Beijing feels that time is on its side
By Gideon Rachman
Published: January 17 2011 20:18
Shortly before President Barack Obama visited Beijing for the first time, he set out US policy to China: “We welcome China’s efforts to play a greater role on the world stage,” he declared. “Power does not need to be a zero-sum game and nations need not fear the success of each other.”
I am prepared to bet that Mr Obama will say something very similar when he welcomes President Hu Jintao to Washington this week. And I’m sure the Chinese leader will respond with warm words.
The increasing number of Sino-American disputes is not just a coincidence or a run of bad luck. The global economic crisis has fundamentally shifted the logic of US-Chinese relations. Before the crisis, most Americans were still comfortable with the rise of China. Both countries were prospering economically – and China did not then seem a plausible challenger to America’s position as the world’s only superpower.
Since the crisis, things look different. Both as individuals and as a nation, Americans are taking a less benign view of China. With unemployment in the US still close to 10 per cent, more Americans now blame China for job losses and stagnant wages – hence the rise in protectionist sentiment in Congress and in influential circles in academia. The US government is also increasingly concerned that China is now turning into a serious strategic rival, particularly in the Pacific – hence the increase in the volume of American complaints about China’s military build-up.
Chinese attitudes have also changed as a result of the Great Recession. The country’s leaders are all too aware of the financial difficulties of the US – how could they not be, after secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s humbling request in 2009 for the Chinese government to keep purchasing US Treasury bills? With a greater consciousness of their own strength, China’s leaders are prepared to be more assertive. They are increasingly ignoring the famous advice of Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of modern China, to “hide our capacities; bide our time ... never claim leadership”. A new assertiveness is on display – whether it involves confronting the US at the climate change talks in Copenhagen, rebuffing American demands on currency or testing a new Stealth fighter while the US defence secretary is visiting Beijing.
The notion that a rising power is likely to clash with an established power has been around since Thucydides chronicled the rivalry between Athens and Sparta. But, in the 20 or so years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of Lehman Brothers, a different, more optimistic view became the conventional wisdom in Washington. Successive presidents, from Bill Clinton to Mr Obama, argued that globalisation and mutual economic interests meant that America could take a benign view of the rise of China. The profitable web created by trade and an expanding global economy meant that both countries could prosper together. American leaders also argued consistently that economic liberalisation in China would inevitably lead to political liberalisation – and that a more democratic China would be more friendly to the US. “Trade freely with China and time is on our side,” said President George W. Bush.
In the aftermath of the economic crisis, however, it is a rising China that feels that time is on its side. The famous prediction by Goldman Sachs that the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the US by 2027 is often cited in Beijing. Indeed the latest projections suggest that this symbolic moment will happen rather sooner. Recent projections by The Economist pointed to 2019. If, as seems entirely possible, China is still a one-party state at that point, then – for the first time for well over a century – the world’s largest economy will not be a democracy.
Still, just because some of the more optimistic predictions of the liberal globalists have not been borne out to date, it would be a mistake to swing entirely in the opposite direction and to assume that China and the US are now doomed to an ever more bitter confrontation. Even former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, the supreme realist, pointed out recently that there are examples of established powers accommodating rising powers in a peaceful way – (although Britain and the US, the example he cites, had cultural affinities that do not exist between China and America). Despite the increase in trade tensions, the two countries’ economies are indeed deeply enmeshed – creating powerful lobby groups with an interest in stable relations. As a last grim insurance policy, the fact that both countries are nuclear powers makes a deliberate decision to go to war almost unthinkable.
It is also comforting that the current leaders of both nations – Mr Obama and Mr Hu – are cool pragmatists. Neither man relishes confrontation. The current generation of leaders in Washington and Beijing can probably be relied on to prevent Chinese-American antagonism rising to dangerous levels. It is the next generation that we should be worrying about.
I am prepared to bet that Mr Obama will say something very similar when he welcomes President Hu Jintao to Washington this week. And I’m sure the Chinese leader will respond with warm words.
But, beneath the rhetoric, things are shifting fast. There is a long and growing list of disputes between China and the US. Old arguments over Taiwan and human rights are now supplemented by a new set of disputes over currency, trade, the South China Sea and China’s military build-up.
The increasing number of Sino-American disputes is not just a coincidence or a run of bad luck. The global economic crisis has fundamentally shifted the logic of US-Chinese relations. Before the crisis, most Americans were still comfortable with the rise of China. Both countries were prospering economically – and China did not then seem a plausible challenger to America’s position as the world’s only superpower.
Since the crisis, things look different. Both as individuals and as a nation, Americans are taking a less benign view of China. With unemployment in the US still close to 10 per cent, more Americans now blame China for job losses and stagnant wages – hence the rise in protectionist sentiment in Congress and in influential circles in academia. The US government is also increasingly concerned that China is now turning into a serious strategic rival, particularly in the Pacific – hence the increase in the volume of American complaints about China’s military build-up.
Chinese attitudes have also changed as a result of the Great Recession. The country’s leaders are all too aware of the financial difficulties of the US – how could they not be, after secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s humbling request in 2009 for the Chinese government to keep purchasing US Treasury bills? With a greater consciousness of their own strength, China’s leaders are prepared to be more assertive. They are increasingly ignoring the famous advice of Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of modern China, to “hide our capacities; bide our time ... never claim leadership”. A new assertiveness is on display – whether it involves confronting the US at the climate change talks in Copenhagen, rebuffing American demands on currency or testing a new Stealth fighter while the US defence secretary is visiting Beijing.
The notion that a rising power is likely to clash with an established power has been around since Thucydides chronicled the rivalry between Athens and Sparta. But, in the 20 or so years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of Lehman Brothers, a different, more optimistic view became the conventional wisdom in Washington. Successive presidents, from Bill Clinton to Mr Obama, argued that globalisation and mutual economic interests meant that America could take a benign view of the rise of China. The profitable web created by trade and an expanding global economy meant that both countries could prosper together. American leaders also argued consistently that economic liberalisation in China would inevitably lead to political liberalisation – and that a more democratic China would be more friendly to the US. “Trade freely with China and time is on our side,” said President George W. Bush.
In the aftermath of the economic crisis, however, it is a rising China that feels that time is on its side. The famous prediction by Goldman Sachs that the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the US by 2027 is often cited in Beijing. Indeed the latest projections suggest that this symbolic moment will happen rather sooner. Recent projections by The Economist pointed to 2019. If, as seems entirely possible, China is still a one-party state at that point, then – for the first time for well over a century – the world’s largest economy will not be a democracy.
Still, just because some of the more optimistic predictions of the liberal globalists have not been borne out to date, it would be a mistake to swing entirely in the opposite direction and to assume that China and the US are now doomed to an ever more bitter confrontation. Even former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, the supreme realist, pointed out recently that there are examples of established powers accommodating rising powers in a peaceful way – (although Britain and the US, the example he cites, had cultural affinities that do not exist between China and America). Despite the increase in trade tensions, the two countries’ economies are indeed deeply enmeshed – creating powerful lobby groups with an interest in stable relations. As a last grim insurance policy, the fact that both countries are nuclear powers makes a deliberate decision to go to war almost unthinkable.
It is also comforting that the current leaders of both nations – Mr Obama and Mr Hu – are cool pragmatists. Neither man relishes confrontation. The current generation of leaders in Washington and Beijing can probably be relied on to prevent Chinese-American antagonism rising to dangerous levels. It is the next generation that we should be worrying about.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011.
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