EUROPE RISKS FAILURE ON MIGRATION / THE FINANCIAL TIMES OP EDITORIAL

Europe risks failure on migration

While the EU tries to agree a policy, nativist politicians are whipping up prejudice

Tony Barber



There is a refugee and migrant question in Europe. But is it a crisis? Measured by the actual numbers of refugees and irregular migrants arriving this year in the 28-nation EU, there is no crisis. Measured by the impact on European politics, however, there is a serious one and it shows no sign of fading away.

This crisis expresses itself in poisonous, polarising debates about national identity and the place of Islam in Europe. It generates support for radical rightwing parties, such as Italy’s League, which entered the government in June and has turned into the nation’s most dynamic political force. It drives centre-right parties further to the right. As in Germany, it undermines coalition governments that it made difficult to form in the first place.

The crisis also fuels mistrust between some western European governments and societies and some in central and eastern Europe. It paralyses efforts to reform the EU and to strengthen its core, the 19-nation eurozone. Lastly, it harms the EU’s reputation as a foreign policy actor and damages relations with neighbours, especially in north Africa.

Viewed from some parts of the world, the European agitation over refugees and migrants can often seem obsessive. According to the UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, there are 68.5m forcibly displaced people in the world, of whom 25.4m are refugees. The burden of caring for refugees in countries such as Iran, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey is higher than in the EU. Jordan has 89 refugees for every 1,000 inhabitants.

By contrast, just over 60,000 migrants and refugees crossed the Mediterranean into Europe between January 1 and August 12, says the UN’s International Organisation for Migration. Almost 120,000 did so during the same period of 2017. The EU’s population is roughly 510m. If the bloc were to receive 100,000 refugees and migrants this year, that would represent about one person for every 5,000 inhabitants.

In 2015, when more than 1m refugees and migrants entered Europe, largely from conflict-ridden Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, the challenge was much more substantial. However, rather than overwhelming the EU’s financial resources or administrative capacities, this wave of arrivals put the spotlight on a quite different problem — the inability of national governments to agree among themselves on how, indeed whether, to share responsibility for the newcomers. This problem persists to the present day. But it is a European political crisis, not a refugee and migrant crisis.

In some countries, public perceptions depart wildly from the facts. According to the European Commission’s latest Eurobarometer survey, released in June, EU citizens as a whole regard immigration and terrorism as the most important issues facing the bloc. Some 38 per cent of respondents put immigration top of the list. Terrorism was second at 29 per cent.

Yet attitudes across the EU differ considerably from nation to nation. The four countries ranked most averse to non-European immigration were the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia, where at least 80 per cent of respondents expressed negative feelings. Compared with elsewhere in the EU, however, none of these countries is host to large numbers of asylum-seekers or any other kind of non-Europeans.

Small, recently independent states, with little historical experience of receiving uninvited outsiders, are no doubt more apprehensive about perceived risks to culture and identity than are larger countries with a tradition of imperialism and immigration. This is understandable and justifies a refugee and migrant policy more tailored to national conditions than the rigid formulas too often devised in Brussels.

However, what is inexcusable is the way that politicians whip up anti-immigrant prejudice to court popularity, win elections and consolidate their grip on power. Western Europeans like to point the finger at Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister, and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Poland’s de facto leader. But there are plenty of similar examples in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.

What can be done? EU authorities rightly contend that to win public trust on immigration they must exert stricter control over the bloc’s external borders and crack down on people traffickers. But every national leader should also muster the courage to present the case for well-run, legal migration routes, reformed asylum procedures and proper treatment of refugees under international law. Recent initiatives do not inspire confidence.

In June, EU leaders discussed setting up “controlled centres” for irregular arrivals on European soil and “ regional disembarkation arrangements” for people rescued at sea. Whatever one makes of these Orwellian phrases, it beggars belief that the leaders aired their ideas without agreeing which EU countries might construct such centres, and without holding prior talks with north African governments about the crucial role they are expected to play.

Even if successful, these initiatives would leave other problems to fester. The most pernicious is that anti-immigrant demagoguery has become part and parcel of European politics. This not only pollutes the public sphere and hinders the search for solutions. It also increases the risk that the EU will be underprepared for the next big refugee and migrant wave, whenever it comes.