THE OUTLOOK
September 22, 2013, 3:55 p.m. ET
Rethinking Fannie, Freddie—and the 30-Year Mortgage
Washington Ponders How to Reshape the Mortgage Market
By NICK TIMIRAOS
The firms are proving to be as difficult to shut down as  the U.S.-operated Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba. Republicans and Democrats are  deeply divided over what to do. On the surface, the disagreements concern what  role the government should play in the mortgage market. 
But the real debate boils down to this: Should all  Americans continue to have relatively easy access to the pre-payable, 30-year,  fixed-rate mortgage?
 
American homeowners love the 30-year mortgage, which  isn't available in most other countries. It provides payments that are stable  for the life of the loan, which makes finances easier to manage. In many other  countries, homes are financed with adjustable-rate mortgages, where payments  rise and fall with prevailing interest rates.
The government plays an unusually large role in the U.S.  mortgage market because banks don't like holding 30-year mortgages. During the  1980s, many savings-and-loan associations failed when rates jumped because the  interest they had to pay to depositors soared above the payments they received  on those 30-year mortgages. This is known as "interest-rate risk."
This middleman role is important. It matches banks with  pension funds and other investors that are more willing to take on the  interest-rate risk. The companies also set uniform standards that facilitated  very liquid securities markets. The 30-year mortgage is available mainly because  of government guarantees—implied before the crisis and explicit since  2008.
Those who want the government out of the mortgage  business say the 30-year fixed isn't all it's cracked up to be. Because  borrowers pay a lot of interest during the first few years of the loan, it's  hard to quickly build equity. This makes the loan less practical in an era where  people move, switch jobs, and get divorced more often than in the past.
Defenders, however, say it's the wrong time to push more  people into adjustable-rate loans because interest rates are likely to rise over  the coming decade.
Wouldn't banks still offer the 30-year fixed mortgage  without a government guarantee if it's so popular? Maybe, but they would likely  require bigger down payments and higher rates.
It's a math issue. There is nearly $10 trillion in  mortgage debt outstanding today with around $4.5 trillion backed by Fannie and  Freddie. Scrapping the government's role means finding trillions of dollars  ready to absorb the credit and interest-rate risk for new mortgages,  since the firms have backed around two-thirds of those made since 2009.
Of course, every overhaul plan calls for more private  capital. That goal faces three challenges:
First, private capital had a lousy  track record during the bubble. Loans securitized without government backing  performed worse than Fannie's or Freddie's, largely because investors relied too  heavily on triple-A ratings. 
Between 2006 and 2012, Fannie, Freddie, and federal agencies suffered $206 billion in mortgage losses, or around 3.9% of all loans they guaranteed, according to data from Moody's Analytics. Privately issued securities, by contrast, faced $449 billion in losses, or 20% of all loans.
Between 2006 and 2012, Fannie, Freddie, and federal agencies suffered $206 billion in mortgage losses, or around 3.9% of all loans they guaranteed, according to data from Moody's Analytics. Privately issued securities, by contrast, faced $449 billion in losses, or 20% of all loans.
Second, a mostly private market could  further concentrate lending in the largest banks—exacerbating the "too big to  fail" problema. In 2008, the top five banks in Canada, the U.K. and Australia,  for example, funded more than half of all mortgages. During the crisis, many  European banks were viewed as implicitly guaranteed by the government. In the  U.S., pushing more mortgages into federally insured banks also doesn't get the  government off the hook, a lesson already learned during the S&L crises of  the 1980s.
Third, private capital takes on more  risk in good times but exits quickly at the first sign of trouble. This tends to  magnify the boom-and-bust nature of real estate. Downturns are worse because  credit is hardest to find when it's most needed.
During the bank runs of the Great Depression, panicked  depositors pulled their money from banks, afraid that the institutions wouldn't  survive. In 2007, the mortgage market faced its own series of runs as investors  liquidated their mortgage bonds, unsure over the quality of loans backing their  investments. Securitization markets are particularly vulnerable to runs because  the first seller suffers the smallest loss. 
Several overhaul proposals propose creating federal  reinsurance for mortgage-backed securities. Any government guarantee would be  explicit and paid for by investors, akin to deposit insurance provided by the  Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
Government insurance solves some problems while creating  others. Chiefly, taxpayers could face losses if capital levels or fees are set  too low for this new insurance.
Fannie and Freddie, which held far too little capital to  withstand the downturn, had for years argued successfully that higher capital  standards translated to more costly mortgages, meaning less homeownership.  Today, some worry that the housing industry would eventually make similar  arguments for lower fees.
No one said an overhaul would be easy. Ultimately,  Washington will have to be honest about what it wants and what that will  cost.
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