IN MOZAMBIQUE, THE FUTURE MAY BE BUILT ON RWANDAN SECURITY / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

In Mozambique, the Future May Be Built on Rwandan Security

Gas companies are returning to the rebellious province of Cabo Delgado.

By: Ronan Wordsworth

Five years after an insurgent attack brought Mozambican natural gas production to a halt, two of the country’s energy projects – and, as it happens, Africa’s largest projects – are advancing again. 

In January, TotalEnergies announced the full restart of its $20 billion Mozambique liquefied natural gas development. 

In August, ExxonMobil awarded $1.1 billion in preparatory contracts for the Rovuma LNG project, which involves a proposed total investment of roughly $30 billion. 

And yet Mozambique’s insurgency has not ended. 

Islamic State Mozambique continues to attack communities across the northern province of Cabo Delgado, and more than 600,000 people remain displaced. 

Foreign companies, however, now believe the risk can be contained. 

Much of that confidence rests on the Rwanda Defense Force, which was dispatched in 2021 to contain the insurgency and secure towns, transportation routes and energy infrastructure. 

It has been relatively successful in that regard.

This, in turn, has given the government in Kigali influence far beyond Mozambique. 

European governments regard the RDF as indispensable in Cabo Delgado. 

The problem is that the same governments accuse the RDF of supporting the M23 rebels that have taken control of the eastern resource-rich areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo – and have imposed certain sanctions accordingly. 

Rwanda has effectively become a security guarantor in one conflict and a source of insecurity in another. 

This gives Kigali considerable geopolitical leverage.

Northern Mozambique is historically poorer and less strongly governed than the political and economic center in the south. 

Public services have been limited, youth unemployment has been high, and communities have had little influence in the central government. 

Offshore gas discoveries in 2010 promised national transformation, but the benefits have been funneled to political elites in Maputo and to foreign companies. 

All of this has made Cabo Delgado a hotbed for militancy.

And so an armed rebellion began in 2017. 

The group now known as Islamic State Mozambique emerged from a movement commonly called Ahlu Sunnah wa-Jamaa and was also known locally as al-Shabab. 

(It had no relationship with the Somali organization of the same name.) 

The Islamic State began to claim responsibility for attacks in 2019, but recruitment continued to focus on local marginalization and resentment toward the state rather than on strict Islamist ideology.

IS-Mozambique expanded rapidly between 2019 and 2020, seizing Mocimboa da Praia and exposing the weakness of Mozambique’s security forces. 

In March 2021, insurgents attacked Palma, immediately north of Afungi, killing dozens, displacing thousands and trapping scores of foreign workers. 

TotalEnergies withdrew its personnel and declared force majeure the following month. 

The insurgents didn’t capture the construction site, but by threatening the workforce and supply routes, they froze the project, which was expected to become operational in 2024.

Rwanda Steps In

Mozambique sought help from foreign partners early in the insurgency. 

Mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group arrived in 2019, but insufficient intelligence, logistics and coordination with Mozambican forces forced it to withdraw after suffering some humiliating defeats. 

South Africa’s Dyck Advisory Group later provided limited aircraft, mobility and firepower but could neither hold territory nor build local security institutions. 

(It also faced allegations of indiscriminate attacks.) 

The European Union established a training mission in 2021 but did not deploy a combat force. 

The Southern African Development Community mission in Mozambique arrived in July that same year, and though it captured some territory, it suffered shortages of funding, equipment and air support before withdrawing in July 2024.

The RDF also arrived in 2021, albeit under a separate bilateral agreement. 

An initial force of around 1,000 soldiers arrived in July and with the help of Mozambican troops quickly retook Mocimboa da Praia. 

The deployment expanded to an estimated 4,000-5,000 personnel operating from positions throughout Cabo Delgado and later retook Palma and Afungi.

The RDF was more successful because it's a capable, cohesive force with clear command and rapid decision-making. 

Unlike a multinational mission, Kigali was able to conduct offensive operations without lengthy regional approvals. 

It did not eliminate IS-Mozambique, but it pushed the group away from the major towns closest to the LNG projects.

Notably, Mozambique is part of a wider Rwandan military footprint. 

The RDF also maintains a bilateral deployment in the Central African Republic and contributes thousands of personnel to U.N. missions in South Sudan and CAR, giving Rwanda one of the largest peacekeeping contingents in the world. 

Military competence has become one of Kigali’s most important diplomatic assets.

Gas, France and the Return to Afungi

Meanwhile, TotalEnergies acquired an operating stake in Mozambique LNG in 2019 and now holds 26.5 percent of the consortium. 

The development includes two offshore fields with two onshore liquefaction plants capable of producing 13.1 million metric tons of LNG annually. 

It is one of Africa’s largest foreign investment recipients and central to Mozambique’s hope of generating tens of billions of dollars in public revenue.

TotalEnergies lifted its force majeure in November 2025 and announced a full resumption of operations in January. 

The project was approximately 40 percent complete before the moratorium, during which much of the engineering and procurement work continued. 

First production is now targeted for 2029. 

TotalEnergies estimated the delay added around $4.5 billion to the tab. 

That’s a lot of money, but disruptions to global energy markets have strengthened the commercial and strategic case for developing alternative sources of LNG. 

Mozambique will not supply Europe exclusively, but its production can add flexibility to global markets.

LNG is central to TotalEnergies’ strategy. 

The volume it manages is expected to increase by 50 percent between 2023 and 2030. 

Mozambique provides enormous reserves within reach of Asian and European markets, and abandoning it would damage the company’s position as a leading LNG trader.

It also matters to France. 

TotalEnergies may be multinational, but it is among France’s largest companies and one of the most visible expressions of French commercial influence in Africa. 

Mozambique, therefore, further illustrates a shift in French interests in Africa. 

As France reduces its military footprint and seeks partners beyond its former colonies, it can preserve influence through companies, development finance, European programs and African security providers.

LNG is also relevant to Europe’s supply diversification goals. 

Mozambique LNG provides greater flexibility for Europe as it attempts to eliminate its remaining dependence on Russian gas. 

New supply can strengthen European energy security even when it is not reserved for Europe. 

(Similar developments are happening in Tanzania, where Norwegian multinational energy company Equinor has expressed interest as the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.)

ExxonMobil’s award of $1.1 billion in preparatory contracts for the second major gas project in Mozambique reinforced the current opportunity and renewed importance of alternative gas supplies. 

Rovuma LNG will produce around 18 million metric tons annually and cost approximately $30 billion. 

Rwanda is therefore helping to reopen the entire northern Mozambique gas basin.

The RDF’s dual reputation

The RDF’s deployment to Mozambique has provided considerable political value for Rwanda. 

Kigali provided effective forces where larger countries, private military contractors and regional organizations struggle, giving Western governments a partner capable of undertaking dangerous missions without deploying their own troops.

The EU recognized this value through two European Peace Facility measures. 

It provided 20 million euros ($23 million) in 2022 and an additional 20 million euros in 2024 to support equipment and the strategic airlift required to sustain the mission. 

France and Portugal backed the renewed funding.

This is despite the sanctions against Rwandan activity in DRC. 

France and Rwanda have slowly been normalizing relations since 2021 (which were strained particularly over France’s role in the genocide of 1994). 

Cooperation in Mozambique further built on these efforts. 

France gains a capable partner protecting a major corporate interest, while Rwanda strengthens its position in Paris and Brussels. 

In May 2026, Macron argued against imposing broader new sanctions on Rwanda, warning that isolating Kigali could undermine diplomatic efforts to stabilize eastern DRC.

And yet obstacles remain. 

EU financing expired in May 2026 as pressure over eastern DRC increased. 

Rwanda warned that it could not bear the cost indefinitely, after which Mozambique secured a direct funding arrangement, with the likely possibility that it is paid for by TotalEnergies and/or ExxonMobil. 

The U.N., the U.S. and the EU have accused the RDF of providing troops, equipment and operational direction to M23. 

Kigali denies any involvement.

France condemned the M23 offensives, and the EU has demanded Rwanda’s withdrawal from DRC territory. 

In March 2025, the EU sanctioned three senior RDF commanders, several M23 leaders, Rwanda’s mining regulator and a Kigali gold refinery accused of processing minerals from rebel-held areas.

These measures stopped short of isolating Rwanda. 

Belgium and Germany have generally favored greater pressure, while France and Portugal have emphasized the danger of weakening the Cabo Delgado mission. 

Rwanda’s position as a stable diplomatic hub, major peacekeeping contributor and effective security provider raises the cost of a complete rupture and allows it more leeway.

Washington has struggled to reconcile these differences too. 

After signing a partnership with DRC to improve access to critical minerals, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the RDF and four of its commanders in March 2026. 

Notably, U.S. authorities granted exemptions to allow TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil to continue working with the RDF in Mozambique. 

Sanctions intended to punish Rwanda in DRC were not allowed to jeopardize gas investments in Cabo Delgado.

The resumption of construction does not mean Cabo Delgado has been fully stabilized. 

Attacks continued in 2026, even in Macomia. 

Rwandan and Mozambican operations have denied IS-Mozambique access to major towns but pushed fighters into less protected communities and denser jungle, where they are harder to confront. 

The failure to fully pacify Cabo Delgado means that people cannot return home, travel safely or rebuild their livelihoods, so the province will continue to be a hotbed of recruitment and exploitation.

The risks are clear, but companies are convinced that the benefits are worth it. 

Mozambique is likely to become a major gas exporter regardless of a wider peace. 

Rwanda will benefit, too, because its military is part of the infrastructure on which Mozambique’s economic future depends.