HOW THE IRAN WAR CREATES A NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

How the Iran War Creates a New Strategic Environment

From the Levant to Central Asia, the conflict creates risk and opportunity.

By: Kamran Bokhari

A change has come to the Iranian government. 

While airpower alone is unlikely to take down the regime, it will never be the same again. 

Over the past few decades, theocrats have steadily weakened the republican elements of the government, but the theocrats themselves have been surpassed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

And as the war now weakens the IRGC, nations in the Middle East and the Levant are concerned about what will emerge in Iran – and what the new regime will mean for them. 

There’s a broad agreement that they would prefer a less ideological regime, but they are nonetheless concerned about the repercussions of state decay. 

Some of these risks have started to materialize. 

On March 11, Iran’s military command warned that the conflict could drive oil prices to $200 per barrel, highlighting the growing risk to energy markets if fighting spreads to the Persian Gulf. 

Israeli officials have privately acknowledged that the war against Iran may not lead to the collapse of the regime, according to an unnamed official in a Reuters report. 

A day earlier, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Dan Caine, said the Pentagon is examining options to escort commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz if ordered to do so. 

U.S. President Donald Trump warned on social media that any mines placed by Iran in the strait must be removed immediately and threatened unprecedented military consequences if Tehran fails to comply.

Addressing the potential blocking of the Strait of Hormuz has become a top U.S. priority as Washington seeks to constrain Iran’s ability to conduct retaliatory missile and drone strikes. 

Yet the broader strategic objective of the campaign remains the same: to degrade the country’s center of gravity, the IRGC, the cohesion of which sustains Iran’s military power and political stability. 

The Trump administration intends to weaken the regime just enough to create conditions for a new regional balance of power, and thus make room for a coalition of pragmatic actors amenable to U.S. terms, but the battlefield realities are compelling Washington to escalate military force, risking a level of degradation that could render the regime incoherent, rather than controllably weakened.

Washington will need a settlement that addresses the decadeslong challenge posed by Iran’s revisionist agenda. 

The White House cannot fully implement its new geostrategy of burden-sharing and burden-shifting in the Middle East if Iran is a destabilizing force with its back against the wall. 

The strategy relies on two regional pillars – Turkey and Saudi Arabia – in coordination with Israel to maintain a stable balance of power. 

Yet that objective is on hold as Israel continues to participate in the war effort, which constrains Washington’s ability to execute its broader regional plan.

Despite concerns over unintended consequences, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other regional stakeholders believe the U.S. war effort aligns with their strategic interests. 

Even so, they remain cautious about divergent U.S. and Israeli objectives. 

While Washington seeks to weaken Iran without precipitating a full collapse of the regime, Israel seeks comprehensive regime change. 

This gap fuels regional anxiety as neighboring states worry about how they will suffer if Tehran loses control over its territory and its instruments of power.

For its part, Turkey would prefer that Iran be weak enough that it can’t project power in the Arab world, reversing a decadeslong era in which Tehran constrained Ankara’s regional ambitions. 

Ankara got some strategic leverage over Iran’s northwestern frontier when it backed Azerbaijan in the 2020 war with Armenia (and, in doing so, reshaped the balance of power in the South Caucasus). 

Similarly, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria gave Turkey an opportunity to project influence in the Levant. 

In Iraq, Turkey wants to loosen Iran’s grip on power – but not so much that it emboldens Kurdish separatism.

Similarly, Azerbaijan has a strategic interest in seeing a stable and cooperative regime take hold in Iran as it secures its southern border and preserves vital cross-border economic and cultural linkages. 

Contrary to popular belief, Iranians in Azerbaijan have not exhibited separatist ambitions, historically seeking to shape Iran’s political mainstream rather than secede. 

Baku wants to leverage these cross-border connections to influence Tehran, reinforcing stability and its own regional position. 

Yet it fears that a severely destabilized Iranian state could also create refugee crises and security challenges along its northern frontier.

Meanwhile, the Gulf Arab states are confronting unprecedented attacks that are already reshaping their strategic environment. 

These energy-rich nations, long regarded as oases of stability in the world’s most volatile region, have attracted international investment and become critical hubs for global air travel. 

Until this conflict, a war with Iran was largely a theoretical risk that could threaten their ability to export oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz. 

Now that that threat is real, there are concerns that attacks could become a recurring feature, forcing states to adapt to a more precarious security environment.

Elsewhere, the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia are assessing the conflict as both risk and opportunity. 

For Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkmenistan, which share borders with Iran, turmoil could trigger spillover effects such as refugee flows and cross-border instability. 

However, a conflict resolution that includes a settlement with the U.S. and relief from sanctions could create significant economic and strategic benefits. 

Beyond these immediate neighbors, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, both of which are landlocked, see a post-crisis Iran as a way to develop new trade corridors and connect them to global markets.

Ultimately, the war against Iran is reshaping not only the Islamic Republic but also the entire regional order as every country navigates the delicate balance between weakening Tehran and avoiding uncontrolled state collapse. 

The conflict has revealed the complex web of interdependencies, risks and unintended consequences that could engulf the Gulf, the Levant and Central Asia. 

For neighboring states, Iran’s internal instability presents both strategic openings and acute security dilemmas. 

The challenge for the U.S. and its partners will be to consolidate gains, stabilize the region and craft a post-conflict order that manages Iran’s revisionist ambitions without triggering a broader crisis.