Iran’s nuclear programme
There are no good options for Iran’s nuclear programme
If America cannot eliminate the threat, what should it do?
Photograph: Getty ImagesMANY THINGS make the Iranian regime loathsome, but what causes it to be especially dangerous is its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Its promise not to build a bomb was belied by its determination to enrich uranium to weapons-grade.
That has long underpinned the regime’s attempts to intimidate its neighbours and threaten Israel’s survival.
If the war unleashed by America and Israel on February 28th is to count as even a narrow success, it must therefore set back Iran’s nuclear ambitions for years, and ideally for ever.
The best way for this to happen would be for the regime to be replaced by a democracy focused on improving the lot of its people and living in peace with its neighbours.
Such a government would pose the least threat.
Yet an aerial war will struggle to create such a renewal. It could even make the situation worse.
The regime has surely understood that being a threshold power makes you a target and that for a nuclear programme to offer any protection, it must go all the way.
The new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is thought to be more eager than his late father and predecessor to get a bomb—and after the death of his family is likely to want vengeance.
In Iran those arguments may overshadow the fact that American and Israeli missiles and bombs have done great damage to the economy.
Despite knowing that future work on a nuke will be met with extraordinary firepower, Mr Khamenei may tolerate the risk.
Post-war Iran would begin a programme with a head start.
Roughly 400kg of highly enriched uranium is buried inside the country, enough for about ten bombs.
Whether in the hands of a hostile regime or, if order collapses, a warlord looking for a buyer, this fissile material poses a grave threat.
America has three options.
One, backed by some in Israel, is to send in special forces to seize it.
As we describe, that would take a huge, days-long occupation, involving a specialist assault force protected by over 1,000 troops and constant air support.
This is feasible, though demanding and risky, but America has lost the element of surprise and intelligence suggests that the 400kg is in two or even three places, possibly putting some of it out of reach.
Furthermore, although Iran would have to restart enrichment from scratch, it would retain its know-how.
That leads to a second option, which is to bomb Iran every time it poses a threat.
This war has shown how costly that would be.
Iran has learned that even its low-tech drones and missiles can roil world energy markets and disrupt the Gulf states, which sell themselves to investors and expats as oases of calm.
American voters would surely reject going to war if each engagement only reset the clock for the next one.
American strategists would not want to be stuck in the Middle East when their focus is China.
That leaves a deal with the regime to end its nuclear threat.
This is a tough option: Mr Khamenei may reject an agreement.
The regime may accept and then go on to cheat.
And yet it is still the best option.
Iran is exhausted after the bombing.
To rebuild its economy it needs sanctions to be lifted.
In exchange, it may be willing to strike a permanent deal as part of a ceasefire, whereby the regime agrees to the end of enrichment, monitoring of its nuclear programme and the dilution or removal of the highly enriched uranium.
It would be an odious compromise.
In 2015 Barack Obama negotiated a similar—temporary—deal, but Donald Trump abrogated it in 2018.
What an indictment of his Iran policy that, eight years and two wars later, he has no better options.
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