CRACKS FORM IN THE TURKEY-AZERBAIJAN FOUNDATION / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Cracks Form in the Turkey-Azerbaijan Foundation

Even stalwart allies are not immune to friction.

By: Ekaterina Zolotova

There’s no question that Turkey and Azerbaijan are close – even complementary. 

They signed a strategic alliance in 2021 that described their relationship as “one nation, two states,” and along with a shared cultural, linguistic and historical affinity of their peoples in the Turkic world, this creates an impression of unquestioned unity.

They share geopolitical goals as well. 

They want to turn the South Caucasus into a transport bridge between Turkey and Central Asia, which would strengthen their respective economies and boost their regional standing. 

For Turkey, Azerbaijan is a source of energy and a geopolitical asset. 

It is thanks to Azerbaijan that Turkey has access to oil and gas and multiple transit routes between Europe and Central Asia. 

Azerbaijan sees Turkey as similarly valuable. 

Its relationship gives Baku access to the Mediterranean and Europe, and a reliable source of investments and weaponry.

Turkey and Azerbaijan maintain cooperation across economic, energy and military sectors. 

And they invest roughly $40 billion in each other’s economies. 

Recently, during the Azerbaijan International Defense Exhibition, several Turkish companies signed partnership and local production agreements with Baku, including one to construct a plant in Nakhchivan and supply ASELSAN-manufactured Alp 100 radar systems. 

Despite all this, tensions are starting to show. 

Following Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address to the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 24, some Turkish social media users and news agencies criticized Azerbaijan over its ties with Israel, highlighting the fact that the Azerbaijani representative did not walk out during the speech. 

(Many delegations, including Turkey’s, did.) Azerbaijani media responded by pointing out what it characterized as Turkish hypocrisy; Ankara trades significant amounts of goods with Israel, which was among the first countries to provide humanitarian assistance to Turkey after recent earthquakes.

Later, on Sept. 26, the Azerbaijani parliament’s ad hoc commission on countering foreign interference and hybrid threats accused Turkey of launching an information campaign against Azerbaijan meant to undermine bilateral relations and erode trust in Azerbaijan’s state institutions. 

That same day, Baku warned it might consider restricting entry into the country for the campaign's organizers and active participants.

Clearly, their interests do not always neatly align. 

For Azerbaijan, which gained independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union, maintaining sovereignty is vital, and it maintains sovereignty by balancing between various powers to maximize benefits and strengthen its economy and regional standing. 

It does this even if it runs counter to Turkish ambitions. 

Today, Azerbaijan is able to pursue a more independent policy thanks to its own capabilities and growing importance to major international players, especially in its role as an alternative energy supplier and transit hub that bypasses Russia. 

Militarily, Azerbaijan has become the strongest power in the South Caucasus.

Its multi-vector foreign policy includes relations with Israel, with which it maintains close military-technical cooperation. 

Israel supplies arms and technology to Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan supplies Israel with energy exports. 

That its foreign policy also demands partnerships with Turkey creates a potential conflict of interest, particularly if the rivalry between Israel and Turkey intensifies, raising the possibility that Baku might be forced to choose sides.

Disagreements stem not only from foreign policy but also from regional cooperation. 

Although Turkey continues to view its alliance with Azerbaijan as a cornerstone of its Caucasus policy, relations with Baku are largely an extension of Ankara’s vision of a Turkic world in which it is an independent center of power.

This creates friction, especially in Armenia. 

Turkey benefits from stable logistics corridors and the opening of transport routes across the Caucasus. 

Baku, meanwhile, seeks a settlement with Armenia that maximizes its own interests. 

This is particularly acute in Nakhchivan, where the border opening between Turkey and Armenia and the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan could give rise to a vast regional transport network. 

For Azerbaijan, this would mean increased trade, transit and investment.

Yet Azerbaijan is wary of Turkey’s own pursuits in Armenia: the opening of the border, railway connections and other forms of reconciliation. 

Turkey and Armenia have been engaged in a normalization process since 2022 and have since restored direct air travel and agreed on specific border-related measures. 

In May, Turkey announced that bureaucratic preparations for launching direct trade were complete. 

Technical work on opening the land border is ongoing.

Although Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov recently said that de facto peace had been established between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the two have yet to sign a peace agreement. 

Baku is worried that Turkey might normalize relations with Armenia sooner than Azerbaijan deems appropriate. 

In early September, Azerbaijani sources noted that businesses in Armenia and Turkey were eager to declare an "economic thaw" even before formal agreements are in place, and that this was an attempt to decouple Armenia-Turkey dialogue from the peace process between Baku and Yerevan.

For Baku, the challenge is in its desire for Armenia to first meet specific political conditions regarding constitutional amendments. 

Its primary interests are in consolidating its gains from the Nagorno-Karabakh War, guarantees against Armenian territorial claims and a transport link to Nakhchivan. 

It’s easier to secure Armenia's agreement on Azerbaijani terms when Armenia is heavily dependent on agreements with Baku. 

Opening direct overland access for Yerevan to the Turkish market – and, by extension, to Europe – undermines its leverage. 

Baku is also concerned that Turkey, which has traditionally linked the normalization of relations with Armenia to the resolution of the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict and the development of trade routes across the South Caucasus, might find a compromise with Armenia more advantageous, whereas Baku might prefer to maintain a hard line.

Turkey and Azerbaijan ultimately want the same thing: close strategic coordination. 

While the countries' leaders continue to pledge eternal friendship and strategic alliance, the fact is they define these goals in different terms. 

Baku wants maximum guarantees and economic benefits, whereas Ankara prioritizes expanding regional trade and establishing new routes to position itself as a key regional hub and regional leader. 

This will therefore be a source of friction, even among otherwise stalwart allies.