect Turkey to be the dominant force in the Middle East. It has the geostrategic location, the advantageous population, a suitable economy and military, and the Islamic bona fides to make it happen. And if it does, it will come at the expense of Saudi Arabia. That’s not the sole reason Ankara supported Qatar throughout the blockade, but it was certainly an added benefit. Any low-cost chance to alienate and disempower its rivals in Riyadh is probably too good an opportunity to pass up.
Perhaps the most ironic part of this entire episode is that Saudi Arabia was complicit in its own disempowerment. By trying to undercut Turkey, Saudi Arabia ended up enabling it to expand its role in the Middle East by supporting Qatar. By murdering Jamal Khashoggi, Riyadh bought itself only negative attention, undercutting its efforts to curry international support for the blockade by portraying Qatar as a rogue regime, only to be considered guilty of crimes just as bad in the eyes of the international community. It’s difficult to see this as anything less than a deficiency in Saudi hard power.
It seems as though the only country able to capitalize on the Qatar blockade was Qatar itself. The boycott was supposed to be punishment. Instead, it was validation. Some of the allies it made over the years, especially Turkey, were all but forced to come to its aid. For Qatar, it’ll be important to know who’s on its side in the coming decades as Turkey and Saudi Arabia vie for supremacy in the Middle East – to say nothing of a potential conflict with Iran – but it’s hard to see Doha changing its behavior anytime soon. Turkey can never replace the United States as an ally, nor are Qatar’s ties with the U.S. or Turkey or anyone else strong enough for Doha to fully break with Saudi Arabia. What’s certain is that Qatar isn’t nearly as scared of Saudi Arabia as it once was.
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