The Chinese have been pushing toward this point. They cannot tolerate a blockade and cannot engage in full-fleet action against the Americans. The construction of extensive anti-ship systems coupled with multiple types of sensors is the key. Therefore, if the U.S. wants to carry out a blockade, it would need an extensive air operation to destroy Chinese anti-missile capabilities. And that must be preceded by massive suppression of air defense.
Note that as with the Chinese invasion of Taiwan, what appears to be a simple problem spins out of control. The U.S. can’t be certain it would not be detected and would have to attack the Chinese mainland. Even then it would be unlikely to destroy all Chinese missiles, and Chinese command and control is undoubtedly redundant. The possibility of significant U.S. losses can’t be discounted. That would mean that the use of sanctions and blockades as an alternative to armed conflict would lead to armed conflict.
The Chinese have not, however, fully solved their problem. Even if they drive everyone out of the East and South China seas, which isn’t likely, they are still enclosed by the archipelago. They know the U.S. is unpredictable and therefore can’t assume that the U.S. is reading the battle problem as they are. The Chinese are not facing imminent crisis, but they must have a long-term goal of taking control of the choke points and basing in such a way as to push the U.S. Navy back into the central Pacific.
Attack by main force is not an option. There are too many choke points, and the American response is too unpredictable. The ideal solution is political. This works one of two ways. The first is to reach an agreement with a major country that controls key choke points to allow passage and a Chinese naval presence. Aside from Taiwan, the country that would be valuable in this regard is the Philippines. As long as the Taiwan Straits are open, the Philippines could serve as an exit point. You might note the behavior of the Filipino president of late.
The second option would be to create insurgencies to destabilize one or more countries. This is far less efficient than a political shift, but the Chinese have been quite good in the past with supporting insurgencies, while the U.S. is not at all good at counterinsurgency. It would not provide a satisfactory solution to the Chinese in any reasonable time frame.
The point I am making here and in yesterday’s analysis is that any discussion of war between the U.S. and China overestimates either the Chinese capability or the American capability. The Chinese would not be able to take Taiwan. There are too many failure points. The U.S. could blockade China if it was prepared to accept losses. The U.S. is risk averse, and minimizing threats would mean a far larger war than merely a naval picket line.
Each action by either side faces a counter that opens the door not only to failure but also to losing forces neither side can afford to lose. The only practical way to force a change in the balance of power in the region is a shift in alliances by one of the countries, and the Philippines is the one to watch.
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