WHAT THE ETHIOPIAN WAR MEANS FOR STABILITY IN THE HORN / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

What the Ethiopian War Means for Stability in the Horn

A wider conflict is possible.

By Ronan Wordsworth

The ongoing war in Ethiopia could fundamentally reshape the Horn of Africa. 

Government forces have driven the Tigray People’s Liberation Front from Mekele, Tigray’s regional capital, and are advancing toward the Eritrean border. 

Over the weekend, commercial flights resumed to the north, and there are signs that the government has consolidated its position. 

At the same time, Eritrean troops have been reported crossing into northern Tigray, where Ethiopian drones have targeted their convoys.

The speed of the federal advance is somewhat unexpected. 

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali faces a wider array of adversaries than he did during the previous Tigray war, yet his government also has superior drone capabilities, benefits from divisions within Tigray and retains access to important external suppliers.

Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki appears to have committed military support to the TPLF even as it lost ground. 

Isaias has an interest in preventing Ethiopia from becoming powerful enough to impose its will on its neighbors, but he has potentially widened the war.

A Weaker TPLF

The TPLF spent 27 years as the dominant party in Ethiopia’s ruling coalition before protests, particularly in Oromia and Amhara, helped bring Abiy to power in 2018. 

Despite some consistent economic growth, its rule was marked by political dominance and repression. 

Abiy’s subsequent power consolidation further accentuated disputes between Addis Ababa and the Tigrayan leadership. 

War broke out in November 2020. 

Eritrean and Amharan forces, including Fano militias, joined the federal campaign against the TPLF. 

The Oromo Liberation Army, already fighting the government, allied with the TPLF in 2021.

The Pretoria agreement of 2022 ended the war but left many of the territorial disputes and regional grievances unresolved. 

Since then, there have been attempts to disarm or absorb these regional forces, which in turn have further pushed Fano forces against Addis Ababa. 

Eritrea’s relationship with Abiy also deteriorated as Ethiopia increasingly voiced its desire for permanent sea access. 

These former allies now have more immediate reasons to oppose the government, even if their hostility toward the TPLF remains. 

Hence the announcement of the seven-member opposition coalition on Sept. 20 that brought together the TPLF, the Amhara Fano National Movement, the Oromo Liberation Army and members of four minor groups to remove Abiy.

Since the coalition’s announcement, its members have suffered major setbacks, including the loss of key population centers in Tigray. 

The TPLF itself has fractured. 

Fighters who once served together now face one another across the front, with the Tigray Peace Force (TPF) supporting the federal advance. 

Former Tigray leader Getachew Reda arrived over the weekend with the TPF to help establish an alternative to the TPLF that is allied with Addis Ababa and includes former TPLF fighters.

Perhaps the most consequential difference between the current conflict and the previous one is the cooperation between Eritrean and Fano forces and the TPLF. 

Their combined opposition to Abiy has become more pressing than their hostility to the TPLF. 

Those contradictions constrain the new alliance, but the TPLF also faces a more immediate problem: recruiting new soldiers. 

In Tigray, there is now widespread disillusionment among people who once supported the TPLF but now lay the blame on the group for renewed fighting and a stalled recovery. 

This has led to forcible recruitment, including of boys as young as 15, but as soon as the battlefield losses started to mount, many of these conscripts fled to the government side.

The government’s advantage in the air compounds these weaknesses. 

Foreign-supplied drones helped reverse the Tigrayan advance toward Addis Ababa in 2021, and Abiy has since invested in sustaining that capability. 

He inaugurated SkyWin Aeronautics Industries in Addis Ababa in March 2025, and there are now two domestically owned drone factories operating nationally. 

This investment has given the government additional means to maintain an advantage that proved decisive in the previous war.

The loss of morale, government drones and forced recruitment of new soldiers, combined with internal defections and the loss of major towns, have left the TPLF at its most vulnerable in decades. 

Its bid to threaten the federal government has been repelled, and it is now looking to survive as an insurgency group supported by Eritrean forces and cross-border logistics.

Eritrea Enters the Conflict

Eritrean troops were first sighted on Ethiopian territory on Oct. 7, signaling that TPLF’s failings have unsettled the government in Asmara. 

After initial drone attacks, Ethiopia by Friday accused Eritrea of an “all-out invasion” and claimed its troops had advanced up to 60 kilometers (37 miles) into Ethiopian territory. 

Eritrea has rejected the allegations.

This is also an escalation of an unfinished confrontation. 

Eritrea never signed the Pretoria agreement, and its forces kept their positions in border areas after the war. The settlement ended the main internal Ethiopian conflict, but there was no agreement between Addis Ababa and Asmara. 

Each government now describes the other as the aggressor.

Asmara’s calculations have changed since the previous war. 

Isaias once saw cooperation with Abiy as a way to weaken the TPLF, its long-standing enemy. 

Ethiopia’s renewed insistence on permanent sea access has since made Abiy’s ambitions more concerning. 

Eritrea now sees cooperation with the TPLF as a means of weakening what it views as a hostile actor in Addis Ababa. 

A TPLF that was able to hold Tigray would effectively bog down Ethiopian troops and become a useful buffer. 

The recent setbacks may force Asmara to choose between losing its buffer and committing more of its own forces to defend it.

Over the past weekend, Ethiopia invoked its right to self-defense at the U.N. Security Council. 

Eritrea made a separate appeal for deterrence as both seek international support for their own accounts. 

Asmara wants external pressure to constrain Ethiopia, considering its own military intervention appears to have achieved little. 

Isaias is also now 80 and, having been in power since 1993, has become increasingly authoritarian, isolated and hostile to his country’s neighbors. 

Abiy would like an excuse to help with his removal and ensure a new friendly regime is imposed.

Eritrea’s neighbors have reason to support these efforts. 

At El Alamein on Oct. 4, Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan’s military de facto government reiterated some common positions on control over the Nile, Somalian sovereignty and Red Sea governance. 

Their declaration called for Red Sea governance to remain the responsibility of coastal states and opposed unilateral measures that harm downstream Nile users. 

The alignment is plainly intended to constrain Ethiopian ambitions, although it falls short of a mutual defense pact and is more of an informal effort to constrain Ethiopia.

Each government has its own issues with Ethiopia. 

Egypt wants leverage over Ethiopia’s control of Nile flows through the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. 

Somalia opposes Ethiopian arrangements with Somaliland that bypass Mogadishu. 

Sudan’s army accuses Addis Ababa of helping its rival, the Rapid Support Forces. 

(A report earlier this year determined that an RSF training camp was established in western Ethiopia with financing from the United Arab Emirates.)

The sea-access dispute helps to bring these countries together. 

Ethiopia depends heavily on Djibouti for exports and has an economic incentive to diversify. 

In fact, 95 percent of Ethiopia’s exports went through the Port of Djibouti, which is expensive, is accessed through the hostile Afar region, and is unable to accommodate its growing exports. 

A January 2024 memorandum with Somaliland linked maritime access for military and commercial purposes to potential future recognition. 

DP World’s investment in Berbera and the infrastructure linking Somaliland to Ethiopia gives the UAE a large commercial stake in that alternative corridor.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 strengthened the territory’s diplomatic position. 

These overlapping interests help explain the emerging alignment around Ethiopia, Somaliland, the UAE and Israel. 

The Turkish-mediated Ankara Declaration acknowledged Ethiopian sea access under Somali sovereignty, but in practice Somaliland has drawn closer to this bloc.

Turkey meanwhile has significant interests in the region and would oppose any larger regional conflict. 

Ankara has supplied Ethiopia with drones while signing deals for oil and gas exploration and defense provision with Somalia. 

It has invested in manufacturing in Ethiopia and has tried to capitalize on the cheap energy produced there. 

A wider war would endanger its investments and undermine its position in the region.

Unequal External Support

Though many of these countries have an incentive to constrain Ethiopia, there’s only so much they can do. 

Egypt has drawn closer to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan but faces much more immediate military threats from Iran.

Turkey has too much at stake for its own support and too many competing interests in Ethiopia.

Meanwhile, wealthier countries like the UAE support Ethiopia. 

The UAE is by far the most influential of the Middle Eastern states in the conflict and the most willing and capable external backer. 

It backed the federal government during the previous war and has maintained close relations with Addis Ababa ever since.

Israel likewise shares an interest in Ethiopian stability and has expanded its engagement around the Horn of Africa more broadly. 

Foreign Minister Gideon Saar reaffirmed support for Ethiopia’s unity and stability, and has said it would be possible to share intelligence. 

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland also places it closer to Ethiopian and Emirati interests regarding maritime access.

This shows that while there is a wider regional power struggle at play, Ethiopia has by far the more capable external support, so external players are unlikely to restrain its battlefield successes. 

Abiy is well positioned to sustain the present campaign against both the TPLF-led coalition and potentially farther into Eritrea.

His successes raise the stakes for Eritrea. 

Isaias’ age and the concentration of power around him make a serious military defeat particularly consequential. 

He has ruled since independence, and there is no established succession mechanism. 

A war could unsettle the military and political relationships on which his government depends and bring about regime change all on its own.

But that’s no easy task. 

Ethiopia would also have to maintain the military campaign while managing its own internal rebellions and rebuilding control in Tigray. 

A durable settlement will depend on security, services, recovery and potentially the end of the TPLF as a group.

Foreign governments interested in stable ports and trade routes would have their own reasons to oppose an Ethiopian offensive that threatened prolonged disorder in Eritrea. 

With concurrent conflicts in Sudan, the Red Sea and Somalia, any sustained crisis has the potential to become a much larger regional conflict at a time when international shipping and energy exports are under duress.

For now, Abiy is in the stronger position. 

His opponents have struggled to turn a broad coalition into effective military cooperation, while his government has the air power and drone advantage to create divisions inside Tigray. 

Isaias’ intervention risks converting Ethiopian gains into a direct threat to his own rule. 

The next question is how far Abiy intends to push the opportunity and whether he is willing to take a larger gamble.