US and China Find a New Intermediary in the Taiwan Strait
Their outreach to the new KMT leader signals a shift toward managing, rather than contesting, Taiwan’s political future.
By: Victoria Herczegh
First, the American Institute in Taiwan, the island’s de facto U.S. embassy, invited the newly elected chairwoman of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party, Cheng Li-wun, to visit the United States.
Reports also indicate that China may allow Cheng to meet with President Xi Jinping around the Lunar New Year in mid-February.
Finally, Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an is traveling to Shanghai for the Shanghai-Taipei City Forum, one of the few remaining institutionalized cross-strait exchanges.
Taken together, and coming at a time when Washington and Beijing are cautiously stabilizing relations, these developments signal that both sides are more focused on managing Taiwan’s political landscape than directly contesting it.
For Washington, the outreach to Cheng is notable for its timing.
The United States has long engaged Taiwan’s opposition, but the invitation comes amid a softening of U.S. rhetoric on Taiwan, including in the new National Security Strategy, which dropped language encouraging Taiwanese participation in multinational military exercises such as RIMPAC.
The American Institute in Taiwan, staffed primarily by State Department personnel, typically meets Taiwanese politicians in Taipei.
Bringing Cheng to the United States suggests a decision to elevate the engagement and possibly involve senior U.S. officials beyond the de facto embassy.
Framing the discussions around “avoiding war” reflects a strategy of engaging Taiwanese political actors who emphasize stability and restraint.
Beijing’s interest is more straightforward.
The potential Cheng-Xi meeting indicates that Chinese leaders see her as ideologically compatible in ways previous KMT chairs were not.
Cheng speaks more openly about Chinese identity than most Taiwanese politicians and portrays the 1992 Consensus – an informal (and disputed) agreement between semi-official representatives of both sides that there is only one China – as the basis for long-term peace.
Her rhetoric aligns closely with Beijing’s preferred themes of cultural affinity and political normalization without solely depending on coercion.
The Shanghai-Taipei City Forum reinforces that trend.
Although framed as a “non-political municipal exchange,” it serves as evidence that cross-strait dialogue still exists despite the governing Democratic Progressive Party’s reluctance to engage Beijing.
The forum underscores how the KMT continues to maintain channels of communication even when formal mechanisms are frozen.
Cheng’s rise helps explain why both Washington and Beijing are paying attention.
Elected KMT chairwoman in October, she now sets the party’s cross-strait policy and leads it into the 2026 local elections and the 2028 presidential race.
Her “mainlander” background – her family fled to Taiwan with the KMT after the KMT lost the Chinese civil war – shapes both her political identity and her appeal within the party.
Her blunt rhetoric about Chinese identity resonates with the KMT’s “deep blue” base, particularly retired military personnel with mainlander backgrounds who dominate the party’s Huang Fu-hsing faction.
Her early moves to rebuild Huang Fu-hsing have reinforced her standing inside the party.
Her policy positions reflect the same worldview.
Cheng expresses strong confidence in Beijing’s intentions and treats the 1992 Consensus as a workable peace arrangement.
She argues that political reconciliation, not military preparedness, is Taiwan’s real national defense, and she opposes defense spending above 3 percent of gross domestic product.
Her skepticism of Washington, rooted in long-standing KMT grievances over perceived U.S. betrayals and frustration over delayed or costly arms sales, shows in warnings that Taiwan could be used as a bargaining chip in great-power negotiations.
Her sharper rhetoric toward the United States plays well with hardline supporters but reflects a strategic outlook in which Taiwan’s security is tied more to Beijing’s restraint than to American support.
In the developing U.S.-China detente, both sides see value in engaging her.
Beijing, seeking economic stabilization and American investment, finds her ideologically legible.
Washington, preparing for extended negotiations with Beijing and looking to reduce escalation risks, sees the KMT – which controls the legislature and could retake the presidency in 2028 – as a useful hedge.
Signals from Washington, including the downplaying of Taiwan in Trump-Xi discussions, suggest a shift toward managing the Taiwan issue rather than elevating it, even as the U.S. continues to provide major arms packages.
This approach creates space for the KMT to reassert its traditional role as a stabilizing intermediary.
The party has long occupied an ambiguous but useful position – anti-communist in identity but supportive of dialogue and exchange – making it more acceptable to Beijing than the Democratic Progressive Party while remaining tolerable to Washington as a moderating force.
Initiatives like the Taipei mayor’s attendance at the Shanghai-Taipei City Forum fit this pattern, offering both sides a channel they can use without political cost.
Cheng’s prominence, however, comes with limits.
Her emphasis on Chinese identity, revival of Huang Fu-hsing and explicit opposition to Taiwanese independence align her more closely with Beijing’s preferred narrative than previous KMT leaders, narrowing her appeal in a society that overwhelmingly rejects political unification with the People’s Republic of China.
Younger voters see her rhetoric as outdated and disconnected from Taiwan’s distinct political identity.
Even within the KMT, some worry she could push the party too far toward a “pro-China” image in future elections.
Institutionally, she lacks control over foreign policy and the presidency, and any attempt to shift Taiwan’s defense posture would provoke domestic backlash and strain ties with Washington.
Yet Cheng fits the geopolitical moment.
She offers Beijing an alternative narrative to coercion and gives Washington a channel into the legislature and the opposition.
She can keep lines of communication open, temper hostile rhetoric and test ideas for further exchanges.
The structural obstacles to unification remain – entrenched public opinion, distrust after China’s crackdown on dissent in Hong Kong and the destabilizing consequences of political integration – but the value of dialogue in a fragile regional environment is clear.
The simultaneous outreach to Cheng by both Washington and Beijing is not coincidental.
It reflects a shared preference for stability and communication during a period of uncertainty.
Cheng may become a useful intermediary in this phase of U.S.-China adjustment, even as her influence is constrained by domestic politics and strategic realities.
She cannot resolve the Taiwan question, but she can help manage it – and in the current climate, management may be the most important contribution any political actor can make.
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