Greetings from RGE!
In the ten months since George W. Bush’s departure from the scene, the Obama administration has portrayed the tasks confronting it as a series of challenges stemming primarily from a miserable presidential inheritance. From the economy to healthcare, from Russia to North Korea to Iran, words like rescue, reform, reset and reengagement are designed to drive home the point that the problem was created on someone else’s watch. This is particularly true in the geopolitical arena, one of the few places a president has wide leeway to act independently of Congress.
For most presidents, the expiration date for this rhetorical approach is, roughly, two years—or the period between inauguration and the first mid-term election. After that, “you break it, you buy it” generally holds true. But for Barack Obama, events have conspired to vastly shorten this honeymoon. Before the end of his first year in office, Obama appears likely to face “break-it, buy-it” decisions on the nuclear threats posed by North Korea and Iran, the war in Afghanistan, pinning the success of these diplomatic and military endeavors squarely on the president’s shoulders.
Second Thoughts on ‘The Good War’
Afghanistan, with its potential to drain national resources and wreak havoc with Obama’s political capital, ranks at the top of these challenges, and Obama’s policy there is at a turning point. The new president made good on campaign promises to add troops (some 20,000) to “the good war,” while moving to set an exit date from Iraq. But Afghanistan’s September elections dealt a blow to Obama’s characterization of the war. UN and other observers reported massive fraud on behalf of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, undermining the long-term goal of building a credible central government in Kabul that can ultimately take over the fight against the Taliban.
Shortly after the vote, a memo leaked to the Washington Post detailed a request for 30,000 more troops from Obama’s hand-picked commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal. The leak emboldened critics of the war, particularly liberals in his Obama’s own party, into demanding a withdrawal. This remains a minority stance, but the war has lost significant support among the U.S. public, and uncertainty about where Washington stands on the issue can only hasten moves by NATO and other U.S. allies deployed in Afghanistan to remove their own forces.
Besides posing a risk to Obama’s presidency should casualties and public support move sharply in opposite directions, a severe setback for the United States in Afghanistan at this juncture would strengthen the narrative depicting American power as being in steep decline and possibly embolden rivals to test areas of the global status quo propped up largely by the U.S. since the Cold War ended.
Double Jeopardy
The nuclear conundrums in Iran and North Korea show some countries are already testing Washington’s reach. Obama’s team has used these proliferation cases to test the theory that the previous administration’s policy of keeping such “rogue” states at arm’s length was ultimately unproductive. Early feelers to both regimes were rebuffed, however.
Summer brought signs that fed White House optimism on this count. A North Korean ship thought to be carrying prohibited weapons toward Myanmar—a possible transit point for Iran, intelligence officials speculated—was tracked and ultimately forced to turn back. Shortly thereafter, the post-election uprising in Iran following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s controversial reelection offered a rare look into the deep fissures of opposition that exist inside the Islamic Republic.
Yet neither country has acted chastened in any way, nor have Obama’s diplomatic efforts borne obvious fruit. North Korea held a second round of nuclear tests in May and spent the summer rebuffing efforts to revive the Six-Party Talks. China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao goes to North Korea next week in the latest effort to restart them.
Iran, meanwhile, has hinted at a willingness to hold talks with the United States, but just as often insists nuclear issues will remain out of bounds (and that Israel should be wiped off the face of the earth). This past week, as the UN General Assembly opened in New York, speculation arose anew about Israel’s frequently repeated determination to use military force, if necessary, to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Iran has held a series of deliberately public missile tests.
‘Reset’ or Retreat?
If there is a silver lining in the clouds looming over Iran, it might be Russia. Speaking at the UN, Russia’s President Dmitri Medvedev suggested Moscow may be open to more serious sanctions against Iran. This is widely viewed as a quid pro quo—Obama two weeks ago ended plans to base a U.S. anti-missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, plans which had driven Moscow to distraction. This decision, unsurprisingly, drew fire from Obama’s right at home.
Of more concern was the noncommittal language of Medvedev’s statement—and the fact that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is thought to be the true power in Russia. Both leave open the question of whether anything has changed with regard to Russia’s stance on Iran. Prospects for tightening sanctions on Iran are further clouded by the fact that China, too, must be wooed.That China, too, must be wooed if sanctions are to be tighten, further clouds prospects.
Japan’s Turnabout
In East Asia, another challenge from a surprising quarter: Japan. U.S.-China ties, while enduring ups and downs over issues like the rising in Xinjiang this summer and a trade spat over tire imports, rest solidly on geoeconomic grounds, with both Washington and Beijing acutely aware of the financial interest each has in the other’s economic success.
Across the Sea of Japan, however, the victory of the Democratic Party in September’s elections overturned a half century of rule by the pro-American Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This has implications for American power in Asia. Just before his election, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s wrote in a New York Times op-ed that Japan should seek trade and security solutions in Asia, not across the Pacific. Hints since the election that Tokyo may eventually tire of buying U.S. debt puts Japan squarely in line with China, the GCC and other disgruntled creditors.
Japan’s new leadership includes many who resent the continued existence of large American military facilities on Okinawa and the Japanese main islands, as well as the large footprint the U.S. Navy maintains in Kyoto, where the U.S. Seventh Fleet is based. The new government has launched a review of military ties and is probing whether secret pacts were reached over such sensitive topics as basing nuclear-armed ships in Japan or the extent of Japanese aid to American forces in case of war in Korea or Taiwan. Tokyo also has proposed an East Asian security pact.
Longer-Term Investments
Time may work more to Obama’s favor elsewhere.
On Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, the U.S. has failed to breathe life into peace talks, but the would-be talkers look quite dysfunctional. Israel’s current government finds the status quo just fine and is more focused on Iran’s nascent nuclear capabilities. As for the Palestinians, they remain divided between a corrupt old guard ruling the West Bank and the zealous Hamas rejectionists in Gaza. Staying “engaged” until Israeli and Palestinian internal political roadblocks clear themselves may be the best bet for now.
In Europe, the sweeping victory of Angela Merkel’s party in German elections should give her a freer hand in dealing with major geopolitical questions now that the grand coalition with the Social Democrats is no longer necessary. Frictions with the U.S. and Britain over reforms to global markets and banking regulations will remain—Merkel is allied with France’s Nikolas Sarkozy in demanding, for instance, a cap on bonus payments for executives. However, the Free Democrats who will replace the left-leaning SPD in the next government will, if anything, insist on a more liberal economic line, and they support Germany’s deployment in Afghanistan, too.
Finally, toward week’s end, déjà vu of sorts will play out in Ireland as voters consider further federalization of the EU—the so-called Lisbon Treaty, which 53 percent of Irish voters stopped dead in its tracks about a year ago. But this is a very different Ireland, one suffering the most severe economic crisis of any eurozone economy; in such circumstances, ties to Brussels have shown their worth. Polls suggest a “yes” vote this time, which clears an important hurdle. However, three further nations have yet to approve the treaty: Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic. Polls indicate the Czechs are the most likely to play the spoiler.
In the ten months since George W. Bush’s departure from the scene, the Obama administration has portrayed the tasks confronting it as a series of challenges stemming primarily from a miserable presidential inheritance. From the economy to healthcare, from Russia to North Korea to Iran, words like rescue, reform, reset and reengagement are designed to drive home the point that the problem was created on someone else’s watch. This is particularly true in the geopolitical arena, one of the few places a president has wide leeway to act independently of Congress.
For most presidents, the expiration date for this rhetorical approach is, roughly, two years—or the period between inauguration and the first mid-term election. After that, “you break it, you buy it” generally holds true. But for Barack Obama, events have conspired to vastly shorten this honeymoon. Before the end of his first year in office, Obama appears likely to face “break-it, buy-it” decisions on the nuclear threats posed by North Korea and Iran, the war in Afghanistan, pinning the success of these diplomatic and military endeavors squarely on the president’s shoulders.
Second Thoughts on ‘The Good War’
Afghanistan, with its potential to drain national resources and wreak havoc with Obama’s political capital, ranks at the top of these challenges, and Obama’s policy there is at a turning point. The new president made good on campaign promises to add troops (some 20,000) to “the good war,” while moving to set an exit date from Iraq. But Afghanistan’s September elections dealt a blow to Obama’s characterization of the war. UN and other observers reported massive fraud on behalf of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, undermining the long-term goal of building a credible central government in Kabul that can ultimately take over the fight against the Taliban.
Shortly after the vote, a memo leaked to the Washington Post detailed a request for 30,000 more troops from Obama’s hand-picked commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal. The leak emboldened critics of the war, particularly liberals in his Obama’s own party, into demanding a withdrawal. This remains a minority stance, but the war has lost significant support among the U.S. public, and uncertainty about where Washington stands on the issue can only hasten moves by NATO and other U.S. allies deployed in Afghanistan to remove their own forces.
Besides posing a risk to Obama’s presidency should casualties and public support move sharply in opposite directions, a severe setback for the United States in Afghanistan at this juncture would strengthen the narrative depicting American power as being in steep decline and possibly embolden rivals to test areas of the global status quo propped up largely by the U.S. since the Cold War ended.
Double Jeopardy
The nuclear conundrums in Iran and North Korea show some countries are already testing Washington’s reach. Obama’s team has used these proliferation cases to test the theory that the previous administration’s policy of keeping such “rogue” states at arm’s length was ultimately unproductive. Early feelers to both regimes were rebuffed, however.
Summer brought signs that fed White House optimism on this count. A North Korean ship thought to be carrying prohibited weapons toward Myanmar—a possible transit point for Iran, intelligence officials speculated—was tracked and ultimately forced to turn back. Shortly thereafter, the post-election uprising in Iran following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s controversial reelection offered a rare look into the deep fissures of opposition that exist inside the Islamic Republic.
Yet neither country has acted chastened in any way, nor have Obama’s diplomatic efforts borne obvious fruit. North Korea held a second round of nuclear tests in May and spent the summer rebuffing efforts to revive the Six-Party Talks. China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao goes to North Korea next week in the latest effort to restart them.
Iran, meanwhile, has hinted at a willingness to hold talks with the United States, but just as often insists nuclear issues will remain out of bounds (and that Israel should be wiped off the face of the earth). This past week, as the UN General Assembly opened in New York, speculation arose anew about Israel’s frequently repeated determination to use military force, if necessary, to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Iran has held a series of deliberately public missile tests.
‘Reset’ or Retreat?
If there is a silver lining in the clouds looming over Iran, it might be Russia. Speaking at the UN, Russia’s President Dmitri Medvedev suggested Moscow may be open to more serious sanctions against Iran. This is widely viewed as a quid pro quo—Obama two weeks ago ended plans to base a U.S. anti-missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, plans which had driven Moscow to distraction. This decision, unsurprisingly, drew fire from Obama’s right at home.
Of more concern was the noncommittal language of Medvedev’s statement—and the fact that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is thought to be the true power in Russia. Both leave open the question of whether anything has changed with regard to Russia’s stance on Iran. Prospects for tightening sanctions on Iran are further clouded by the fact that China, too, must be wooed.That China, too, must be wooed if sanctions are to be tighten, further clouds prospects.
Japan’s Turnabout
In East Asia, another challenge from a surprising quarter: Japan. U.S.-China ties, while enduring ups and downs over issues like the rising in Xinjiang this summer and a trade spat over tire imports, rest solidly on geoeconomic grounds, with both Washington and Beijing acutely aware of the financial interest each has in the other’s economic success.
Across the Sea of Japan, however, the victory of the Democratic Party in September’s elections overturned a half century of rule by the pro-American Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This has implications for American power in Asia. Just before his election, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s wrote in a New York Times op-ed that Japan should seek trade and security solutions in Asia, not across the Pacific. Hints since the election that Tokyo may eventually tire of buying U.S. debt puts Japan squarely in line with China, the GCC and other disgruntled creditors.
Japan’s new leadership includes many who resent the continued existence of large American military facilities on Okinawa and the Japanese main islands, as well as the large footprint the U.S. Navy maintains in Kyoto, where the U.S. Seventh Fleet is based. The new government has launched a review of military ties and is probing whether secret pacts were reached over such sensitive topics as basing nuclear-armed ships in Japan or the extent of Japanese aid to American forces in case of war in Korea or Taiwan. Tokyo also has proposed an East Asian security pact.
Longer-Term Investments
Time may work more to Obama’s favor elsewhere.
On Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, the U.S. has failed to breathe life into peace talks, but the would-be talkers look quite dysfunctional. Israel’s current government finds the status quo just fine and is more focused on Iran’s nascent nuclear capabilities. As for the Palestinians, they remain divided between a corrupt old guard ruling the West Bank and the zealous Hamas rejectionists in Gaza. Staying “engaged” until Israeli and Palestinian internal political roadblocks clear themselves may be the best bet for now.
In Europe, the sweeping victory of Angela Merkel’s party in German elections should give her a freer hand in dealing with major geopolitical questions now that the grand coalition with the Social Democrats is no longer necessary. Frictions with the U.S. and Britain over reforms to global markets and banking regulations will remain—Merkel is allied with France’s Nikolas Sarkozy in demanding, for instance, a cap on bonus payments for executives. However, the Free Democrats who will replace the left-leaning SPD in the next government will, if anything, insist on a more liberal economic line, and they support Germany’s deployment in Afghanistan, too.
Finally, toward week’s end, déjà vu of sorts will play out in Ireland as voters consider further federalization of the EU—the so-called Lisbon Treaty, which 53 percent of Irish voters stopped dead in its tracks about a year ago. But this is a very different Ireland, one suffering the most severe economic crisis of any eurozone economy; in such circumstances, ties to Brussels have shown their worth. Polls suggest a “yes” vote this time, which clears an important hurdle. However, three further nations have yet to approve the treaty: Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic. Polls indicate the Czechs are the most likely to play the spoiler.
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