The price of passage
After the war, how open will the Strait of Hormuz be?
Access may come at a price
Photograph: Getty ImagesFOR THE hundreds of ships and thousands of mariners stranded in the Gulf by the war in Iran, the ceasefire has yet to happen.
Most are waiting for the fog of uncertainty to lift from the Strait of Hormuz, the sole waterway between the Gulf and the Arabian Sea, which Iran has closed to all but a few ships.
The clerical regime is using its new-found control of the strait to charge a toll, in effect changing its status from an international waterway with the right of free navigation to something resembling an internal passage or a canal.
There has been little change in the number of ships braving the strait since the ceasefire was announced on April 7th (Washington time).
In fact, fewer passed through it the next day. According to Clarksons, a shipbroker, in the week leading up to the ceasefire about 11 ships made the journey each day—typically vessels operated by Iran or countries deemed friendly—down from around 125 per day before the war.
It counted 13 transits on April 7th (the day before the ceasefire), eight on April 8th, 14 the following day and seven plus an unconfirmed four on April 10th.
Given the disagreement between Iran, America and Israel over the terms of the ceasefire, most ships are biding their time.
“The current situation should be seen as a cessation of violence, rather than a complete ceasefire agreement,” said INTERTANKO, an association of tanker owners, in a message warning members that “conflict could break out at very short notice.”
The body is working on a plan to ensure safe navigation in the rush to move ships if and when the strait opens.
Similarly, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), an international organisation, is trying to negotiate a “humanitarian corridor” for seafarers.
Other UN bodies are trying to unblock shipping of essential goods, such as fertiliser.
The IMO warned that charging a toll would “set a dangerous precedent”.
Iran’s ten-point peace plan, which America said would form the basis of negotiations due to begin in Islamabad on Saturday, envisages limited traffic which will be subject to Iranian controls.
Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, said safe passage “will be possible via co-ordination with Iran’s armed forces and with due consideration of technical limitations.”
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the country’s foremost military force, has issued a map describing parts of the long-established shipping lanes, mostly through Omani waters, as a “danger zone”, presumably because they have been mined.
Instead ships must pass through Iranian waters, around the island of Larak.
Richard Meade, editor-in-chief of Lloyd’s List, a shipping journal, says those making the crossing fall into roughly three categories.
First are ships owned by Iran or part of its “shadow fleet” taking its oil to international markets (typically Chinese refineries).
Then come ships operated by Iran’s friends, such as India, China and Russia (and others able to negotiate diplomatic deals).
These must submit extensive paperwork setting out ownership, management, financing, insurance and trading and chartering history to ensure they have no connections to America or Israel.
Last come ships of other nationalities.
These must also pay a toll of up to $2m for the largest oil tankers, adding roughly a dollar to the price of a barrel of crude.
Brent crude currently trades at roughly $95 per barrel.
More typically, says Mr Meade, the tolls range between $120,000 and $250,000 per vessel.
The exact amount may depend on how badly owners want to recover their vessels, or whether they have a vestigial connection with Iran’s foes.
Payment is either in crypto-currency stablecoins or Chinese yuan.
How far Iran will try to impose this system in a permanent agreement, if one is achieved, is unclear.
Iranian lawmakers are reportedly drafting a bill “to formally codify Iran’s sovereignty, control and oversight over the Strait of Hormuz”, while also creating a source of revenue through fees.
Donald Trump, the American president, has swung every way: at times expressing indifference to Iran’s restrictions; at others suggesting America itself would share in the tolls in a “joint venture” with Iran; and warning Iran against imposing tolls.
“There are reports that Iran is charging fees to tankers going through the Hormuz Strait—They better not be and, if they are, they better stop now!” he posted on social media on April 9th.
Iran stands to earn billions of dollars a year if it can keep charging ships.
In 2023 Egypt raised a little more than $10bn from the Suez Canal, charging around $800,000 for a supertanker, though income has fallen to around $4bn a year since the Houthi rebels in Yemen started attacking ships in the Red Sea in late 2023.
The Panama Canal charges up to $300,000 per crossing, raising around $5.7bn a year.
The two countries have every right to charge for use of canals dug on their territory.
This is not the case for international straits, where ships have long enjoyed a right of “innocent passage” through the territorial waters of littoral states, which are prohibited from charging fees except as non-discriminatory payment for services rendered.
This right was further extended under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which came into force in 1994 and introduced the concept of “transit passage”.
Iran and sympathetic lawyers have offered two main legal arguments to claim control of maritime traffic.
One was outlined during the war in a letter to the IMO on March 22nd, claiming that it was entitled to restrict the passage of ships “belonging to or associated with the aggressors”.
It also falsely claimed that it was not closing the strait to non-belligerents but was simply requiring them to comply with “safety and security regulations”.
Legal experts accept that countries may temporarily restrict innocent passage in their territorial waters for security reasons, but not in international straits.
“Iran’s actions to block the strait are contrary to both the letter and spirit of UNCLOS and applicable customary international law,” argued Mark Nevitt, a legal scholar at Emory University School of Law, in a recent article.
Other scholars, such as Maryam Jamshidi of the University of Colorado, argue that Iran is not bound by UNCLOS since it has not ratified the treaty (neither has America).
Yet most argue that the right of innocent passage predates that treaty, which has in any case become part of customary international law.
Lawyers sympathetic to Iran also argue that the strait is akin to the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, which link the Mediterranean and Black Seas.
These are controlled by Turkey, which charges fees.
But these straits fall entirely within Turkey’s territorial waters, whereas the Strait of Hormuz is shared with Oman.
More important, the Turkish straits are governed by a specific treaty—the Montreux Convention, signed in 1936—and are deliberately excluded from the scope of UNCLOS.
Cross currents
The Iranian regime seems split among three broad strands of thought.
Hardliners, relishing their new-found “weapon of mass disruption”, want to resume fighting and keep the strait closed until Israel agrees to stop attacking Hizbullah, their proxy militia in Lebanon.
Pragmatists, who appear to hold influential positions, want to avoid being dragged back into the conflict.
Instead, they see strategic and fiscal value in acting as gatekeepers to the maritime corridor.
Arab Gulf states would fret but might acquiesce to a deal that acknowledges the reality of Iranian control in exchange for Iran halting support for militias and surrendering its stock of highly enriched uranium.
Reformists, who are largely excluded from decision-making, caution against over-reach.
Acting as the regional bully might deliver short-term gains, but in the longer term would provoke a reaction that could cost Iran dear.
Gulf Arab states would seek to bypass the strait and divert exports through new pipelines.
They might also try to contain Iran with bolstered security alliances.
Guaranteeing open passage, by contrast, could start to build Iran’s reputation as a reliable regional actor, stimulating the foreign investment vital for the country’s reconstruction.
“The temptation for short-term extraction—through tolls or restrictions—is understandable.
But it is ultimately self-defeating,” says Ali Ameri, an Iranian industrialist and investor.
Similar questions will dog Mr Trump, too.
Can he really declare victory over Iran if it can now act as toll-collector on a vital international shipping lane?
Or will he dare resume military action in the hope of breaking its grip, even though some 40 days of bombing failed to do so?
0 comments:
Publicar un comentario