The perils of mutual miscalculation
By Philip Stephens
Published: January 13 2011 21:57
One of the under-reported changes in the global geopolitical balance last year was the US’s return to Asia. One of the worrying changes was the notable deterioration in the Sino-American relationship. On this much Barack Obama and Hu Jintao should be able to agree during the Chinese president’s upcoming visit to the White House.
.
It is when they turn to the “why” that things are likely to get tricky. “You started it” has thus far been the shared refrain. So Mr Hu will be tempted to protest that the second of the two developments flowed from the first: the chill was a consequence of a US strategy to contain China. Mr Obama’s riposte will be that America’s diplomatic and military re-engagement in the region was an inevitable response to China’s decision to throw its weight around.
It is when they turn to the “why” that things are likely to get tricky. “You started it” has thus far been the shared refrain. So Mr Hu will be tempted to protest that the second of the two developments flowed from the first: the chill was a consequence of a US strategy to contain China. Mr Obama’s riposte will be that America’s diplomatic and military re-engagement in the region was an inevitable response to China’s decision to throw its weight around.
This, of course, is before the two leaders get to the economics. Most of the headlines from Mr Hu’s state visit next week will probably be generated by differences over trade and exchange rate policy. China’s huge trade surplus generates strong protectionist pressure in the US. Washington’s oft-repeated demand for revaluation of the renminbi is seen in Beijing as unwarranted intrusion in China’s economic affairs.
.
These are the issues where the domestic political pressures most obviously bite. Mr Obama is presiding over a jobless recovery. Mr Hu is under constant pressure from the Chinese exporters who have driven the country’s growth. That said, there are mechanisms to manage the differences; and they tend to simmer rather than explode.
Taking a longer view, the success or failure of the White House summit will depend on whether the two presidents manage to break out of the loop of deepening mistrust over the balance of power in east Asia. The dangerous flashpoints in the relationship are to be found on the Korean peninsula and the seas off China’s eastern coastline.
On the face of it, there are powerful incentives to defuse the tensions. Neither country has anything to gain from an escalation of what already looks like an east Asian arms race. Both, albeit in different ways, are threatened by the unpredictability of the nuclear-armed regime in Pyongyang.
On the other hand, mutual mistrust and competing interests do not make for easy compromise. The obstacles were underscored during Robert Gates’s visit to Beijing this week. The US defence secretary had intended a confidence-building trip in the wake of last year’s spats about Taiwan, North Korea and the two countries’ maritime rights in the South China Sea.
The response of the People’s Liberation Army was to stage-manage the maiden flight of its new stealth fighter jet only hours before Mr Gates’s meeting with Mr Hu. The test of the hitherto secret J-20 inevitably fanned speculation about a power grab by China’s military chiefs. Mr Gates remarked that even the Chinese president seemed surprised by the timing of the PLA’s latest show of military prowess.
Chinese foreign policy experts acknowledge the rising influence of the PLA. Some of them worry about it. China’s economic rise, they say, has made the case for a rapid expansion of military capabilities to match the country’s burgeoning interests and vulnerabilities. The booming economy has provided the PLA with the wherewithal, while its leadership has proved adept at harnessing popular nationalism.
The risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation reach beyond the particular ambitions of the PLA. Washington, too, has its hawks. What’s worrying is that the political leaderships of the two countries have thus far failed to provide an alternative narrative.
In the US administration’s version of events, Mr Obama’s offer in 2009 of a strategic partnership was misinterpreted by Beijing as admission of US decline.
China saw an America gripped by the financial crisis and facing secular decline. Its response was to push around its neighbours, to take a tougher line on Taiwan, to harden its maritime claims and step up the missile and other weapons programmes specifically designed to counter US access to the region.
In the Chinese account, the trouble began with US arms sales to Taiwan, its welcome for the Dalai Lama, its support for Japan in the disputed East China Sea and its declaration of a national interest in the South China Sea. Whatever Washington might say about partnership, its regional alliance-building, notably with India, and a provocative series of US military exercises smacked of a strategy of containment.
A more objective view would say China did misjudge the reaction both in the region and in Washington to its more combative stance. Not so long ago, Mr Hu cautioned that China should deploy soft rather than hard power – the former would dull fears about its rise, while the latter would harden them. It is a lesson that Beijing seemed to forget during 2010 as its pushed many of its neighbours closer to the US.
In any event, you do not have to take sides to see where the present standoff is leading. China builds new weapons systems designed to push US forces farther from its coastline; the US develops countermeasures. The hawks’ prediction of inevitable confrontation then becomes self-fulfilling as mistrust feeds miscalculation.
There is no easy way out of this loop. China will continue to build its military and to stake its claim to a pre-eminent role in its own backyard. That is what rising powers do. The US is not about to abandon its role as the guardian of east Asian security. Great powers do not readily hand over to new ones. Anyway, most of the countries in the neighbourhood want the US to stay.
Washington is not trying to contain China. It knows the attempt would be futile. It does have a hedging strategy to constrain Beijing. Collisions are inevitable, and there is no magic reset button. As with economics, the shared interest lies in rules, mechanisms and structures to manage differences. What’s needed are confidence-building measures, more transparency on the Chinese side, and one or two projects to promote a habit of working together. This is all pretty unglamorous stuff, you could say – better, though, than the alternative.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011.
0 comments:
Publicar un comentario