WHY IRAN COULD BECOME THE NEXT IRAQ / THE FINANCIAL TIMES OP EDITORIAL

Why Iran could become the next Iraq

The first Gulf war left a weakened regime in place without a political settlement — paving the way for future conflict

Sanam Vakil

© Ann Kiernan

The war against Iran that began on February 28 is likely to end with all sides claiming military success — but battlefield wins will not automatically lead to political change. 

Despite the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the conflict’s first day and sustained attacks on Iran’s strategic infrastructure, the regime quickly appointed a successor and continued to mount retaliatory strikes targeting Israel and the more vulnerable Gulf Arab states. 

Tehran has demonstrated its capacity to continue fighting by relying on a deliberately decentralised military structure designed to ensure retaliation even if leadership is disrupted. 

It is clear that the regime sees this war as a fight for its survival.

Washington’s objectives are less clear. 

At different moments, US officials have framed the war as an effort to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities, weaken its military and proxies, or pave the way for regime change led by the people. 

These are very different goals that point to very different endgames. 

With no coherent strategy and as the war’s costs grow, a more recognisable outcome is emerging. 

Iran could come to resemble Iraq after the 1990-91 Gulf war: a country militarily defeated and economically debilitated yet still governed by a reconstituted form of the same regime.

The Iraq precedent matters because battlefield success there did not produce the political transformation many in Washington had predicted. 

Coalition forces expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait and destroyed much of Saddam Hussein’s military power but stopped short of overthrowing him. 

Instead, President George HW Bush publicly encouraged Iraqis to rise up. 

In 1991, Shia in the south did so while Kurdish forces launched a rebellion in the north. 

For a moment the regime’s authority appeared dangerously fragile. 

But the uprisings were brutally suppressed as the battered Republican Guard responded with overwhelming force.

What followed was not regime change but more than a decade of containment through sanctions, weapons inspections, no-fly zones and periodic military strikes. 

Throughout the 1990s, Iraq existed in strategic limbo with its military weakened, infrastructure devastated and an economy ravaged by UN sanctions. 

Western powers controlled the skies over northern and southern Iraq, limiting Baghdad’s military reach. 

Saddam lost much of his regional influence but retained coercive control at home. 

The humanitarian consequences were severe. 

Sanctions and economic isolation hollowed out state institutions, poverty surged and public services deteriorated. 

Regular citizens were hit harder than the regime, which adapted by tightening control over dwindling resources and preserving loyalty among security forces.

Iran could follow a similar trajectory. 

New US intelligence estimates suggest that America and Israel’s military success is unlikely to produce political change in Tehran. 

Regimes built around powerful security institutions have a history of resilience, even in defeat. 

Saddam survived because his elite forces remained loyal. 

In Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps plays a comparable role, combining military and economic power with ideological commitment to regime survival.

This war could end with a weakened but enduring Islamic republic — one facing damaged military infrastructure, a deepening economic crisis and greater international isolation while its political leadership remains intact. 

Iran will lose some of its regional reach and financial ability to support partners like the Houthis and Hizbollah while strengthening internal repression.

For Iranians, the consequences could be profound. 

Wartime destruction combined with sanctions would deepen economic hardship and could lead to a steeper currency collapse alongside hyperinflation. 

This could spark a new cycle of social unrest. 

Although some may hope that economic trauma will generate renewed protests, Tehran is signalling that dissent will be treated as collaboration with external enemies. 

In this context, protests are likely to be met with even harsher repression.

The humanitarian implications would extend beyond Iran’s borders. 

Economic collapse would trigger new migration flows towards neighbouring states such as Turkey, Iraq, the Gulf states and Europe. 

For the region, this outcome would resemble a return to the strategic logic of the 1990s.

After the Gulf war, the US and its partners adopted a policy of containment rather than removing Saddam from power. 

The approach limited Iraq’s ability to threaten its neighbours but also produced a prolonged period of instability. 

For more than a decade, Iraq remained locked in a low-level confrontation with western powers that ultimately culminated in the 2003 US-led invasion.

This experience should serve as a warning — of how the aftermath of the current war with Iran might unfold and what policymakers could do to avoid repeating past errors. 

Leaving a defeated and contained regime in place without a clear political settlement may function as a temporary solution, but it is unlikely to resolve underlying issues. 

Most importantly, frozen conflicts tend to drift back towards war. 

Over time, unresolved issues will resurface, leading to recurring crises, periodic military escalation and inevitable pressure in the US and Israel to “finish the job”.

If the current war ends with Iran’s regime weakened but still in power, the greater risk is that the region will slip into another cycle of containment, crisis and confrontation that could gradually generate pressure for a larger, more destructive conflict in the future.

The writer is director of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme