If money and trade were the only issues, China could likely generate a significant amount of leverage in the Philippines, and China has been slowly increasing its share in Philippine trade over the past 10 years. China has also shown that if Duterte would be willing to accept the Chinese position on sovereignty of the islands in the South China Sea, China would be willing to considerably increase its relatively small investment in the Philippines. The problem is that if Duterte were to accept China’s terms, he would have to give up Philippine sovereignty claims. Allying his country with China could also mean a great deal of economic difficulty, not just because of the U.S. response, but also because of other countries that would be unhappy about an alliance between Manila and Beijing.
Empathetic Analysis
Duterte’s crass language offends some; his mercilessness in carrying out his self-declared war on drugs and corruption in the Philippines offends others. Many also attribute his mercurial personality and his colorful remarks to stupidity at best and raving lunacy at worst. Looking at Duterte’s actions instead paints a rather different picture, one of a smart, ruthless political leader attempting to play a weak hand to maximize benefits for the Philippines.
At the global level, consider that until Duterte took office, fewer people around the world cared whom the Philippine president was or could name him. The Philippines is a militarily weak country in a dangerous neighborhood, and it faces a Chinese rival that outclasses it in terms of economic, military and diplomatic strength. The Philippines felt threatened and embarrassed, not just by China’s advances, which deprive Manila of what it considers sovereign Philippine land, but also by a lack of firm U.S. support for the Philippine position. Duterte has turned this position on its head by using the Philippines’ one major strength: the strategic importance of its location in the Asia-Pacific region. The Philippines is now being courted by the world’s great powers: China, Japan, Russia and the United States, all of whom are willing to accept Duterte’s outbursts on the chance that doing so might aid their chances of solidifying an old relationship with the Philippines or developing a new one.
Despite U.S. officials insisting that all is well when speaking about the Philippines, despite the fact that Duterte or one of his underlings walks back his anti-U.S. comments each time he makes them, and despite the fact that the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty signed by the U.S. and the Philippines remains in place, Duterte has injected a degree of uncertainty into the relationship with the United States, which is the Philippines’ main security blanket. When a country is as weak as the Philippines and depends on changing the behavior of a much stronger country, the weaker power must get creative. The one thing the Philippines can do is make U.S. policymakers and strategists doubt that it can be taken for granted, then make demands and hope that the doubt is enough to change the stronger power’s behavior.
For months, the U.S. has been blaming Duterte for potential human rights abuses related to extrajudicial killings in the drug wars, and yet on Jan. 14, the U.S. State Department changed its tune, saying the U.S. was unable to verify human rights abuses in the Philippines. This is a small and relatively insignificant concession in the broader relationship, but the point is that Duterte has already succeeded in shifting the parameters of the relationship to be more responsive to his desires. This is a difficult gambit to continue, but thus far Duterte has done a good job maximizing the value of the Philippines’ geographic position in terms of diplomatic relations.
The Philippines’ main problem with the U.S. is not that the U.S. has been too aggressive – it is that the U.S. has not been aggressive enough in countering China’s expansionist moves in the South China Sea. Duterte is exploring an alliance with China to decrease Philippine dependence on the United States, but the main goal of doing so would be to give Manila more leverage in its relationship with the U.S. The problem for Duterte and Xi is that China and the Philippines ultimately have a fundamental, mutually exclusive imperative. For Manila and Beijing to bury the hatchet, one side must give up sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Neither side is going to do that, and at the end of the day, what the Philippines needs most is a United States that will defend the Philippines from China. Duterte expresses this sentiment when he criticizes the U.S. for focusing on alleged human rights abuses carried about by the Philippine government. The Philippines focuses on the shared imperatives that have made the Philippines and the U.S. treaty allies since 1951, and Duterte wants the U.S. to mind its own business when it comes to his domestic moves to solidify his power and undertake ambitious reforms.
ConclusiĆ³n
China wants to have the Philippines as an ally. The Philippines wants to become less dependent on the U.S. The United States wants the Philippines to behave as the U.S. wishes. However, desire does not determine reality. Until either China or the Philippines is willing to give up sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, it is hard to see how an alliance between Beijing and Manila could work. Until the Philippines develops a better military or finds a naval power capable of replacing the U.S. security guarantee, the Philippines will remain an American ally, if a reluctant and boisterous one. The U.S. has always been slow to learn that self-righteous moral indignation does not translate into strategically valuable action and will have to re-examine its approach to the Philippines if it wants the relationship to be based on anything more than superior strength and need.
Duterte is likely to produce plenty more eyebrow-raising quotes, but until one of these variables changes, the Philippine relationship with China won’t progress much beyond a tease.
|
0 comments:
Publicar un comentario