WHY WASHINGTON`S ADVERSARIES MUST FIND ACCOMMODATION / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Why Washington’s Adversaries Must Find Accommodation

Russia, China and Iran can’t achieve their geopolitical imperatives without it. 

By: Kamran Bokhari

China, Russia and Iran have certain geopolitical imperatives they can’t achieve without first reaching some kind of accommodation with the United States. Beijing needs tariff relief to stabilize its economy. 

Moscow can’t extricate itself from Ukraine without freeing itself from U.S.-led sanctions. 

And Tehran must safeguard its regime amid a floundering political economy and strategic setbacks. 

All three nations can be expected to offer some combination of tactical concessions, backchannel engagement and selective cooperation as each tests U.S. resolve.

 

Recent diplomatic activity confirms as much. 

On Nov. 4, China’s ambassador to the U.S., Xie Feng, said Beijing’s red lines in negotiations with Washington were Taiwan, democracy and human rights, China’s political system, and development rights. 

But he also stressed that “the pressing priority is to follow up on the consensus” reached between presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. 

Earlier on Oct. 24, a day after Trump announced tough new sanctions on Russia, the head of the Russian sovereign wealth fund, Kirill Dmitriev, and a Kremlin special envoy flew to Washington to meet with U.S. officials “to continue discussions about the U.S.-Russia relationship.” 

Meanwhile, prominent Iranian cleric Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, who has held several key government positions since the founding of the Islamic Republic, dropped a bombshell when he said, “The seizure of the U.S. Embassy [during the 1979 revolution] was a major mistake and many of our troubles began there.”

Despite China's continued dominance of critical minerals and key supply chains, its long-term economic health depends on U.S. markets, investment and advanced technologies. 

This gives China some degree of leverage against the U.S., of course, but the benefits are outweighed by its structural disadvantages in technology, finance and innovation. 

U.S. restrictions on semiconductors, AI and high-end equipment constrain Beijing’s ambitions and threaten domestic stability. 

Xi’s domestic challenges – slowed growth, social unrest and ceaseless internal purges from the highest ranks of government – only heighten the stakes.

As for security, China’s regional and global ambitions are constrained by U.S. military presence and alliances in the Western Pacific with Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Australia. 

Washington’s commitments to Taiwan and other partners similarly curb China’s ability to coerce other nations and expand throughout the region. 

Any miscalculation abroad could amplify dissent at home and undermine Xi’s authority. 

Put simply, China’s economic power is no match for U.S. military power and alliances. 

Consequently, even tactical moves in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea require careful calibration against U.S. considerations.

Likewise, China’s global initiatives – from its Belt and Road Initiative projects to its multilateral trade arrangements – are still somewhat at the mercy of U.S. financial and institutional leverage. 

The U.S. dollar, along with Washington’s control of international financial institutions, allows it to shape investment flows, impose sanctions and influence multilateral governance in ways that Beijing cannot fully neutralize. 

Xi’s political legitimacy hinges on sustained economic performance and global prestige, making stable access to U.S.-linked markets and supply chains indispensable. 

In short, China’s structural disadvantages and domestic vulnerabilities make accommodation with Washington essential to achieving its strategic objectives.

Russia’s economy, meanwhile, remains tightly constrained by U.S. and Western sanctions, which target energy exports, finance and key industrial sectors. 

Though Moscow has sought to reorient its economy toward China, India and other partners, these markets cannot replace access to U.S.-linked capital, technology and global financial networks. 

Energy revenues, which underpin the state budget and military spending, remain highly exposed to Western pricing and trade mechanisms. 

Any U.S.-China accommodation, and the U.S.-India deal that is reportedly in the works, would only isolate Russia’s economy further.

Militarily, the war in Ukraine has exposed the limits of Russia’s operational capabilities and underscored the importance of U.S. influence over NATO and allied support for Kyiv. 

U.S. and allied arms transfers, intelligence sharing and sanctions have amplified Moscow’s battlefield challenges and constrained strategic maneuvering. 

Even with incremental gains, sustaining the war effort over time depends on relieving these external pressures. 

And here again, potential accommodations between the U.S. and China and India would intensify these constraints.

Russia is increasingly isolated from multilateral forums and global financial institutions, where U.S. leverage shapes sanctions enforcement, trade norms and international legitimacy. 

Efforts to cultivate alternative alliances provide only limited relief as access to capital, technology and global markets remains tied to Washington. 

There is only so much that China and India can do for Russia, so there is only so far Moscow can spread its influence across Asia and the broader world. 

It has already become a junior partner to China, even as Beijing expands its influence into Moscow’s backyard.

Then there is Iran, whose structural isolation and economic fragility are worse than Russia’s. 

Decades of sanctions have gutted its industrial base, crippled energy exports and denied it access to modern technology and international finance. 

Tehran lacks great-power patrons that are willing or able to underwrite its survival; China and Russia exploit Iran’s desperation for cheap energy and regional leverage, but they offer little strategic cover. 

The result is an economy that survives through evasion and endurance, not growth or diversification – an untenable model for a regime under mounting domestic strain.

Iran also faces a deteriorating strategic environment that limits its freedom of action. 

Its proxies in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria have been defeated, and the ones in Iraq and Yemen are under considerable pressure and vulnerable to sustained Israeli and U.S. strikes. 

The Gaza conflict and regional instability have exposed Iran’s inability to shape outcomes without inviting retaliation. 

Without accommodating Washington, Tehran risks strategic encirclement by U.S. partners – Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Domestically, Iran’s legitimacy is eroding under economic decline, political factionalism and a generational crisis of faith in the system’s ideology. 

Internal divisions within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and between the IRGC and the regular armed forces underscore declining coercive capabilities. 

Worse, a leadership transition is rapidly approaching, and everyone involved wants to see it through without sacrificing the stability of the country. 

In this context, reaching some form of understanding with Washington is not a strategic option but an existential necessity. 

Without it, Tehran faces the slow annihilation of its economy, its regional influence and eventually the cohesion of the regime itself.

Ultimately, Beijing, Moscow and Tehran are being pulled toward Washington by structural necessity, not diplomatic preference.