To the protesters, the lesson was that mass marches aren’t enough. It took confrontation for the government to show its true colors and turn the public against it. And with Lam still refusing to fully withdraw the bill (despite another mass march on June 16 that drew as many as 2 million people), much less to cede to demands for her resignation, decided to try the same tactic again. But the government evidently learned the same lesson. And this time, police largely stood by as the protesters moved on LegCo. The government now has the legal standing to take the vanguard of the opposition movement off the streets, and it may have greater political cover to do so. And the divisions among the broader opposition movement, which Beijing and the Hong Kong government have routinely proved adept at exploiting, may only deepen.
Tried and True
Still, the underlying issues that have fueled the opposition to the extradition bill aren’t going away. The feeling of losing autonomy to outside forces – unforgiving market realities, mass immigration, moves by outside governments to secure their interests – is a powerful one, and the impulse to take back control by whatever means necessary can drive people to extremes, even in the world’s wealthiest cities. Youths in Hong Kong face a future shaped by each of these. For so dense a city, Hong Kong is a marvel of urban planning, but an excellent public transport system can only do so much. Its size and density have made it by far the most expensive city in the world, making home ownership a pipe dream for most. The ever-rising tide of mainland money and migrants pouring into Hong Kong has further distorted job and real estate markets for natives, fueling soaring inequality. Meanwhile, Beijing has been gradually stripping Hongkongers of the right to choose the leadership responsible for tackling the city’s mounting woes.
Beijing cannot fix these problems. Nor can it ignore their implications. If Beijing appears paralyzed on what to do beyond issuing veiled threats and condemnations, that’s because it’s following its tried-and-true playbook for managing Hong Kong.
Historically, Hong Kong’s crucial role as a gateway for foreign tech and investment to the Chinese economy compelled Beijing to keep a low profile in the city. As the economic rise of mainland counterparts like Shenzhen and Shanghai has made Hong Kong less vital, Beijing has been emboldened to protect its interests in the city with a heavier hand. But China still benefits enormously from Hong Kong’s reputation as a place that operates on rule of law. But as more and more investors become wary of navigating the pitfalls of doing business in communist China, and with the U.S. and other Western governments starting to restrict Chinese access to core technologies, Hong Kong is recovering some of its leverage over Beijing. This was made clear as protests first spiked in early June, which briefly sent Hong Kong stock markets into free fall and interbank lending rates soaring amid fears of capital flight.
What Beijing needs most is the power to prevent Hong Kong’s autonomy from being exploited by dissidents, political opponents, uncooperative tycoons, and media muckrakers to destabilize the mainland. The extradition bill would advance its powers in these areas. But, to date, the lack of an extradition treaty between the two governments hasn’t stopped Beijing from reaching in to snatch figures it deems threatening. It’s not about to sacrifice Hong Kong’s international reputation and risk an all-out insurrection by intervening too forcefully to save the bill. (Indeed, there’s been some reporting that Lam’s government was pushing the extradition bill forward on its own volition, not at Beijing’s behest).
Of course, Beijing may not want to set the precedent that it can be deterred by collective action and, especially, by acts of civil disorder. So don’t expect some grand concession. This is why Lam merely suspended debate on the bill, rather than withdrawing it altogether. But Hong Kong is a real problem for Beijing only to the extent that it threatens mainland stability. At present, there’s little evidence that the Hong Kong protests are raising the risk of similar uprisings at home. Unless this changes, Beijing will remain content to let the Hong Kong government do what’s necessary to keep a lid on matters on its behalf.
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