Former Brazilian president: Revolutionary conditions are developing in Brazil

by Fernando Henrique Cardoso

An image of the Brazilian flag adorns the presidential palace in Brasilia, Brazil. (Eraldo Peres/AP)

SAO PAULO — Brazilians are confronted with a fateful choice in the upcoming general elections, including for the presidency, in October.

Either there must be a convergence of democratic leaders capable of bridging the gap between society and politics, rebuilding trust from the bottom up, or Brazil will join other disintegrating democracies, such as Venezuela, which have embraced false prophets and demagogues who persuade the population that the only solution to the crisis lies in the direct relationship of a strongman with the masses.

Should the latter be the outcome, representative democracy, freedom and the public interests will all be at risk.

Brazil’s structural challenges

Brazil faces a series of structural and short-term problems. The difficulty of a middle-income country in sustaining its level of prosperity is compounded by the fact that the country is industrialized but not yet fully integrated into the global networks of production and commercialization. A great part of Brazil’s economic dynamism in recent decades came from the deepening and expansion of the internal market. But it still lacks a strong capacity to export manufactured goods.

Despite steady growth from the end of World War II to the 1980s, and some sparse favorable periods later on, Brazil’s GDP growth rate in 2017 was only 1 percent, which pales in comparison with the global rate. The average productivity of the Brazilian economy remains inferior to that of developed economies and even that of some still developing ones. GDP per capita in Brazil was 13 percent of that of the United States in 1990; today it is 15 percent. By contrast, South Korea stood at 27 percent of U.S. levels in 1990, but it is now 48 percent.
In Brazil and elsewhere, the radical transformations in the means of communication (Internet and social media) and in the modes of production (automation and artificial intelligence) have profoundly changed society and the way people connect with each other and acquire information. One of the consequences of these tectonic shifts has been the generalized feeling that political institutions — the parties, Congress and the whole architecture of representative democracy — are no longer capable of responding to the demands of a connected and informed citizenry.

Misguided policies and a moral crisis

To these structural factors one must add two major hazards. First, the misguided economic policies implemented in the last years of former president Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva’s government and throughout the mandates of his successor, Dilma Vana Rousseff, have nearly bankrupted the state with fiscally reckless spending.

Second, Brazil’s political and economic systems are facing an appalling moral crisis. Investigations by the judiciary have brought to light a systemic web of corrupt collusion among the government, the political parties and private and public companies. Privilege and patronage replaced competition as the driver of both economic and political life.

Prosecutors and magistrates in the so-called Operation Car Wash scandal have revealed that the money used to illegally finance political parties came from overpriced contracts with public corporations, whose directors were nominated by the government to execute exactly this kind of deal. Far from a simple matter of covert campaign funds, what came to light was a system organized to divert public funds for the benefit of companies and parties, and more often than not, also for the pockets of individual politicians.

Moral crisis combined with relative economic stagnation — unemployment stands at 13 percent today — is a deadly mix for any society.

Confronted with the indignation of the public, and also with the crossfire of accusations among conflicting political groups, it became impossible to acknowledge that not all corruption cases are alike, that a given political leader did not misuse campaign funds for personal benefit, that another may have committed a crime but his party had not and so forth. To the eyes of an incensed public, all politicians looked like a bunch of crooks guilty of thievery. Both the political class and the government have lost credibility and legitimacy.

No revolution has occurred in Brazil. Yet we are witnessing the revolutionary conditions in which avengers are gearing up to cut off the heads of the high and the mighty and are cheered by the populace. If history is any guide, the endgame tends to be the arrival of a providential leader, the charismatic savior or strongman who comes to put an end to anarchy in the land. 
These are the risks hovering over the forthcoming elections. With Lula ineligible due to being jailed on corruption charges, the different segments of the left, bereft of their natural leader, feel electorally insecure. The right is calling for the restoration of order at any cost, including the curtailment of democratic freedoms. A far-right former military officer, Jair Bolsonaro, accused of racially charged language against Brazil’s Afro-Brazilian and indigenous communities, is currently leading in the polls.

A fragmented body politic that distrusts institutions

The remaining political sensibilities are fragmented, unable to coalesce around the disconnected parts of the political center, really only an amalgam of some with an archaic vision and others more liberal or vaguely social-democratic who value the institutions of democracy and know that inequality is the main threat.

The wide array of political groups is organized in no less than 26 political parties with representation in Congress, the majority of which hardly deserve to be called “parties.” They are rather conglomerates of individuals whose only objective is to loot the booty of the state. Understandably skeptical, the body politic at this stage does not know whether it is worthwhile to vote at all.

In this, Brazil is no exception. Our society, like others, has been splintered by the very advances of modernity: improved social mobility, the advent of the information age and the rise of race and gender identity politics. All have broken the cohesiveness of the old class divisions and of the parties and ideologies that represented them in an earlier era.

A dim prospect

Is there no way out? I am convinced that in situations like this, a common vision of the future is the only message that can unite society.

Social demands are linked to people’s basic needs: the search for jobs, the fight against inequality, and the complaints about the inability of the state to efficiently provide security, housing, transportation, health and, above all, education. In times of crisis, political leaders must translate a common set of values — the spirit of freedom, equality of opportunity and the respect for human dignity — into concrete ideas and proposals that touch people’s hearts and minds.

They must address themselves to persons who are no longer part of an amorphous mass. Each voter has access to information, is aware of his or her rights and wants the government to take care of his or her needs. This “re-enchantment” of public life has to go hand in hand with the effort to control public finances and promote productive investment, without which there is no employment creation.

Everyone who values democracy and freedom knows what has to be done. Yet, as elsewhere, the old mainstream is out of step with the new realities, and new political alliances have not yet found a cogent voice in common with the whole of the people.

The risk of regression coexists with the perspective of renewal. Brazilian society, driven by social and economic transformations and by new values, is on the move. This process of change is not as visible as the current political polarizations. In many fields, the pace of change in society is faster than in institutions. There is, thus, reason for hope – if we find the political will to transform our institutions in sync with public aspirations.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso was the president of Brazil from 1995 to 2002. He is a member of the Berggruen Institute’s 21st Century Council.

This was produced by The WorldPost, a partnership of the Berggruen Institute and The Washington Post.

What Is the Trade Deficit?

It’s not a scorecard, and reducing it won’t necessarily be good for jobs.

By Neil Irwin

Money has been flowing from China to the United States, the flip side of the U.S. trade deficit that President Trump has bemoaned. CreditThomas White/Reuters

This is an updated and expanded version of an article published in 2016.

A core idea that Donald J. Trump has embraced throughout his time in public life has been that the United States is losing in trade with the rest of the world, and that persistent trade deficits are evidence of this fact.

In this accounting, the $69 billion United States trade deficit with Mexico or $336 billion gap with China is something of a scorecard reflecting diminishing American greatness.

The vast majority of economists view it differently. In this mainstream view, trade deficits are not inherently good or bad. They can be either, depending on circumstances.

As the president’s emphasis on trade deficits puts the United States at odds with allies — in this case at the Group of 7 leaders meeting this weekend in Canada — the trade-offs in making this an overwhelming focus of economic diplomacy are becoming more clear. 
Trying to eliminate the trade deficit could mean giving up some of the key levers of power that allow the United States to get its way in international politics. The reasons have to do with the global reserve currency, economic diplomacy and something called the Triffin dilema.

What is the trade deficit?

Imagine a world with only two countries, and only two products. One country makes cars; the other grows bananas.

People in CarNation want bananas, so they buy $1 million worth from people in BananaLand. Residents of BananaLand want cars, so they buy $2 million of them from CarNation.

That difference is the trade deficit: BananaLand has a $1 million trade deficit; CarNation has a $1 million trade surplus.

But this does not mean that BananaLand is “losing” to CarNation. Cars are really useful, and BananaLanders got a lot of them in exchange for their money.

Similarly, it’s true that the United States has a large trade deficit with Mexico, for example. But it’s not as if Americans were just flinging money across the Rio Grande out of charity. Americans get a lot of good stuff for that: avocados, for example, and Cancún vacations.

If you want to think of it in terms of winners and losers, you could justifiably reverse Mr. Trump’s preferred framing: “Those losers in Mexico gave us $69 billion more stuff than we gave them last year. Ha, ha, ha. We’re winners.”

What does that have to do with savings and investment?

When a country runs a trade deficit, there is a countervailing force. Think back to our pretend countries. BananaLand has a $1 million trade deficit with CarNation. But that means that car producers in CarNation are sitting on an extra $1 million a year in income.

Something has to happen with that $1 million. If CarNation doesn’t want the value of its currency to rise, it has to take that $1 million trade surplus and plow it back into BananaLand. There are different ways it could do that. People in CarNation could buy stocks or bonds in BananaLand, or companies in CarNation could invest in factories in BananaLand, or the government of CarNation could buy assets directly.

In effect, the flow of capital is the reverse of the flow of goods. And the trade deficit will be shaped not just by the mechanics of what products people in the two countries buy, but also by unrelated investment and savings decisions. The cause and effect goes both directions.

So, for example, if a country enacts a giant tax cut that increases its budget deficit, it is effectively lowering its savings rate — which tends to increase its trade deficit. 
That, of course, is exactly the fiscal policy choice the United States has made, so the tax cut passed late last year will tend to increase the trade deficit relative to its level if tax rates had remained unchanged.

New Volkswagens in a delivery tower in Wolfsburg, Germany.CreditMichael Sohn/Associated Press

But don’t trade deficits mean fewer jobs?


It is true that a trade deficit subtracts from a country’s gross domestic product. G.D.P. measures the value of goods and services produced within a country’s borders, so when a country is selling less stuff abroad than it buys from abroad, the country is making less stuff, and as a result there are fewer jobs. This piece of the Trump theory of trade is true.

But the flow of capital into the country — the inverse of the trade deficit — creates benefits that can be good for jobs, by encouraging more domestic investment.

This isn’t just an abstraction. It’s what has happened between the United States and China for the last couple of decades. China has had consistent trade surpluses, but it did not want its currency to rise in a way that would undermine its exporters. So money has flowed from China into the United States — both from the Chinese government’s purchases of United States Treasury bonds and more recently in the form of direct investment from Chinese companies into the United States.

When you see a headline about a Chinese company buying American hotels or factories, you’re seeing the flip side of the trade deficit Mr. Trump bemoans. (The same when a citizen of China buys a luxury apartment in a Trump tower.) Money flowing into a country is usually considered a good thing. It makes borrowing money cheaper, drives up stock prices and can mean more investment in new businesses.

So does a trade deficit mean fewer jobs? It depends on which force is more economically powerful: fewer jobs creating exports or investment dollars flowing into the country.

So which is it?

It depends on what the country does with the investment that comes in.

In theory, that money could go toward long-lasting investments with positive economic returns: new factories and equipment; education for the work force; new roads and bridges, or repairs and improvements to existing ones. 

Unfortunately, how countries use these capital inflows is not always so fruitful. In the United States, the influx of foreign capital in the mid-2000s went in large part to fuel an unsustainable housing and mortgage bubble. Greece’s capital inflows in the same time period went to fund bloated public spending.
When the world is flinging money at you, it’s important to use it for something productive. It’s not that trade deficits (and the capital inflows that are their flip side) don’t matter — but just knowing the numbers doesn’t tell you much about whether they are good, bad or indifferent.

Wouldn’t it be better if the U.S. didn’t run a deficit?

It’s not clear that that’s even an option, because the dollar isn’t used just in trade between the United States and other countries.

The dollar is a global reserve currency, meaning that it is used around the world in transactions that have nothing to do with the United States. When a Malaysian company does business with a German company, in many cases it will do business in dollars; when wealthy people in Dubai or Singapore’s government investment fund want to sock away money, they do so in large part in dollar assets.

That creates upward pressure on the dollar for reasons unrelated to trade flows between the United States and its partners. That, in turn, makes the dollar stronger — and American exporters less competitive — than they would be in a world where nobody used the dollar for anything except commerce involving the United States.

The roughly $500 billion trade deficit that the United States runs each year isn’t just about poorly negotiated trade deals and currency manipulation by this or that country. It’s also, to some degree, a byproduct of the central role the United States plays in the global financial system.

There’s even a name for this: the Triffin dilemma. In the mid-20th century, the economist Robert Triffin warned that the provider of the global reserve currency would need to run perpetual trade deficits to keep the world financial system from freezing, with those trade deficits potentially fueling domestic booms and busts.

The key idea is that if Mr. Trump really wanted to reduce our trade deficits in a major way, he would have to have to rethink the very underpinnings of global finance.

If having the global reserve currency means bleeding jobs overseas, why keep it?

Be careful what you wish for.

There’s no doubt that maintaining the global reserve currency creates costs for the United States, namely a less competitive export industry.

But it also creates a lot of advantages. Lower interest rates and higher stock prices are among them (though they have the downside of also feeding debt-driven booms and busts). Even more important is what the dollar’s prominence in global finance does for America’s place in the world.

It helps ensure that the United States can afford to finance wars, and it gives the government greater ability to fight recessions and panics. A country experiencing a banking panic will see money sent out of the country, causing its currency to fall and its interest rates to rise. All that limits a government’s options for fixing the problem. In 2008, when the United States experienced a near collapse of the banking system, the opposite happened.

The centrality of the dollar to global finance gives the United States power on the global stage that no other country can match. It has enforced sanctions on Iran, Russia, North Korea and terrorist groups with the implicit threat of cutting off access to the dollar payments system for any bank in the world that does not cooperate with American foreign policy.

Part of what makes the United States powerful is the great importance of the dollar to global finance. And part of the price the United States pays for that status is a stronger currency and higher trade deficits than would be the case otherwise.

The debate over the trade deficit is about more than Mexico and China, cars and bananas, or winning and losing. It’s about what makes America great, and which of the country’s priorities should come first. 

Neil Irwin is a senior economics correspondent for The Upshot. He previously wrote for The Washington Post and is the author of “The Alchemists: Three Central Bankers and a World on Fire.”

Buttonwood: Ignore your instincts

A case for owning euro-zone shares

The contrarian wisdom of George Costanza

IN AN episode of “Seinfeld”, a 1990s television comedy, George Costanza, a serial failure played by Jason Alexander, decides that every instinct he has is wrong. So he resolves to do the opposite. He is soon squiring a new girlfriend and is up for a dream job. “It’s all happening because I’m completely ignoring every urge towards common sense and good judgment I’ve ever had,” he says.

Success in investing often means going against the grain—and your own feelings. To do otherwise is to be swept along by the general greed and fear. Still, fear is a useful emotion. It would be unwise, for instance, to ignore the recent turmoil in Italy, where bond yields spiked in response to concerns that the country might be on the road to leaving the euro. Though the worst fears have subsided, the coalition that was eventually given the president’s blessing to form a government looks capable of causing trouble.

A natural inclination in the circumstances is to turn away from euro-zone assets—not just bonds (where the rewards are notably scanty in relation to the risks) but equities, too. Yet such instincts can betray investors. There is an argument for buying euro-zone shares precisely because their defects have now become all too clear to everyone.

Among the shortcomings is that Europe is ageing. It is the place to find businesses ripe for disruption, rather than those doing the disrupting. Its bourses are heavy with the technologies of the second industrial revolution—mass-market cars, petrochemicals and machinery—but light on the digital firms that power stockmarkets in America (see chart). Its banks, a big weight in stockmarket indices, look leaden. Deutsche Bank is a target of short-sellers. Last year’s strong GDP growth has cooled. To cap it all, there are glaring holes in the euro area’s design. There is no continent-wide deposit or unemployment insurance, for instance. A nasty recession could plausibly break the zone apart.

So there is plenty not to like. The experience of owning European stocks over the long haul has been quite horrible. The Euro Stoxx 50 of big euro-zone shares is no higher now than it was 20 years ago. Its broader sibling, which contains 300-odd companies, is well below its peak in the summer of 2000. The inclination to steer clear is quite natural. But there is a strong case for doing exactly the opposite.

For a start, euro-zone equities look cheap. The earnings yield on the Euro Stoxx 50 is 6.4%. That compares with a 4.8% earnings yield on America’s S&P 500 index and is handsome for an economy where holding cash pays less than nothing and where the safest government bonds pay a negative yield after adjusting for inflation. Patience may be required. But over time the chances that a punt on euro-zone equities pays off are good.

What is more, there is room for earnings to improve. Take banks, for instance. Bad loans and the need for more capital had been a continuing drain on their profits. But now even Italy’s big banks are in decent shape. “If at any point interest rates turn positive, you could see huge earnings upside,” says Eric Lonergan, of M&G, a fund-management group. Similarly, other firms, which still had to fork out on wages and rents during the euro zone’s depressed years, could squeeze out more profits if the economy keeps growing. In America, by contrast, there is no comparable scope for earnings to accelerate, because the economic cycle is more mature.

To be sure, the euro is a rickety construct. Countries are also currency zones and they work tolerably well because of fiscal transfers from rich to poor regions. That is absent in the euro area—hence the fear of break-up. Even so, it is far from obvious that this should be ranked higher than any number of other uncertainties.

What investors choose to worry about changes. At the beginning of 2016, for instance, China’s debt mountain was a source of terror for financial markets. Now it elicits a yawn. Few have yet mapped out the implications for markets of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy in the way they have done for a break-up of the euro. Yet it might turn out to be of greater consequence. The risks to the euro are simply more salient. And when risks are more palpable, people tend to give them too much credence.

Instinct does not always serve investors well. The political tremors in Italy are more like a scare than a rerun of the crisis of 2012. In which case there is money to be made from European equities, says Mr Lonergan. So remember George Costanza. When every urge tells you to shy away, consider doing the opposite.

How Amazon Will Supercharge the Blockchain Revolution

By Jeff Brown, editor, The Near Future Report

Most investors missed it…
And the mainstream media, as far as I know, never even reported on it…

But while Wall Street remains fixated on the ups and downs of bitcoin, something unusual is playing out behind the scenes in the blockchain industry.

And it could have huge implications for cryptocurrencies… and even change how business is done… forever.

In short, I believe a major U.S. company is about to issue its very own cryptocurrency…


What I’m about to tell you may sound unbelievable. But I’ll show you all the proof. Then you can decide for yourself.

The company I alluded to is Amazon, the e-commerce and web-services giant. And I believe it is about to issue its very own cryptocurrency.

You likely know Amazon as an e-commerce company. Maybe you’re even an Amazon Prime member and use the company’s fast delivery services.

But investors who think that Amazon is in the business of just selling books, electronics, and dishwasher detergent online are unfortunately missing the big picture… unless you dig in and understand what’s happening behind the curtain, it’s easy to miss.

But there has been an interesting development with Amazon. And as an investor, it should be on your radar…

Strange Discovery

You see, something interesting popped up in the internet domain name registry recently. And it looked like this:

Amazon registered the new website address under the name “amazonethereum.”

And it registered another called “amazoncryptocurrency.”

And another: “amazoncryptocurrencies.”

And this was on top of the already registered “amazonbitcoin.”

Now, these websites will not lead to anything. They are not “live.”

But if history tells us anything, this is likely just the beginning of something exciting.

As I said, I think Amazon is getting ready to launch its own digital currency. And I can’t think of a better company traded on a U.S. stock exchange that could pull this off.

An Early Experiment

Now, before you think I’ve gone mad, have a look at this:

In 2013, Amazon started experimenting with issuing “coins” to be used on Amazon “Fire tablets, Fire TV, and on any Android device through the Amazon Appstore.”

These coins are kind of like frequent flyer points. They have a clear value and can be redeemed for Amazon applications or other services; but they cannot be transferred, sold, or converted back into a fiat currency like the U.S. dollar.

This was just the first step. For a company with annual revenues the size of a decent-sized country, it is in a position to issue a real currency, cryptocurrency, or digital token that is fully convertible into popular cryptocurrencies like bitcoin and ether.

And if a cryptocurrency or token is convertible into bitcoin or ether, it’s convertible into U.S. dollars or just about any other form of fiat currency.

And what’s the best way to guarantee such convertibility of an Amazon cryptocurrency? Simple: create a marketplace to do so. And that’s precisely why Amazon has locked up the domain names above.

How It Would Work

This is where the issuance of a digital token or cryptocurrency has significant advantages. Not only is it completely fungible, it is also divisible down to the smallest amounts desirable.

So… how would it work?

Amazon would either issue a finite number of Amazon-coins or employ a slightly inflationary monetary policy, something aligned with Amazon’s rate of growth over time. This might be something similar to Ethereum’s monetary policy.

It would likely do what is called an airdrop of Amazon-coins into Amazon Prime customers’ accounts. An airdrop simply means that it would distribute the crypto-assets to its ecosystem of customers and partners to get the system started.

Having its own currency would enable Amazon to:

• Give coins away to application developers to incentivize development on any of its technology platforms.

• Issue coins to facilitate in-application purchases.

• Potentially use the coins for in-game purchases of virtual items.

• Reward customers with more digital tokens if they purchase regularly from the Amazon online store.

And Amazon is the perfect company to do this. It has the ideal ecosystem of partners, retail customers, and business customers to leverage.

For starters, Amazon already has 300 million individual customer accounts worldwide. That’s roughly the population of the United States.

Amazon also has 100,000 sellers on its platforms with hundreds of millions of items for sale.

Also, nearly half of all shoppers use Amazon—not Google—as a search engine to find products when they go online.

This is the big difference between Amazon and these tiny four- or five-person teams that are writing white papers and having initial coin offerings (ICOs) to raise money.

There is a massive, vibrant economy taking place around the world that’s already linked to Amazon. And this Amazon ecosystem would be able to utilize Amazon-Coin as soon as it’s issued.

But there’s more to this story than just Amazon…

A Bigger Trend

The emergence of blockchain technology is an area of intense focus for me. Everything I’ve uncovered tells me that we are just at the beginning of a revolution in blockchain-related technologies and cryptocurrencies.

But nobody has really considered the impact of a multinational corporation like Amazon issuing its own digital currency.

For the reasons I laid out, I believe Amazon-Coin isn’t just possible, I believe it’s imminent. When this happens, it will signal the institutional adoption of blockchain technology.

And when Amazon issues its own cryptocurrency, what’s to stop other major companies from following suit? Perhaps one day, you’ll book your next flight using American Airlines-Coin, or pay for your trip to Disney World with Disney-Coin.

It may seem too far-fetched. But these companies have issued customer “reward points” for years. A company-backed cryptocurrency is not beyond the realms of possibility.

What that means is that blockchain and digital assets will no longer be a curiosity of the mainstream investing world, they’ll be adopted with open arms. As a result, high-quality blockchain projects like bitcoin and Ethereum will likely appreciate several times over in the years ahead.

So get ready. The blockchain revolution isn’t just imminent. It’s here.