How Geography Limits Russo-Chinese Military Cooperation
Even limited engagement has its uses.
By: Andrew Davidson
The prospect of a formal alliance between China and Russia has long worried their adversaries, especially the United States.
But Beijing and Moscow are not formal allies, and their military cooperation remains conditional.
Their history of rivalry and different regional priorities limit how closely their militaries can integrate.
Even so, selective cooperation can strengthen both militaries and force Washington to manage pressure at both ends of Eurasia.
In July, Chinese and Russian naval forces held the annual Joint Sea exercise off Qingdao.
Russia contributed a cruiser, corvette, diesel-electric submarine and rescue vessel from its Pacific Fleet.
Selected units then continued into the Pacific for a joint patrol.
The exercise and patrol showed that the two navies can assemble a mixed force and continue operating together beyond a single drill.
Repeated exercises build familiarity, improve tactical coordination and signal political alignment.
They demonstrate limited, task-specific coordination but do not by themselves establish the capacity or political commitment to sustain a combined campaign.
That would require standing arrangements for intelligence, communications, logistics and command.
NATO developed these structures to defend alliance territory under a collective defense commitment.
Its regional plans allow national units to enter established operations through existing command arrangements.
China and Russia have no known equivalent.
Their 2001 friendship treaty calls for consultations if either faces a threat but creates no mutual defense obligation or standing combined command.
But they don’t need that kind of a system as much as Europe does because geography places their principal wars in different theaters – Moscow’s in Europe, Beijing’s in the Western Pacific – and neither wants to cede wartime control.
Still, cooperation is useful because selective collaboration and parallel pressure in separate theaters can force Washington to divide its attention and resources without assigning major formations to a common campaign.
Stable Frontier
Geography determines what’s possible and what’s necessary in a Russo-Chinese alignment.
Russia’s demographic and political core lies west of the Urals.
NATO and the war in Ukraine naturally account for its most immediate conventional military demands.
China’s main military problems lie to the east, where it must prepare for a Taiwan contingency, defend its coastal approaches and restrict U.S. intervention across the first island chain and the Western Pacific approaches.
China’s unresolved border dispute with India also directs forces to the Western Theater Command.
This produces different deployment priorities.
Chinese ground formations are unlikely to fight NATO in the Baltics, just as Russian airborne units are unlikely to join a Taiwan campaign.
The bigger strategic benefit of cooperation is more likely to come through industrial, intelligence or diplomatic support and through pressure each applies in its own theater.
Russia is still a substantial military power in the Pacific, anchored by its nuclear submarine force and the Sea of Okhotsk bastion.
The fleet monitors Japan and U.S. forces and sustains a presence from the Western Pacific to the Arctic, primarily in support of Moscow’s own deterrence and territorial defense.
Their settled frontier further reduces the likelihood of direct conflict.
Chinese and Soviet forces fought along the border in 1969, but the remaining territorial disputes were resolved in the 2000s.
This political accommodation allows both countries to treat the border as a stable rear rather than a primary military front.
Geography reinforces that stability by making large-scale operations difficult.
Their border extends more than 4,000 kilometers (2,500 miles), much of it along the Argun, Amur and Ussuri rivers or through sparsely populated territory.
High-capacity cross-border transport is concentrated along a handful of routes, limiting the speed and scale of large deployments.
Despite the shared frontier, Manzhouli, a major rail crossing on the China-Russia border, lies roughly 5,100 kilometers from Moscow in a straight line.
Major movements and logistics from Russia’s western industrial core would still have to cross Siberia.
But border stability doesn’t mean they can’t compete elsewhere.
Central Asia is the clearest example.
The region forms a broad buffer along Russia’s southern approaches and China’s western flank; mountains, deserts and long distances channel movement through a limited number of corridors.
Russia has military bases and formal security ties with the region, while China’s trade, infrastructure projects and expanding security contacts give regional governments alternatives to exclusive reliance on Moscow.
In Northeast Asia, Moscow’s use of North Korean troops and munitions shows that it can seek military support outside of Beijing.
Neither development amounts to military rivalry, but both reinforce their mutual preference for freedom of action.
Cooperation becomes more useful where their operating areas overlap, particularly in Northeast Asia.
Their most regular recent military cooperation were in the air and maritime domains, especially in Northeast Asia, where it places additional pressure on Japan.
Japan lies between Russian operating areas in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan and Chinese routes from the East China Sea into the Western Pacific.
Japan monitors Russian activity from the north and Chinese activity from the southwest.
In June, their 11th joint strategic air patrol operated over the Sea of Japan, East China Sea and Western Pacific.
Naval exercises and patrols let their forces practice communications, formation movements, air defense, anti-submarine warfare and rescue operations.
China has also participated in Russian ground and command-staff exercises, most notably Vostok 2018.
Ground force interactions, however, have been less frequent and smaller in scale than their naval exercises, especially since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In some cases, cooperation is more active than mere exercises.
During a 2024 patrol near Alaska, Chinese bombers operated from northern Russia alongside Russian aircraft.
Joint Sea 2025 established a bilateral command center for the exercise to revise drill and emergency plans.
Ships formed a mixed formation, established communications and exchanged weather, sea and air information.
Public evidence still points to mission-specific coordination.
Deeper integration would require a level of mutual dependence neither government wants to accept.
Shared intelligence, access and logistics would leave each military exposed to the other’s political decisions during times of crisis.
Technology ties remain selective.
Russia accounted for 66 percent of China’s major arms imports in 2021-25, but China’s total fell 72 percent between 2016-20 and 2021-25 as domestic production expanded.
Recent deliveries centered on aircraft engines, helicopters and naval components, whereas the preceding period included Su-35 fighters and S-400 air defense systems.
The relationship increasingly fills specific technical gaps rather than creating broad dependence.
Specialized assistance also runs in both directions.
The Royal United Services Institute reported in 2025 that Russia agreed to equip and train a Chinese airborne battalion in airdropping armored vehicles and inserting special forces, capabilities relevant to a Taiwan contingency.
RUSI said the documents appeared genuine but might be incomplete or altered.
Separately, Reuters reported that China trained about 200 Russian personnel in drone operations, electronic warfare and other battlefield skills, some of whom later fought in Ukraine.
(Neither defense ministry responded to Reuters about the story, while China’s Foreign Ministry simply reiterated Beijing’s stated neutrality.)
If implemented as reported, the programs would strengthen each military’s independent capabilities rather than prepare the forces to fight as one.
The Russian Far East also constrains cooperation, which would place Chinese troops near sensitive Pacific Fleet bases, nuclear forces and approaches to the Arctic, making Moscow reluctant to share control over military access and infrastructure.
China’s greater economic weight reinforces that caution.
Strategic Effect
Limited integration does not mean limited strategic effect.
Oceans insulate the U.S. homeland, but defending U.S. interests requires Washington to distribute forces at both ends of Eurasia.
China and Russia can concentrate near their primary theaters, so concurrent demands in Europe and East Asia can strain U.S. force allocation.
Recent operations against Iran thinned U.S. stocks of long-range munitions and air defense interceptors, illustrating how demands in one theater constrain options in another.
Even uncoordinated pressure by China or Russia can create opportunities for the other by narrowing the forces and resources Washington can shift between theaters.
Over the next two to three years, continuity is more likely than a leap toward integration.
Expect more patrols, increasingly complex exercises, technical exchanges and selective industrial support.
Communications and information sharing within exercises will likely improve, and temporary access arrangements will likely be repeated.
Limited refueling and resupply during exercises is plausible in the Russian Far East but less likely near sensitive Arctic facilities.
Timing may matter as much as complexity.
Patrols or exercises held during heightened tensions in another theater could require Washington and its allies to monitor both regions regardless of coordination.
In the event of a Taiwan crisis, increased Russian air and naval activity around northern Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk could keep U.S. and Japanese air, maritime and surveillance assets in the north while Moscow remains outside China’s campaign.
Reciprocal combat deployments are unlikely. Standing planning and intelligence structures, prepositioned supplies, shared wartime command or mutual combat commitments would mark a shift toward integration.
Until then, their operations may become strategically connected while remaining operationally separate and under national command.
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