SAUDI ALLIES WEIGH THE COST OF SUPPORT / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Saudi Allies Weigh the Cost of Support

Several have pledged support, but to what extent?

By: Andrew Davidson

On Oct. 19, Egypt’s parliament postponed until Oct. 26 a vote on authorizing military assistance to defend Saudi Arabia against attacks from Yemen’s Houthi rebels, if Riyadh requests it. 

A day earlier, Egypt’s National Defense Council endorsed President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi’s pledge to support Riyadh through military means. 

Cairo isn’t the only ally coming to Saudi Arabia’s defense. 

The Regional Four (R-4) grouping comprising Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia released a joint statement on Oct. 11 condemning Houthi attacks on Saudi airports and energy infrastructure and backing Riyadh’s response.

Beyond its own borders, Saudi Arabia is supporting Yemeni government-aligned forces in an escalating battle against the Houthis. 

The latest battleground is the city of Taiz, a key government stronghold in Yemen’s southern highlands. 

Foreign support for defense of the Saudi homeland could help Riyadh sustain its campaign in Yemen. 

Lasting gains, however, will depend on Yemeni forces’ ability to recover and hold territory.

The Fight for Taiz 

Taiz is Yemen’s third-largest city and a gateway to both the port city of Aden and the strategic Bab el-Mandeb strait. 

Holding the city supports government operations toward Bab el-Mandeb and the defense of approaches to Aden. 

Given that roughly 70 percent of Yemeni people in 2025 lived in Houthi-controlled areas, losing Taiz would also further reduce the government’s reach among the population. 

In recent days, government forces and Houthi rebels have claimed new gains in and around Taiz. 

Houthi advances along the road between Taiz and Aden have severed the city’s main supply route, while government forces backed by Saudi-led coalition airstrikes lost some ground in mid-October as they tried to reopen it. 

Airstrikes can damage equipment, disperse fighters from their positions and disrupt reinforcements but cannot on their own ensure that critical supplies reach the city. 

Doing so requires accurate intelligence and coordination with Yemeni ground forces capable of retaking and holding the roadway. 

If Taiz falls, recovering it would require reopening supply routes through the surrounding hills and an on-the-ground presence to counter Houthi fighters inside the city.

External Support

Several regional countries have pledged support for the Saudis in their fight against the Houthis but remain reluctant to extend their assistance to Yemen itself. 

Forged earlier this year, the R-4 released a joint statement this month reaffirming its full support for Riyadh. 

However, the statement specified no military commitments. 

Actual assistance depends on applicable defense agreements and separate national decisions. 

Turkey has ruled out an offensive role despite signing the Mecca mutual defense pact with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in August. 

It has, however, reportedly provided assistance through surveillance, logistics and drone operators. 

Egypt has pledged military support but hasn’t said what that would look like.

In May, Reuters reported that Pakistan had deployed about 8,000 troops, a fighter squadron and an air defense system to Saudi Arabia. 

Riyadh financed the deployment under an existing bilateral defense pact. 

Islamabad says its ground forces are defending Saudi territory and will not cross into Yemen.

In a joint statement released on Oct. 5, the three Mecca pact signatories said they would activate the mutual defense clause of their agreement and rapidly deploy forces to Saudi Arabia in accordance with each country’s laws. 

Turkey submitted the agreement to parliament for ratification on Oct. 20, but approval is pending. 

In recent weeks, Houthi attacks on Saudi targets have escalated, repeatedly hitting key energy infrastructure including the headquarters of oil giant Saudi Aramco in the city of Dhahran on Oct. 13. 

Other infrastructure requiring protection includes Saudi Arabia’s approximately 1,200-kilometer East-West pipeline, which delivers oil supplies to the port city of Yanbu on the Red Sea.

In September, drone attacks, which Saudi Arabia said originated in Iraq, temporarily shut down the pipeline and halted the loading of crude at Yanbu. 

Once ships are loaded, they can sail north to the Suez Canal to avoid the threat of Houthi attacks near the Bab el-Mandeb strait. 

However, reaching Asian markets through the northern path involves a much longer voyage.

Saudi Arabia operates around 300 strike-capable aircraft, including F-15 strike variants, Typhoons and Tornados, but its own assets might not be enough to protect commercial shipping and critical infrastructure. 

Partner countries could assist by joining in defensive patrols, with tankers extending patrol time and early-warning aircraft helping detect threats. 

They could also help transport personnel and supplies, while shared radar tracks could improve threat detection and satellite imagery could help identify launch sites and signs of preparation, allowing Saudi forces to focus surveillance and raise defensive readiness.

At sea, Egypt’s frigates and Gowind corvettes could escort vessels and conduct maritime surveillance. 

Turkey has agreed to participate in a Saudi-led effort to protect Red Sea navigation. 

Such deployments could protect select commercial vessels and military supply shipments. 

For Saudi oil exports, however, escorts would offer limited relief if attacks on the pipeline or loading terminals continue.

Sustaining a foreign deployment would require replenishment, spare parts and crew rotations. 

Casualties, equipment losses and rising costs could weaken political backing for prolonged involvement.

Egypt fields North Africa’s largest military with more than 435,000 active personnel. 

Its interest in Saudi security reflects its economic ties to the Gulf states, which have provided Cairo with aid and investment. 

Approximately 61 percent of Egypt’s refined petroleum imports by value came from Saudi Arabia in 2025. 

Its support for Riyadh is also driven the fact that disruption to commercial shipping through the Red Sea leads to reduced Suez Canal traffic.

The speaker of the Houthi-controlled parliament has warned Egypt that it could retaliate if Cairo gets involved in the conflict. 

Houthi attacks on central Israel demonstrate that the group’s weaponry has a reach of roughly 2,000 kilometers, placing parts of Egypt within range. 

Depending on the nature and extent of their support, other partner countries could also face retaliation against their commercial vessels in the region. 

Attacks could raise shipping costs and force more diversions. 

These risks favor limited defensive contributions and make a wider campaign in Yemen harder to sustain politically.

Saudi Limits

Even if Riyadh’s allies commit nothing but defensive forces, they could still impact the campaign inside Yemen. 

Troops and equipment used to defend Saudi airspace could help free up Saudi aircraft for operations in Yemen.

If approved for use in the Yemen campaign, partner surveillance and communications support could improve the targeting capabilities of Saudi pilots and Yemeni ground forces.

Outside the R-4 framework, the United Arab Emirates has reportedly agreed to resume funding for a government-aligned militant group called the Giants Brigades in exchange for Saudi air cover for the force. 

The group is part of a broader Saudi-backed anti-Houthi coalition of forces with different benefactors and regional loyalties that Riyadh has tried to bring under a unified command. 

However, an assessment by the Sanaa Center released this month found that these efforts have not been successful.

Additional funding could keep the unit’s forces deployed, but disputes over command and control of recovered territory could obstruct efforts to reinforce one front while holding another. 

Indeed, Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s partners in Yemen will continue to compete over who gets to maintain local control, complicating their fight against the Houthis.

A larger air campaign would also offer no guarantee of ending the Houthis’ long-range attacks. 

A 2025 U.S. air and naval campaign called Operation Rough Rider ended with a limited U.S.-Houthi agreement to halt mutual attacks. 

The campaign, which had no accompanied ground operations, stopped Houthi strikes on U.S. targets but did not eliminate the group’s strike capabilities.

Even if Yemeni forces regain territory, Houthi long-range attacks could continue. 

The group’s procurement networks and domestic weapons production could sustain attacks despite Saudi strikes. 

Dual-use imports and multiple supply routes complicate efforts to restrict replenishment, allowing the Houthis to continue their attacks on Saudi airports, export infrastructure and shipping.

The bottom line is that over the coming year, assistance from Saudi Arabia’s regional partners is likely to remain focused on air defense, surveillance and limited maritime protection. 

These missions serve to defend Saudi national security and secure Red Sea trade while limiting direct involvement in the Yemeni ground war. 

However, direct attacks on participating countries or heavy losses among their deployed forces could increase pressure for retaliatory strikes or wider maritime interdiction.

Saudi Arabia’s security cooperation with Egypt and its Mecca partners is likely to outlast the battle for Taiz and the broader campaign in Yemen. 

Washington, meanwhile, has so far refrained from renewed strikes against the Houthis, preferring to maintain the existing ceasefire. 

Thus, hosting foreign, non-American forces could become a routine part of Saudi defense strategy, alongside existing U.S. defense ties. 

Even if it signs a ceasefire with the Houthis, Riyadh would still need a longer-term plan to protect its territory and export routes. 

Cooperation is therefore more likely to deepen through defensive planning and logistical arrangements than through a joint offensive inside Yemen.

If Taiz falls, Saudi Arabia will likely continue supporting forces able to defend remaining government positions to preserve its leverage in settlement negotiations. 

Persistent export interruptions and further government losses would strengthen incentives to seek an agreement that would limit Houthi attacks, particularly if additional support failed to stabilize the front. 

A negotiated pause could ease immediate pressure on Saudi Arabia and reduce the deployment burden, though the territorial and political disputes within Yemen would remain unresolved.