What the U.S. Has Accomplished in Iran
The regime is much weaker, and time is on the side of the U.S. and its allies that want a more stable region.
By Condoleezza Rice
The war against Iran has been a limited war, and its outcome is likely to be inconclusive.
But it has achieved enough to produce a far better Middle East.
The three-month military campaign degraded Iran’s ability to project power by significantly damaging its conventional forces, missile stockpiles and proxies.
It drew America, Israel and the Arab states closer together through defense cooperation and intelligence sharing.
In this regard, Israel has never been more secure.
Israel responded furiously to the terrorist attack of Oct. 7, 2023, and pummeled Iranian proxies, including Hezbollah and Hamas, that threaten its population.
Securing international support for its continued efforts to deal with that threat remains a diplomatic hurdle for Jerusalem.
But many Arab regimes no longer question Israel’s legitimacy; instead, they seek the benefits of technological and economic cooperation with Israel.
Modernization is their strongest motivation.
The war demonstrated that the Iranian regime’s leaders were physically vulnerable to U.S. military power and allied intelligence.
It also showed that although Iran can close the Strait of Hormuz, that leverage is limited, as the U.S. blockade confronted Iran with the prospect of severe economic damage in return.
The war also had global implications.
It showed that China is no friend of the Arab world, as Beijing watched from the sidelines as Iran attacked the economic infrastructure of the region.
Ukraine, which used its advanced defensive capabilities to support the war effort against Iran, demonstrated that it is an asset to the U.S. and its allies.
Given the mounting strategic losses for Russia—Syria, Venezuela, possibly Cuba and on the battlefield in Ukraine—this is the time to press the advantage on behalf of Kyiv.
Most important, along with Operation Midnight Hammer last June, Operation Epic Fury set back Iranian nuclear ambitions significantly.
It will be a long time before Iran can build a viable nuclear weapon.
Yes, there are large stockpiles of highly enriched uranium somewhere in Iran, but this is a problem for the future, not today.
Even if the uranium is at 60% enrichment, a fairly short technical step away from weapons grade, taking that final step is virtually impossible today.
To reach weapons-grade—93% or higher—the material must be spun in sensitive centrifuges that are subject to breakage.
It is hard to imagine that Iran’s centrifuge cascades survived the intense bombing.
The Iranian conversion facility, without which one can’t make a bomb, was destroyed.
Its A-team of nuclear scientists has been eliminated.
In sum, Iran is far weaker today than it was in February.
No amount of Iranian propaganda can mask this reality.
America’s near-term goals should be to keep it in that weakened state, to strengthen the region’s political realignment, and to make certain that President Trump’s promise that Iran will never possess a nuclear weapon is fulfilled.
The U.S. doesn’t need a nuclear agreement with Iran to achieve these goals.
But once the Strait of Hormuz is opened, if the administration engages in nuclear negotiations, it’s critical that the following conditions are maintained:
Not a single penny of frozen assets or sanctions relief should go to Tehran.
Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran used the money to rebuild its capabilities and those of its proxies.
It would do so again.
The U.S. must maintain military readiness in the region and the will to attack again if the Iranians begin to rebuild their nuclear infrastructure or missile capabilities.
We should publicly expose any Russian or Chinese efforts to help the regime rebuild these capabilities.
Additionally, the lessons of the war should spur deeper defense—technological and intelligence cooperation with allies in the region, particularly concerning asymmetric warfare in the age of drones.
The international community should again reaffirm the dangers of a nuclear Iran.
Our European allies have behaved shamefully, standing by as the U.S. dealt with growing Iranian capabilities and Iran attacked regional powers. Our allies need to re-engage with us, and we with them.
Iran isn’t only our problem.
It isn’t only an Israeli problem.
The United Nations Security Council between 2006 and 2010 passed five resolutions declaring Iran’s nuclear ambitions under Chapter VII an “action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.”
The next time our European friends are inclined to say that conflict with Iran is “not our war,” they should reread those resolutions.
Whenever possible—by both overt and covert means—the U.S. and Israel should undermine the regime’s capacity to oppress its own population.
We owe this to the Iranian people.
Finally, we should secure the world’s energy and transportation systems against the vulnerabilities revealed by the war.
It is puzzling that the Trump administration appeared to be caught off guard by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, despite decades of anticipation of this by military experts in planning exercises.
The U.S. can’t afford to be surprised again.
This war hasn’t brought, as many had hoped, the end of the Iranian regime.
But it has left a weaker, more confused one.
The public hasn’t seen Mojtaba Khamenei since his installation as supreme leader.
Economic pressure has made the regime vulnerable—not necessarily to the street, where it can always crush dissent, but perhaps to internal fractures over Iran’s future relationship with the world.
If the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps controls 40% of the economy, as reports indicate, the U.S. must make sure Tehran understands that 40% of nothing is nothing.
Strategic patience is hard, and it isn’t always satisfying. But time is on the side of the U.S. and its allies.
Reaching no deal is fine.
Reaching a bad deal isn’t.
This is a new day in the Middle East, though it isn’t one without clouds.
No American president has had a better chance to build a different and more stable region.
It may just take a little more time.
Ms. Rice is director of Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. She served as U.S. secretary of state, 2005-09.
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