THE VENEZUELAN MOVE AS PREFACE TO CUBA / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

 The Venezuelan Move as Preface to Cuba

By: George Friedman

In recent weeks, I have focused on two points. 

First, the United States is reducing its involvement in the Eastern Hemisphere and increasing its involvement in the Western Hemisphere. 

I based this on the new geopolitical reality, and it was confirmed by the new U.S. National Security Strategy. 

Second, I argued that the massive U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean was more than was necessary for dealing with Venezuela and is ultimately intended to address Cuba, all this being the first phase of the new U.S. strategy.

The deployments to the Caribbean were the first step. 

The second step occurred early Saturday morning with the U.S. attack on Venezuela and the capture of President Nicolas Maduro and his wife. 

In a subsequent press conference, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would run Venezuela for an unspecified period, reorganize the Venezuelan economy, particularly the oil industry, and make Venezuela a wealthy country – which, I would add, it was to some extent before Hugo Chavez, a leftist who took power in 1999. 

More precisely, it was far wealthier than it is today.

In addition, in response to a reporter’s question on Cuba, Trump said: “I think Cuba is going to be something we’ll end up talking about, because Cuba is a failing nation right now, very badly failing nation. … 

It’s very similar [to the Venezuelan case] in the sense that we want to help the people in Cuba, but we want to also help the people that were forced out of Cuba and living in this country.” 

Secretary of State Marco Rubio added, “If I lived in Havana and were in the government, I’d be concerned at least a little bit.” 

Later, he said the Cuban government is “a huge problem” and “in a lot of trouble.”

An American focus on the Western Hemisphere would inevitably involve Cuba as a priority. 

In the late 19th century, with its preeminence in North America secure and its power increasing rapidly, the U.S. was in a position to scan the horizon for potential threats. 

Partly to end Spanish colonial rule in the Caribbean and the Pacific, it went to war with Spain in 1898. 

The conflict featured Teddy Roosevelt’s famous charge with his Rough Riders up San Juan Hill. 

The hill was in Cuba.

Cuba reappeared on Washington’s radar on Jan. 1, 1959, when Fidel Castro took power on the island. 

Castro’s communist regime allied itself with the Soviet Union, which aided Cuban operations in support of Marxist insurgencies in Central and South America. 

But Castro’s Cuba, by virtue of its proximity to the U.S., also challenged Washington directly. 

At the height of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, what discouraged nuclear war was the concept of mutually assured destruction: A missile launched from one territory toward the other would be detected with enough time before impact to enable a retaliatory launch. 

However, when the Soviets moved nuclear weapons into Cuba, they gained the theoretical ability (with enough missiles) to destroy the U.S. before it could retaliate, undermining MAD. 

This was as close as the world ever came to nuclear war.

Washington’s nightmare, therefore, was a Cuban regime allied with a major U.S. adversary. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to end that nightmare, but it was resurrected to a degree when Russia invaded Ukraine and, in 2025, renewed its military agreement with Cuba. 

With U.S. arms supporting Ukraine’s defense, a reasonable Russian counter would be to supply Cuba with new, more dangerous (albeit non-nuclear) weapons.

In this sense, Cuba and Ukraine are to some degree geographical equivalents due to their proximity to the U.S. and Russia, respectively. 

Just as a Western-armed Ukraine is a threat to Russia, a Russian-armed Cuba is a threat to the U.S. – not in terms of nuclear war, but because it could block essential trade routes from the U.S. Gulf Coast to the Atlantic, and to some extent the Pacific, with conventional weapons. 

The tension over Cuba has not even approached what it was during the Cold War, but it is still a significant issue, depending on how aggressive Russia becomes.

Currently, neither Russia nor any other major U.S. adversary controls Cuba. 

The renewed U.S. focus on the Western Hemisphere is intended to keep it that way. 

During Saturday’s press briefing on Venezuela, Trump and Rubio both referenced American interest and concern in Cuba. 

The U.S. president also explicitly mentioned the Monroe Doctrine, which declared U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere. 

Given this emphasis, the move to depose a hostile leader in Venezuela makes sense and could be a useful preface to dealing with Cuba. 

The anxieties motivating Trump and Rubio are neither new nor unreasonable.