VACACIONES OCTUBRE 2016 (CLICK ON LINK)
viernes, octubre 14, 2016
THE WORLD ECONOMY: AN OPEN AND SHUT CASE / THE ECONOMIST
|
Etiquetas:
Economics,
Inequality,
Trade,
World Economic And Political
The world economy
An open and shut case
The consensus in favour of open economies is cracking, says John O’Sullivan. Is globalisation no longer a good thing?

THERE IS NOTHING dark, still less satanic, about the Revolution Mill in Greensboro, North Carolina. The tall yellow-brick chimney stack, with red bricks spelling “Revolution” down its length, was built a few years after the mill was established in 1900. It was a booming time for local enterprise. America’s cotton industry was moving south from New England to take advantage of lower wages. The number of mills in the South more than doubled between 1890 and 1900, to 542.
By 1938 Revolution Mill was the world’s largest factory exclusively making flannel, producing 50m yards of cloth a year.
The main mill building still has the springy hardwood floors and original wooden joists installed in its heyday, but no clacking of looms has been heard here for over three decades.
The mill ceased production in 1982, an early warning of another revolution on a global scale.
The textile industry was starting a fresh migration in search of cheaper labour, this time in Latin America and Asia. Revolution Mill is a monument to an industry that lost out to globalisation.
In nearby Thomasville, there is another landmark to past industrial glory: a 30-foot (9-metre) replica of an upholstered chair. The Big Chair was erected in 1950 to mark the town’s prowess in furniture-making, in which North Carolina was once America’s leading state. But the success did not last. “In the 2000s half of Thomasville went to China,” says T.J. Stout, boss of Carsons Hospitality, a local furniture-maker. Local makers of cabinets, dressers and the like lost sales to Asia, where labour-intensive production was cheaper.
The state is now finding new ways to do well. An hour’s drive east from Greensboro is Durham, a city that is bursting with new firms. One is Bright View Technologies, with a modern headquarters on the city’s outskirts, which makes film and reflectors to vary the pattern and diffusion of LED lights. The Liggett and Myers building in the city centre was once the home of the Chesterfield cigarette. The handsome building is now filling up with newer businesses, says Ted Conner of the Durham Chamber of Commerce. Duke University, the centre of much of the city’s innovation, is taking some of the space for labs.
.

North Carolina exemplifies both the promise and the casualties of today’s open economy. Yet even thriving local businesses there grumble that America gets the raw end of trade deals, and that foreign rivals benefit from unfair subsidies and lax regulation. In places that have found it harder to adapt to changing times, the rumblings tend to be louder. Across the Western world there is growing unease about globalisation and the lopsided, unstable sort of capitalism it is believed to have wrought.
A backlash against freer trade is reshaping politics. Donald Trump has clinched an unlikely nomination as the Republican Party’s candidate in November’s presidential elections with the support of blue-collar men in America’s South and its rustbelt. These are places that lost lots of manufacturing jobs in the decade after 2001, when America was hit by a surge of imports from China (which Mr Trump says he will keep out with punitive tariffs). Free trade now causes so much hostility that Hillary Clinton, the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate, was forced to disown the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade deal with Asia that she herself helped to negotiate. Talks on a new trade deal with the European Union, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), have stalled. Senior politicians in Germany and France have turned against it in response to popular opposition to the pact, which is meant to lower investment and regulatory barriers between Europe and America.
Keep-out signs
There is growing disquiet, too, about the unfettered movement of capital. More of the value created by companies is intangible, and businesses that rely on selling ideas find it easier to set up shop where taxes are low. America has clamped down on so-called tax inversions, in which a big company moves to a low-tax country after agreeing to be bought by a smaller firm based there. Europeans grumble that American firms engage in too many clever tricks to avoid tax.
In August the European Commission told Ireland to recoup up to €13 billion ($14.5 billion) in unpaid taxes from Apple, ruling that the company’s low tax bill was a source of unfair competition.
Free movement of debt capital has meant that trouble in one part of the world (say, America’s subprime crisis) quickly spreads to other parts. The fickleness of capital flows is one reason why the EU’s most ambitious cross-border initiative, the euro, which has joined 19 of its 28 members in a currency union, is in trouble. In the euro’s early years, countries such as Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain enjoyed ample credit and low borrowing costs, thanks to floods of private short-term capital from other EU countries. When crisis struck, that credit dried up and had to be replaced with massive official loans, from the ECB and from bail-out funds. The conditions attached to such support have caused relations between creditor countries such as Germany and debtors such as Greece to sour.
Some claim that the growing discontent in the rich world is not really about economics. After all, Britain and America, at least, have enjoyed reasonable GDP growth recently, and unemployment in both countries has dropped to around 5%. Instead, the argument goes, the revolt against economic openness reflects deeper anxieties about lost relative status. Some arise from the emergence of China as a global power; others are rooted within individual societies.
For example, in parts of Europe opposition to migrants was prompted by the Syrian refugee crisis. It stems less from worries about the effect of immigration on wages or jobs than from a perceived threat to social cohesion.
But there is a material basis for discontent nevertheless, because a sluggish economic recovery has bypassed large groups of people. In America one in six working-age men without a college degree is not part of the workforce, according to an analysis by the Council of Economic Advisers, a White House think-tank. In Britain, though more people than ever are in work, wage rises have not kept up with inflation. Only in London and its hinterland in the south-east has real income per person risen above its level before the 2007-08 financial crisis. Most other rich countries are in the same boat. A report by the McKinsey Global Institute, a think-tank, found that the real incomes of two-thirds of households in 25 advanced economies were flat or fell between 2005 and 2014, compared with 2% in the previous decade. The few gains in a sluggish economy have gone to a salaried gentry.
This has fed a widespread sense that an open economy is good for a small elite but does nothing for the broad mass of people. Even academics and policymakers who used to welcome openness unreservedly are having second thoughts. They had always understood that free trade creates losers as well as winners, but thought that the disruption was transitory and the gains were big enough to compensate those who lose out. However, a body of new research suggests that China’s integration into global trade caused more lasting damage than expected to some rich-world workers. Those displaced by a surge in imports from China were concentrated in pockets of distress where alternative jobs were hard to come by.
.

It is not easy to establish a direct link between openness and wage inequality, but recent studies suggest that trade plays a bigger role than previously thought. Large-scale migration is increasingly understood to conflict with the welfare policy needed to shield workers from the disruptions of trade and technology.
The consensus in favour of unfettered capital mobility began to weaken after the East Asian crises of 1997-98. As the scale of capital flows grew, the doubts increased. A recent article by economists at the IMF entitled “Neoliberalism: Oversold?” argued that in certain cases the costs to economies of opening up to capital flows exceed the benefits.
Multiple hits
First, jobs and pay have been greatly affected by technological change. Much of the increase in wage inequality in rich countries stems from new technologies that make college-educated workers more valuable. At the same time companies’ profitability has increasingly diverged.
Online platforms such as Amazon, Google and Uber that act as matchmakers between consumers and producers or advertisers rely on network effects: the more users they have, the more useful they become. The firms that come to dominate such markets make spectacular returns compared with the also-rans. That has sometimes produced windfalls at the very top of the income distribution. At the same time the rapid decline in the cost of automation has left the low- and mid-skilled at risk of losing their jobs. All these changes have been amplified by globalisation, but would have been highly disruptive in any event.
The second source of turmoil was the financial crisis and the long, slow recovery that typically follows banking blow-ups. The credit boom before the crisis had helped to mask the problem of income inequality by boosting the price of homes and increasing the spending power of the low-paid.
The subsequent bust destroyed both jobs and wealth, but the college-educated bounced back more quickly than others. The free flow of debt capital played a role in the build-up to the crisis, but much of the blame for it lies with lax bank regulation. Banking busts happened long before globalisation.
Superimposed on all this was a unique event: the rapid emergence of China as an economic power.
Export-led growth has transformed China from a poor to a middle-income country, taking hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. This achievement is probably unrepeatable. As the price of capital goods continues to fall sharply, places with large pools of cheap labour, such as India or Africa, will find it harder to break into global supply chains, as China did so speedily and successfully.
This special report will disentangle these myriad influences to assess the impact of the free movement of goods, capital and people. It will conclude that some of the concerns about economic openness are valid. The strains inflicted by a more integrated global economy were underestimated, and too little effort went into helping those who lost out. But much of the criticism of openness is misguided, underplaying its benefits and blaming it for problems that have other causes. Rolling it back would leave everyone worse off.
viernes, octubre 14, 2016
TURNING OFF THE DIVIDEND SPIGOT / PROJECT SYNDICATE
|
Etiquetas:
Banks And Banking,
Europe Economic and Political
Turning Off the Dividend Spigot
Viral Acharya, Diane Pierret, Sascha Steffen
.
NEW YORK – European banks’ high litigation and restructuring costs have resulted in major losses on their books and abysmal stock-market performance. As the industry and European regulators now reflect on this dismal state of affairs and search for solutions, they should consider banks’ revenue distribution – including employee bonuses and shareholder dividends – as part of the problem.
Revenue distribution is one primary reason for European banks’ capital shortfalls. To understand why, we should look back to October 2014, when the European Banking Authority began balance-sheet stress tests for the eurozone’s largest 123 banks and found a capital shortfall of €25 billion ($28 billion) in all of them.
At the time, the EBA required the banks to devise plans to address their respective shortfalls within 6-9 months. Some banks took action and raised equity through rights issues, sometimes with substantial help from governments. But most banks mollified regulators by simply shedding riskier assets to improve their capital ratios.
Needless to say, these efforts were ineffective, and European banks’ share prices have declined by 50%, on average, since the initial 2014 assessment. Banks that failed the stress test and didn’t take the result seriously are partly to blame, but so, too, are regulators who did not sufficiently hold the banks’ feet to the fire to improve their balance sheets, and who may have applied stress tests that were too weak to detect financial frailty.
The EBA conducted another series of stress tests and reported the results in late July. This latest round looked at 51 banks and, contrary to previous tests, was not designed to identify capital shortfalls, but rather to provide “a common analytical framework to consistently compare and assess the resilience of large EU banks to adverse economic developments.”
Regulators now suppose that the European banking sector is resilient to adverse shocks. On the same day as the EBA’s announcement, the worst performer, Italy’s Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, announced €5 billion ($5.6 billion) in new funding, pursuant to its €5.6 billion capital requirement.
Still, market reaction to the announcement was negative (the EuroStoxx Banks index fell 7.5% in two days), most likely because the EBA did not include specific estimates of European banks’ capital shortfalls or outline a recapitalization plan.
In a new paper investigating this market reaction, using United States capital-requirement rules, we calculate the total capital shortfall in all 51 participating banks to be €123 billion.
Despite this large capital shortfall, 28 of the 34 publicly listed banks in the stress test paid out about €40 billion in dividends for 2015, meaning that they distributed, on average, over 60% of their earnings to shareholders.
Dividend payments made by under-capitalized banks amount to a substantial wealth transfer from subordinated bondholders to shareholders, because it is bondholders who will suffer the losses in a crisis. Moreover, it is potentially a wealth transfer from taxpayers to private shareholders, because under new banking rules government bailouts are possible after bondholders have covered (bailed in) 8% of a bank’s equity and liabilities.
By contrast, undercapitalized banks in the US are forced to halt all forms of capital distribution if they fail a stress test. Fortunately, following the 2016 round of stress tests, the EBA is now also considering this type of regulatory sanction. Thus, “competent authorities may also consider requesting changes to the institutions’ capital plan,” which “may take a number of forms such as potential restrictions on dividends required for a bank to maintain the agreed trajectory of its capital planning in the adverse scenario.”
We estimate that if European regulators had adopted this approach and forced banks to stop paying dividends in 2010 – the start of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe – the retained equity could have paid for more than 50% of the 2016 capital shortfalls.
The figure above shows our calculated capital shortfalls, using the EBA stress test’s “adverse scenario” losses and the cumulative dividends these banks have distributed since 2010.
Dividends paid out by some banks, such as BNP Paribas and Barclays, actually exceed the current capital shortfalls, while at others – such as Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, and Société Générale – capital shortfalls far exceed dividends that would have been retained. The latter banks would still require substantial capital issuances on top of dividend restrictions to make up the difference.
Nonetheless, our findings suggest a simple first step toward preventing bank capital erosion: stop banks with capital shortfalls from paying dividends (including internal dividends such as employee bonuses). Such a policy would not even require regulators to broach topics like capital issuance, bailouts, or bail-ins, and some banks have even already begun to suspend dividend payments. All that’s left now is for the European Central Bank to enforce this practice across the eurozone.
viernes, octubre 14, 2016
THE WELLS FARGO STANDARD / THE WALL STREET JOURNAL OUTLOOK & REVIEW
|
Etiquetas:
Banks And Banking,
U.S. Economic And Political,
Wells Fargo
The Wells Fargo Standard
Imagine if the Treasury Secretary had to live by new rules for banks.
.
Democrats are waging a non-stop campaign to punish bank executives for misconduct, both real and imagined. After revelations that Wells Fargo WFC 0.04 % fired thousands of employees for setting up accounts without customer permission, Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren and her colleagues were howling this week for Wells to claw back bonuses that had been paid to senior executives. Awkwardly for Ms. Warren and her colleagues, Rep. Scott Garrett (R., N.J.) decided to pursue this line of argument a little too vigorously for Democratic tastes.
At a hearing this week in the House Financial Services Committee, Mr. Garrett asked Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, who helped preside over a titanic financial disaster at Citigroup C 0.08 % in 2008, whether the bank had clawed back any of his compensation.
YouTube viewers may be entertained watching the video of this exchange, in which Mr. Lew makes every effort to avoid answering the simple question. At one point the former chief operating officer of two troubled Citi units says, “I was responsible for administrative activities, not for designing risk products so let’s just remember what my role was.”
What makes this so awkward is not merely that Sen. Warren and her Democratic colleagues overwhelmingly voted to confirm Mr. Lew to run the Treasury. And it’s not merely that many of the regulators on Mr. Lew’s Financial Stability Oversight Council are now drafting clawback rules that other, less politically connected, bankers will have to live by.
There’s also the issue of scale. Jack Lew’s Citigroup consumed a series of multi-billion-dollar taxpayer bailouts and helped trigger a world-wide financial panic. Wells Fargo mistreated its customers, but its $2.6 million in remediation for those affected is a rounding error at a bank with $86 billion in annual revenue. If J.P. Morgan JPM -0.21 % ’s famous 2012 trading loss was triggered by a “London whale,” as a financial matter this is the San Francisco minnow.
Mr. Garrett sums up the lesson for bankers when he says that “so long as you’re a high-ranking Democratic official, you can make all the money that you want on Wall Street but if you’re not one of them then you have to play by the rules if the company collapses.”
Are Central Banks Taking Away The Punchbowl?
by: Mark Haefele
Summary
- Bonds and stocks have become more positively correlated, which complicates asset allocation.
- The monetary policy debate has grown, with support for negative rates appearing to wane. We expect stimulus to continue. But central banks may use different tools.
- Investors can use alternative asset classes to limit volatility and generate returns that should beat cash and government bonds.
We introduce a preference for a basket of emerging market currencies versus a selection of G10 currencies. We remain overweight US equities versus government bonds, and prefer emerging market stocks over Swiss shares.
- The monetary policy debate has grown, with support for negative rates appearing to wane. We expect stimulus to continue. But central banks may use different tools.
- Investors can use alternative asset classes to limit volatility and generate returns that should beat cash and government bonds.
We introduce a preference for a basket of emerging market currencies versus a selection of G10 currencies. We remain overweight US equities versus government bonds, and prefer emerging market stocks over Swiss shares.
Even as the temperatures outside cool, the debate among policy makers has become more heated.
Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has gone so far as to suggest that the path to negative rates was the "wrong" route to take. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) decided at its September meeting to refrain from pushing rates deeper into negative territory. At the same time it unveiled novel stimulus policies, which suggests that sub-zero rates may be going out of fashion.
A consensus has begun to emerge that a world of more active fiscal policy, in which finance ministers take greater charge of economic management, may lie on the "other side" of the monetary attempts to stimulate growth. Even in Europe, the idea of deficit spending is becoming less taboo.
European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker is reportedly considering plans to relax and simplify the Stability and Growth Pact, the set of fiscal rules designed to limit spending among EU member countries.
The prospect that debates about the efficacy of monetary stimulus might lead to the punchbowl being taken away has provoked rising market volatility after a period of summer calm.
Importantly, for portfolios, it also has resulted in rising correlation between stocks and bonds.
Correlations are now close to their highest levels in five years, making portfolios more vulnerable to increased short-term volatility. One investor response has been to seek safety in cash, with average investor proportions of it rising to 5.5% from 5.4% in the most recent BAML Global Fund Manager Survey.
If you think that central banks will give up on stimulus measures tomorrow, then a well-timed move out of a diversified asset allocation and into cash makes sense. In my view, central bank questions about monetary policy will lead to a new phase of stimulus, but not less stimulus.
When I started investing, "prudence" from a central bank meant a willingness to raise interest rates sooner rather than later. Now, according to the US Federal Reserve's Lael Brainard, it means keeping them lower for longer - a strategy that the Fed followed by staying on hold at its September policy meeting. While policy makers are right to question the efficacy of some of the more unorthodox policies - such as negative rates and quantitative easing (QE) - central banks will continue to pursue these and other measures.
For example, the BoJ has continued to innovate, introducing commitments to "overshoot" its 2% inflation target and to cap 10-year bond yields at zero. It might take away the punchbowl, but not until the cups of sake have been poured.
There are at least two important considerations for investors to entertain as we enter what may become a new phase of stimulus efforts.
First, the global policy war on cash is far from over. Investors should prepare for even more negative real yields on cash if inflation rises. With oil unlikely to fall 35% again as it did last year, and with the US close to full employment, inflation can trend higher. Most US inflation gauges are already at or above their 20-year averages.
Top money managers participating in our Investor Forum this month expressed their belief in a firmer inflation outlook. It also is worth noting that some serious economists want to increase the war on cash in other ways - calling for its abolition - so that monetary policy making and law enforcement efforts are more effective.
Second, bonds look increasingly at risk. The rally in government bonds this year has been supported by negative interest rates and QE policies that may now be reaching their limits. We've seen sharp sell-offs in recent weeks, particularly in the UK and Japan (two countries currently pursuing bond buying but where central bank chiefs are clearly uneasy about going further). Such market moves demonstrate the potential risks for bonds if loose monetary policy is shifting focus from bonds to other assets or measures.
What are the alternatives?
Cash and bonds have historically been important components of a diversified portfolio, but they may be getting even more costly to hold as "insurance." In a world where cash and bonds have low to negative yields, we have to work harder to find lower volatility, diversification and/or higher returns.
For investors seeking diversification and returns in a world where bonds may be at risk of sharp drawdowns, we believe that alternatives - hedge funds and private markets - are worth allocations.
Hedge funds are unlikely to deliver the kind of returns they did before the financial crisis; the industry has expanded and competition for alpha is high. But they still provide effective portfolio diversification and returns still compare favorably with other assets in a strategic allocation.
The best managers are still able to seize opportunities in more opaque markets and even in sideways or down-trending markets. Managers of private markets funds have the flexibility to buy assets and add value in illiquid markets. They can more easily take advantage of mispriced assets as information may not be readily available or disclosed to average investors.
Private markets also have proven their ability to diversify returns in periods of equity market turbulence: Compared to the average of the 10 worst drawdowns for public equities over the last decade, private market indices have been more resilient.
Tactical asset allocation
Over our six-month investment time frame, we remain positive on risk assets. Volatility has risen in the short term as the policy debate has gotten louder, and there are a number of political and economic risks ahead. However, as we saw with the Brexit vote shock, policy action and economic growth are likely to prove a stronger driver of markets in the medium term.
On the economic side, we continue to monitor Chinese data and Fed policy closely. Headline growth in China has been good, but balance sheet strains remain - debt is rising, house price growth is extreme in some cities, and financial sector pressure points came to the fore again as Hong Kong interbank rates spiked. And while we believe the Fed is likely to remain cautious over the long-term horizon, varying market interpretations of the path of Fed rates could lead to higher short-term volatility, similar to that seen in recent weeks.
A number of political risks also loom between now and next year's 19th Party Congress in China, the biggest being the US election. A Donald Trump victory is not priced into markets and would likely cause marked short-term volatility, although a Trump win is not our base case.
Despite these and other risks, we are overweight US equities against government bonds because they are less expensive, less vulnerable, and have greater upside, in our view. The earnings yield of stocks relative to Treasuries has only been higher 16% of the time since 1956. As current bond-buying measures are increasingly being questioned, government bonds are vulnerable to sharper drawdowns.
And we see clear catalysts for US equity gains: The earnings drag in the US from lower oil prices and a stronger dollar is abating, and we expect earnings growth of 3% this year overall, which should accelerate to 6.5% next year.
We are overweight emerging market equities versus Swiss equities. Profits are starting to stabilize in emerging countries after a multi-year malaise. The turnaround should be fueled by reviving economic momentum. Gauges of business activity show manufacturing activity expanding. And with the Fed still in go-slow mode, emerging market currencies have rallied, further reducing inflation pressures and the need for tighter monetary policy. Meanwhile, Swiss stock indices are skewed toward defensive sectors and are less well positioned to exploit a global earnings improvement in more cyclical sectors.
We favor the Norwegian krone versus the euro. Norway is arguably more advanced than most other regions in as much as it has generated high inflation - currently running at 4%. We believe this means its central bank's easing cycle is clearly over, a view supported by the more hawkish tone of the Norges Bank's September meeting.
We are introducing a new position on a basket of emerging market currencies - the Russian ruble, Brazilian real, South African rand, and Indian rupee - versus a group of G10 currencies - the Australian dollar, Canadian dollar and Swedish krona. The goal of this position is to take advantage of the interest rate differentials between these nations, which currently amounts to roughly 8% p.a.
We prefer a basket of currencies in order to limit the overall risk of the trade. Taking this position during a time of improving economic conditions limits the danger of weakening emerging market currencies. And the low-yielding developed currencies we have chosen to underweight share a high exposure to commodities and/or the global economic cycle. As a result, they should diversify the risk of the EM basket.
Conclusión
The debate over the right balance between monetary and fiscal policy has grown louder in recent months, contributing to higher volatility. I believe policy support is likely to remain firmly in place for the foreseeable future, even in the means of implementation shift. Cash and bonds are at risk in this environment, and investors will be required to find more creative ways to seek safety and diversification over the longer term.
Over the short term, I maintain a positive view on risky assets. Loose policy and earnings growth should offset potential risks, and we are staying overweight equities relative to bonds in our global tactical asset allocations.
Suscribirse a:
Entradas (Atom)
Bienvenida
Estimados amigos,
Les doy cordialmente la bienvenida a este Blog informativo con artículos, análisis y comentarios de publicaciones especializadas y especialmente seleccionadas, principalmente sobre temas económicos, financieros y políticos de actualidad, que esperamos y deseamos, sean de su máximo interés, utilidad y conveniencia.
Pensamos que solo comprendiendo cabalmente el presente, es que podemos proyectarnos acertadamente hacia el futuro.
Gonzalo Raffo de Lavalle
Les doy cordialmente la bienvenida a este Blog informativo con artículos, análisis y comentarios de publicaciones especializadas y especialmente seleccionadas, principalmente sobre temas económicos, financieros y políticos de actualidad, que esperamos y deseamos, sean de su máximo interés, utilidad y conveniencia.
Pensamos que solo comprendiendo cabalmente el presente, es que podemos proyectarnos acertadamente hacia el futuro.
Gonzalo Raffo de Lavalle
Las convicciones son mas peligrosos enemigos de la verdad que las mentiras.
Friedrich Nietzsche
Quien conoce su ignorancia revela la mas profunda sabiduría. Quien ignora su ignorancia vive en la mas profunda ilusión.
Lao Tse
“There are decades when nothing happens and there are weeks when decades happen.”
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
You only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out.
Warren Buffett
No soy alguien que sabe, sino alguien que busca.
FOZ
Only Gold is money. Everything else is debt.
J.P. Morgan
Las grandes almas tienen voluntades; las débiles tan solo deseos.
Proverbio Chino
Quien no lo ha dado todo no ha dado nada.
Helenio Herrera
History repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce.
Karl Marx
If you know the other and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.
Sun Tzu
Friedrich Nietzsche
Quien conoce su ignorancia revela la mas profunda sabiduría. Quien ignora su ignorancia vive en la mas profunda ilusión.
Lao Tse
“There are decades when nothing happens and there are weeks when decades happen.”
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
You only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out.
Warren Buffett
No soy alguien que sabe, sino alguien que busca.
FOZ
Only Gold is money. Everything else is debt.
J.P. Morgan
Las grandes almas tienen voluntades; las débiles tan solo deseos.
Proverbio Chino
Quien no lo ha dado todo no ha dado nada.
Helenio Herrera
History repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce.
Karl Marx
If you know the other and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.
Sun Tzu
We are travelers on a cosmic journey, stardust, swirling and dancing in the eddies and whirlpools of infinity. Life is eternal. We have stopped for a moment to encounter each other, to meet, to love, to share.This is a precious moment. It is a little parenthesis in eternity.
Paulo Coelho
Paulo Coelho

Archivo del blog
-
►
2020
(2008)
- ► septiembre (145)
-
►
2019
(2103)
- ► septiembre (187)
-
►
2018
(1928)
- ► septiembre (173)
-
►
2017
(1947)
- ► septiembre (160)
-
▼
2016
(2576)
- ► septiembre (182)