Beijing’s foreign policy
By David Pilling
Published: January 19 2011 23:30
No one would still accuse China of hiding its light. After years of obeying Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of restrained foreign policy as the best means of advancing its peaceful rise,an emboldened Beijing now appears more comfortable about brandishing its strengths and achievements. Whether it is greeting visiting dignitaries with stealth fighters, encouraging the adoption of its currency abroad, or allowing retired generals to designate the South China Sea an area of “core interest”, the days of China as a shrinking violet are behind us.
The question is, what kind of foreign power will China become as its confidence grows and as its economic interests from south-east Asia to Africa and Latin America pull it deeper into world affairs. Unlike Japan, the world’s second-largest economy until last year, China will not be America’s shadow. In the phrase of Paul Keating, former Australian prime minister, the international order is returning to a more normal state in which the world’s second most important power is no longer a “client state” of the first.
Even at this early stage of a process that may take 30 years or more to fully unfold, it is possible to make out the contours of China’s foreign policy. One stark difference between it and the US, where Hu Jintao, China’s president, finds himself this week, is that China is unlikely to be a proselytising power.
America was founded on ideas and documents. That, coupled with its Christian roots, produces a strong evangelical streak. Whether in regard to its constitution or the merits of its liberal democracy and free-market ideology, much of the US discourse assumes it has fashioned a superior system. America has often led by example and through the attractiveness of its model. But it has not shied away from using force – through coups in Latin America or war in Vietnam and Iraq – in an effort to impose its vision on the world.
China, by contrast, lacks such ideological compulsion. Beijing is not blind to the utility of soft power. Dozens of Confucian Institutes around the world are spreading the Chinese language, and its state media has stepped up efforts to spread a “Chinese view” of the world. But at bottom, China’s political system and its pragmatic, mixed economy are not ideologically driven. They are a means to an end, the end being the creation of a rich and strong nation.
“Americans are the evangelical nation,” says Orville Schell, head of the Asia Society’s Center on US-China Relations.
“China wants respect and admission of stature.”
China’s official foreign policy doctrine is non-intervention. Beijing deals more or less evenly with Burmese generals and elected western politicians alike. It has shown limited interest in influencing the domestic political agenda of other nations. Its preference for non-intervention will, nevertheless, be strained as its interests become more deeply entangled with the rest of the world. An initial test could come in Sudan, where China’s thirst for oil has led it to do business with Khartoum, but will now require it to build fences with the oil-rich south. Elsewhere, what would happen if there were violent backlashes against ethnic Chinese communities in Indonesia or Malaysia? It is increasingly hard to imagine China standing idly by.
And how would Beijing react if an African government nationalised Chinese-owned mineral deposits or if a democratic government in Burma reneged on deals struck with Beijing by the generals?
Beijing has made much, too, of its supposedly non-expansionary nature.
General Ma Xiaotian last year quoted Mao Zedong saying: “Fifty years from now, China’s territory will remain 9,600,000 square kilometres ... Should we seize one inch of land from others, we would make ourselves aggressors.”
Of course, all states have been expansionary in their past or they would still be confined to villages and valleys. Qing Dynasty China was considerably larger than Ming Dynasty China. But if you accept China’s definition of the Middle Kingdom – incorporating Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan – then its assertion does not ring entirely hollow. Historically, China has preferred hierarchical, tributary relationships with “lesser” powers to outright territorial conquest. For example it never conquered the Ryukyu Kingdom, which paid tribute to it for centuries. Japan, which in the 19th century took on board western notions of the sovereign state, absorbed Ryukyu (now Okinawa) and went on forcibly to incorporate much of Asia into its short-lived empire.
Christopher Ford, author of The Mind of Empire, argues that China “lacks a meaningful concept of co-equal, legitimate sovereignties”. As its strength grows, he predicts: “China may well become much more assertive in insisting on the sort of Sinocentric hierarchy its history teaches it to expect.” Michael Wesley, head of Australia’s Lowy Institute, predicts China will, in time, try to push US forces away from its maritime borders, the better to exercise authority over smaller neighbours. There may already be a hint of this. Beijing has become more insistent in asserting rights over the entire South China Sea, even though these waters also adjoin several other nations, including Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia.
Mr Schell of the Asia Society says China will increasingly seek to reinvent the old tributary system. Other countries will not have to emulate China ideologically. But they will have to show respect – if necessary through concessions. China wants to “let everyone know it doesn’t have to trim its jib to maintain relations with others”, says Mr Schell. “From now on, others are going to have to trim their jib.”
The question is, what kind of foreign power will China become as its confidence grows and as its economic interests from south-east Asia to Africa and Latin America pull it deeper into world affairs. Unlike Japan, the world’s second-largest economy until last year, China will not be America’s shadow. In the phrase of Paul Keating, former Australian prime minister, the international order is returning to a more normal state in which the world’s second most important power is no longer a “client state” of the first.
Even at this early stage of a process that may take 30 years or more to fully unfold, it is possible to make out the contours of China’s foreign policy. One stark difference between it and the US, where Hu Jintao, China’s president, finds himself this week, is that China is unlikely to be a proselytising power.
America was founded on ideas and documents. That, coupled with its Christian roots, produces a strong evangelical streak. Whether in regard to its constitution or the merits of its liberal democracy and free-market ideology, much of the US discourse assumes it has fashioned a superior system. America has often led by example and through the attractiveness of its model. But it has not shied away from using force – through coups in Latin America or war in Vietnam and Iraq – in an effort to impose its vision on the world.
China, by contrast, lacks such ideological compulsion. Beijing is not blind to the utility of soft power. Dozens of Confucian Institutes around the world are spreading the Chinese language, and its state media has stepped up efforts to spread a “Chinese view” of the world. But at bottom, China’s political system and its pragmatic, mixed economy are not ideologically driven. They are a means to an end, the end being the creation of a rich and strong nation.
“Americans are the evangelical nation,” says Orville Schell, head of the Asia Society’s Center on US-China Relations.
“China wants respect and admission of stature.”
China’s official foreign policy doctrine is non-intervention. Beijing deals more or less evenly with Burmese generals and elected western politicians alike. It has shown limited interest in influencing the domestic political agenda of other nations. Its preference for non-intervention will, nevertheless, be strained as its interests become more deeply entangled with the rest of the world. An initial test could come in Sudan, where China’s thirst for oil has led it to do business with Khartoum, but will now require it to build fences with the oil-rich south. Elsewhere, what would happen if there were violent backlashes against ethnic Chinese communities in Indonesia or Malaysia? It is increasingly hard to imagine China standing idly by.
And how would Beijing react if an African government nationalised Chinese-owned mineral deposits or if a democratic government in Burma reneged on deals struck with Beijing by the generals?
Beijing has made much, too, of its supposedly non-expansionary nature.
General Ma Xiaotian last year quoted Mao Zedong saying: “Fifty years from now, China’s territory will remain 9,600,000 square kilometres ... Should we seize one inch of land from others, we would make ourselves aggressors.”
Of course, all states have been expansionary in their past or they would still be confined to villages and valleys. Qing Dynasty China was considerably larger than Ming Dynasty China. But if you accept China’s definition of the Middle Kingdom – incorporating Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan – then its assertion does not ring entirely hollow. Historically, China has preferred hierarchical, tributary relationships with “lesser” powers to outright territorial conquest. For example it never conquered the Ryukyu Kingdom, which paid tribute to it for centuries. Japan, which in the 19th century took on board western notions of the sovereign state, absorbed Ryukyu (now Okinawa) and went on forcibly to incorporate much of Asia into its short-lived empire.
Christopher Ford, author of The Mind of Empire, argues that China “lacks a meaningful concept of co-equal, legitimate sovereignties”. As its strength grows, he predicts: “China may well become much more assertive in insisting on the sort of Sinocentric hierarchy its history teaches it to expect.” Michael Wesley, head of Australia’s Lowy Institute, predicts China will, in time, try to push US forces away from its maritime borders, the better to exercise authority over smaller neighbours. There may already be a hint of this. Beijing has become more insistent in asserting rights over the entire South China Sea, even though these waters also adjoin several other nations, including Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia.
Mr Schell of the Asia Society says China will increasingly seek to reinvent the old tributary system. Other countries will not have to emulate China ideologically. But they will have to show respect – if necessary through concessions. China wants to “let everyone know it doesn’t have to trim its jib to maintain relations with others”, says Mr Schell. “From now on, others are going to have to trim their jib.”
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