The Contradiction at the Heart of China’s Military Reforms
Xi’s aspirations for a military both more intelligent and more obedient are not fully compatible.
By: Victoria Herczegh
China’s military is undergoing its most significant transformation in decades.
The recent appointment of dozens of new commanders, the restructuring of Central Military Commission (CMC) bodies, the introduction of new military audits and ethics codes, and the elevation of discipline inspection officials all point to a fundamental reconstruction of the Chinese military.
In the past year, senior military leaders have been removed, key commands have been left vacant or filled by acting officers, and the traditional leadership hierarchy of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been hollowed out.
The changes go beyond a simple anti-corruption campaign; President Xi Jinping is creating a PLA that is more loyal and controllable.
It is also a more technologically advanced force, through the integration of artificial intelligence into the PLA’s future command structure.
Political control and AI-led modernization are the new, mutually reinforcing pillars of Xi’s military strategy.
The most striking feature of the changes is that political loyalty seems to have overtaken seniority and operational experience as the main factor in promotion.
Investigations, expulsions and disappearances have reduced the CMC, which began its term in 2022 with seven members, to just two members: Xi and Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin.
More than a hundred senior officers have reportedly been removed or investigated since 2022, including CMC members, Rocket Force commanders and leaders of major service branches.
Many of the officers occupying key positions are lieutenant generals or former deputies who have taken on responsibilities traditionally held by full generals, often without formal confirmation.
The reliance on acting appointments suggests that Xi is testing the political reliability of potential successors before granting them permanent authority.
Besides replacing commanders, Xi is also redefining what qualifies someone to command.
Take the cases of Zhang Shuguang and Zhang Shengmin.
Both emerged from the PLA’s discipline inspection and political supervision apparatus.
Zhang Shuguang was recently promoted to full general and appointed as secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, placing him – one of Xi’s most trusted anti-corruption officials – at the center of military governance.
Along with Zhang Shengmin’s elevation to CMC vice chairman, this means that the PLA’s discipline enforcers now occupy positions historically associated with operational leadership.
This is a significant institutional change, indicating that internal control, political rectification and supervision have become key functions of the military leadership.
The introduction of new military audit professional ethics codes reinforces this interpretation.
The new regulations place loyalty ahead of competence and discipline, while increasing oversight of resource allocation, procurement, project implementation and the exercise of authority.
The language of the new audit framework – which emphasizes concepts like “political rectification,” “struggle” and “whole-process supervision” – suggests that Xi is embedding auditing, discipline inspection and political monitoring into the military system itself.
The institutionalization of surveillance is part of a larger effort to dismantle patronage networks and ensure that the PLA remains firmly subordinate to the Communist Party and personally loyal to Xi.
Official statements increasingly link military modernization with loyalty, emphasizing that advanced weapons and sophisticated military systems must remain in the hands of politically reliable personnel.
Xi has repeatedly stressed that the Communist Party’s leadership over the military must be strengthened alongside modernization.
Anti-corruption is thus simultaneously a way to consolidate power and a mechanism for reshaping the military’s internal political order.
In the military context, AI and modernization are inseparable.
Xi has called for the broader military application of unmanned technologies, the deeper integration of network information systems and the gradual construction of an “intelligent military system.”
The Chinese military speaks of “intelligentization,” which is the integration of AI into command, control, logistics, targeting, decision support and autonomous systems across all service branches.
This includes drone swarms, autonomous collaborative operations, AI-assisted operational planning and increasingly networked joint warfare capabilities.
The goal is to transform how the PLA processes information and conducts operations.
Xi’s vision seems to be of a military that can conduct highly coordinated joint operations while remaining politically obedient.
Within the Chinese military, however, enthusiasm for AI is far from uniform.
Chinese defense researchers – like their Western counterparts – have raised concerns that AI systems may be unreliable in combat, vulnerable to bias or insufficiently transparent for high-stakes decision-making.
A recurring theme is that AI should support commanders but not replace them.
Xi’s AI agenda and leadership purge may represent an attempt to overcome institutional resistance within parts of the PLA leadership that remained skeptical of excessive tech dependence.
It has long been rumored that tensions between Xi and the former CMC chairman and vice chairman, as well as former Defense Minister Li Shangfu and senior Rocket Force leaders, extended beyond Taiwan strategy to questions of modernization and the role of AI in future warfare.
The interaction between AI and political centralization creates a strategic paradox.
Xi’s system punishes initiative, independent judgment and deviation from political expectations.
Officers operating in an environment of constant surveillance and career insecurity may become less willing to challenge AI-generated recommendations, report contradictory information or exercise discretion during crises.
AI could therefore reinforce hierarchical conformity rather than improve decision quality.
An intelligent military system has to depend on commanders who are willing to question and override machine-generated assessments when necessary.
If political loyalty becomes the overriding criteria for promotion, commanders may become more dependent on both superior political authority and AI-assisted decision tools.
The result could be a military that is technologically sophisticated but institutionally less adaptable under conditions of uncertainty.
This paradox is reinforced by the PLA’s changing command structure.
Air force officers have assumed a disproportionately large share of newly reassigned leadership positions, reducing the traditional dominance of the army and suggesting that Xi is reshaping the balance of power among the services.
This could support the PLA’s transition toward joint operations and technologically intensive warfare.
However, many of the new leaders are former deputies or chiefs of staff who possess institutional knowledge but lack the authority, cross-service relationships and crisis experience accumulated by the full generals who were removed.
The current structure provides continuity in routine operations, including military exercises around Taiwan, but it may be less effective during a rapidly evolving crisis that requires initiative and decentralized coordination.
The greatest operational risk is therefore not collapse but hesitation.
Acting commanders may defer difficult decisions, avoid reporting bad news and wait for explicit political guidance before acting.
A command structure dominated by provisional leaders and intense political oversight can conduct day-to-day military activity, but it can struggle with the ambiguity and rapid adaptation required in a high-intensity conflict.
AI is intended to accelerate decision-making, but the surrounding political environment may slow it down.
If commanders fear investigation more than operational failure, the benefits of AI could be partially offset by institutional risk aversion.
The same centralization that strengthens Xi’s personal control over the PLA may also reduce the flexibility that modern joint warfare demands.
The geopolitical significance of these developments is often misunderstood.
The PLA is not imploding: Weapons procurement, training, exercises and force modernization continue.
New commanders are being appointed, and technologically advanced capabilities are still expanding.
However, the PLA is being rebuilt under a different logic than before.
Xi is constructing a military centered on loyalty, surveillance and AI, while simultaneously dismantling the patronage networks that previously structured senior military politics.
This reconstruction may eventually produce a more politically reliable force, but it also creates a tension between centralized control and effective command performance.
Xi is attempting to create a military that is both more intelligent and more obedient, but these goals are not fully compatible.
Intelligent warfare requires initiative, adaptability and commanders willing to challenge flawed assumptions.
Xi’s reconstruction of the PLA emphasizes loyalty, supervision and political reliability above all else.
The result could be a force that is more technologically sophisticated and more tightly controlled than its predecessor, but also one that faces a growing risk of hesitation and distorted decision-making in a future crisis.
In the highly uncertain environment leading up to the next Party Congress and amid renewed strategic competition with the United States, China is likely to continue demonstrating military strength through exercises, technological advances and AI-enabled modernization.
However, a real military move against Taiwan would remain strategically unreasonable while the PLA’s senior command structure is still being rebuilt.
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