THINKING ABOUT IRAN`S STRATEGY / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Thinking About Iran’s Strategy

By: George Friedman

In geopolitical analysis, strategy is a combination of defining the national interest, having the military and economic power available to pursue it, accurately assessing an enemy’s strength, identifying its greatest vulnerability and, most importantly, taking advantage of it. 

If a nation can correctly exploit an enemy’s weakness, it often stands to benefit even if it’s militarily inferior.

In that sense, it’s difficult to understand what Iran’s strategy is. 

If Tehran looked at the most recent wars the U.S. fought in – Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan – a critical pattern appears. 

In each case, there are two weaknesses. 

The first is that none of the wars were existential for the U.S. – which is to say the war’s outcome was never going to determine America's fundamental well-being. 

The second is that, as the wars went on without an end in sight, support in the U.S. waned.

That was not the case in World War II. 

A defeat by Japan or Germany would have dramatically reduced American power while vastly increasing Japan’s power in Asia and the Pacific and Germany’s in Europe and the Atlantic. 

Together, both would have profoundly threatened U.S. national security and redefined America’s economic relationships. 

Thus, the American response after the attack on Pearl Harbor and after the German declaration of war triggered a massive change internally, both socially and politically.

Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan were not unimportant wars, but they did not fundamentally affect the U.S. the same way. 

Therefore, the American social and political system responded differently. 

When these wars began, there was some opposition to the government’s position but not enough to stop the wars from happening. 

But as the wars wore on, with neither victory nor end, domestic support for the wars changed. 

It was not so much any active opposition to the wars that was the critical dimension (although in Vietnam the intensity and large number of casualties brought about more opposition as it dragged on) but a generalized feeling that even in victory, the war was not worth fighting. 

Given that each was an elective war, and given the price that was being paid, the feeling was that the wars needed to be ended, even if enemy forces were victorious.

This equation was based also on the apparent willingness of the Viet Cong, Islamists and Baathists in Iraq, and the Taliban in Afghanistan to continue to resist, to impose on the population of their countries a desire to resist, and to instill fear in those who would have desired an end to the war.

The reality was that the war was an existential matter to these nations. 

As a result, the U.S. was not militarily defeated but was unable to sustain the conflicts for political reasons – an issue still being debated today – which led to a political demand to end the wars.

The leadership of Iran is certainly familiar with this model of war. 

The current war was initiated by the U.S. out of fear that Iran would become a nuclear power, and executed on the assumption that limited American force would compel Iran to submit to American will. 

Such was the case in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq – without the nuclear component.

Iran’s stance appears to follow this logic. 

Iran knows the war is unpopular in the U.S., even among many Republicans, who supported President Donald Trump when he promised to avoid such wars. 

Iran cannot defeat the U.S. militarily, but if it maintains social and political solidarity, based on both ideology and fear of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), it believes the war will end as these other U.S. wars did. 

And since this is an existential war for Iran, or at least for the IRGC, it can absorb far higher costs – both economic and in terms of lives – than the Americans can.

In tactical politics, Iran is aware of Trump’s polling numbers in the lead-up to midterm elections. 

This is why Tehran makes gestures toward ending the war and then undermines those gestures by continuing the war. 

For Iran, control of the Iranian public is greater than Trump's control of Americans. 

The Iranian government understands that if it can hang on a little longer, the war could cost Trump his control of Congress, crippling his presidency.

If this logic is correct, the Iranian strategy is to extend the war until Trump is forced to end it out of political necessity. 

Trump would be much less likely to make peace based on major concessions to Iran closer to the elections, as that could increase Republican losses. 

In other words, a peace deal would need to be reached months before the elections, which means pretty soon.

My theory is that Iran is prepared for two negotiating options: an agreement with Washington on terms more favorable to Iran, predicated on domestic political considerations at home, or a prolonged war, with Washington ultimately ending it as it did in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. 

I suspect Tehran prefers the first option but is prepared for the second. 

Therefore, it will continue to extend the war until the U.S. makes the critical concessions.

This is an existential war for the IRGC and possibly for many Iranians. 

For the U.S., it isn’t (save for Iran’s nuclear program). 

The end is unclear, but it would seem the logic of the situation is emerging.

If Trump does not agree to a settlement proposed by Iran, and if U.S. public opinion does not massively turn against him for that, which is possible, it would mean the other three wars' cycles do not apply here. 

In that case, the Iranian regime must prepare the Iranian public for continual U.S. strikes. 

Short of that, the regime might well be in danger regardless of how ruthless it is. 

For Iranians, the stakes are high.