EUROPE HAS THREE OPTIONS FOR DEFENDING GREENLAND / THE ECONOMIST

Out in the cold

Europe has three options for defending Greenland

Fending off Donald Trump may yet prove agonisingly difficult

Training of Danish Armed Forces Arctic specialists in Greenland, Oct 2025 / Photograph: Martin Finnedal/Forsvaret

“IT IS NOT easy to think about solutions when you wake up every morning to new threats.” 

Such was the understated view of Lars Lokke Rasmussen, Denmark’s foreign minister, on January 14th. 

He and his Greenlandic counterpart had just held a testy meeting with Marco Rubio, America’s secretary of state, and J.D. Vance, the vice-president, in Washington. 

Since America’s exfiltration of Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s dictator, on January 3rd, President Donald Trump has revived his interest in what Mr Rasmussen called “conquering” Greenland. 

Anything less than having the island “in the hands of the United States” would be “unacceptable”, Mr Trump wrote on social media before the meeting. 

Otherwise Greenland would fall into the clutches of Russia or China.

The two sides “agreed to disagree”, Mr Rasmussen said. 

He offered no hint that his government might budge on the status of Greenland, a self-governing territory that is part of Denmark. 

But even if no crisis seems imminent, Mr Trump’s meddling with the sovereignty of a NATO ally has sparked alarm in European capitals. 

His intentions are hard to divine. 

Does America want to divide the Greenlanders from the Danes, to buy the islanders off, or even to invade? 

Europe’s politicians are scrambling for a strategy. 

Their options fall into three camps: deflate, deter and distract.

For now the priority is to deflate Mr Trump’s purported concerns by showing that they can be resolved within the existing legal framework. 

Mr Rasmussen said a “high-level working group” would be convened to discuss Arctic security. 

Within NATO, Britain and Germany have proposed an “Arctic Sentry” naval surveillance mission. 

Such suggestions are buttressed by the flattery Mr Trump has come to expect from his NATO allies: chiefly, that he is right to fret about security in the high north. 

“There’s always a bit of truth in what he says,” noted Mr Rasmussen.

Not when it comes to Greenland, though. 

Under the terms of an agreement signed with Denmark in 1951 America may in effect station as many troops as it likes on the island. 

After the cold war America shrank what had been a substantial deployment to what is now fewer than 200 troops at a single base on the island’s north-west, used for space surveillance and early-warning radar. 

Greenland also sits under NATO’s security umbrella.

Broader security concerns seem overdone, too. 

“There’s not really a security case for a NATO mission in Greenlandic waters,” says Andreas Osthagen, an Arctic specialist at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo. 

Evidence is scant for Mr Trump’s claim that the island’s seas are “covered with Russian and Chinese ships”, and the Danes have largely seen off Chinese interest in investing in Greenland. 

Experts say the more pressing Arctic issues lie elsewhere, including Alaska. 

As for the rare earths and other minerals Mr Trump covets, digging them out looks prohibitively expensive. 

American firms would need no transfer of sovereignty to obtain mining concessions, but few have shown interest.

Yet these arguments leave the president unmoved. 

So it is worth taking him at his word when he says “ownership is very important”. 

Securing possession of Greenland is part of his “obsession with legacy”, says a former American diplomat. 

That means Europe needs to consider its second set of options: deterring a Trump grab for Greenland. 

There is some tough talk in Brussels and elsewhere over suspending elements of the European Union’s recent trade deal with America, or squeezing its tech firms. 

Wilder ideas include shutting American military bases in Europe or dumping holdings of US Treasuries.

But finding majorities for such proposals will be difficult, says Jeremy Shapiro, the Washington-based research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. 

And most amount to retaliation rather than deterrence. 

Better, he suggests, to consider actions designed to change the decision-making calculus in the White House. 

These might include establishing a rotational presence of European troops in Greenland; pre-committing to sanctions on American firms that exploit Greenland’s minerals without locals’ consent; and lobbying friendly Republicans.

The Royal Danish Navy frigate HDMS Triton passes an iceberg in the waters around Greenland. / Photograph: NATO

As the meeting in Washington began Denmark announced an increase in its naval, air and land presence in Greenland. 

Allies including France, Germany and Sweden said they would contribute. 

The symbolism is striking. 

But do Europeans have the stomach to escalate further? 

Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, is on the hawkish side. 

On January 14th he told his cabinet Mr Trump was risking “a cascade of unprecedented consequences”. 

Mette Fredriksen, Denmark’s prime minister, once favoured caution but now warns an attack on Greenland would destroy NATO. Robert Habeck, a former German vice-chancellor now at the Danish Institute for International Studies, says an American move on Greenland could embolden Russia to nibble at the Nordics: “All measures must be on the table.”

Others fear that escalating will make a Trump grab more likely, not less. 

Ukraine is another worry: antagonising the White House risks sacrificing America’s tentative offer to join Europe in providing Ukraine with security guarantees after a ceasefire. 

For now, most European politicians seem reluctant to turn the screws. 

“The problems we have can be solved with Greenland as part of Denmark under the existing treaties,” says Jurgen Hardt, foreign-policy spokesman for Germany’s ruling Christian Democrats. 

“I’m sure that this argument will convince President Trump.”

If not, the final hope is that Mr Trump may be distracted from his quest. 

A stealthy takeover operation—say, agitating for Greenlandic independence as a prelude to an American association agreement or annexation—would require planning and follow-through. 

These are not the president’s strengths. 

A military takeover would be simpler to execute. 

But it would severely test the loyalties of some in the armed forces, the government and Congress. 

Just 4% of American voters back the use of force to obtain Greenland. 

Mr Trump has a lot on his plate, from November’s midterms to troubles in Iran, and values easy wins. 

Once the sugar high from Venezuela has worn off, he may find something else to worry about. 

Perhaps his annexation talk is merely designed to press the Danes into a deal on security or mining. 

That, at least, is the European hope.