The Problem With China’s Renewed Push for Unity
It doesn’t do much for a trade deal with the U.S.
By: Victoria Herczegh
The Chinese government recently introduced a new set of regulations, set to take effect in 2026, to manage Chinese citizens employed by foreign diplomatic and consular missions in China.
The new rules state that the Chinese Foreign Ministry will strictly handle the hiring process of these employees, who must abide by a code of conduct that upholds Chinese law.
Like the travel restrictions imposed last month on public sector workers, the move means to tighten state control over foreign influence, drawing a clear line between foreign and domestic authority, as well as monitoring Chinese citizens’ loyalty to their country’s political system, laws and values.
Though the government in Beijing has always tried to instill a sense of loyalty to the ruling party and its leaders, laws like these suggest there is a newfound sense of urgency to maintain unity.
Given China’s recent economic instability, the urgency is unsurprising.
But even in times of prosperity, unity is historically elusive in a country as large, populous and regionally disparate as China.
Economic duress is only one element.
For now, China’s primary imperative is to survive the trade conflict so that its most important economic sectors can begin to recover.
The importance of uniting China cannot be overstated.
Not only is it crucial in keeping the nation itself stable, but it also enables its leaders to influence and build, upgrade or mend relations with other countries.
It is also very difficult.
Throughout its history, China has struggled to lift up the poorer, rural interior provinces, even as the coastal provinces have thrived.
This is why the Chinese government has long tried to enact measures to narrow the wealth gap.
More recent attempts, such as the “common prosperity” campaign, failed because of systemic problems like urban-rural divides and market-driven inequalities.
Neither is unique to China, of course, but China’s size and divisions make them more pronounced – as do periods of economic hardship.
In past times of economic struggle, the regions of China’s periphery tended to feel the pressure first, so they were also likely to engage in unrest.
(Which is why places like Tibet and Xinjiang are so heavily scrutinized by the West.)
Ultimately, this is why Beijing spends so much time promoting loyalty.
The National People’s Congress Standing Committee, for example, recently reviewed the draft Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which promotes social integration, economic development and oversight of ethnic minorities, as well as the Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language, which advocates use of standard Chinese across all sectors.
Both drafts can be linked to the Chinese government’s renewed promotion of “ethnic unity.”
Clearly, the government is now placing special attention on the country’s peripheral regions.
Last month, Chinese President Xi Jinping and some senior members of the Chinese Communist Party paid a rare visit to Tibet, praised its local government for “engaging in a struggle against separatism," and called for stability and unity along China’s borders.
Even more recently, Xi attended the 70th anniversary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the first time any president has ever been present for this celebration.
Beijing’s push for unity doesn’t end with ethnic minorities in restive regions.
Last month, the People’s Liberation Army Daily published details of the government’s new campaign of “strengthening the Party’s absolute leadership over the military,” including a bigger role for political commissars, mandatory political study sessions focused on “Xi Jinping thought,” enhanced mechanisms of monitoring and reporting, and the integration of political criteria in promotions.
The article describes how the CCP means to curb dissent and enhance ideological unity within its ranks.
The scale of recent purges in the PLA sparked speculation that Xi wasn’t in control of the PLA anymore.
The new regulations suggest that though Xi has not lost control, he is still wary of any form of opposition.
And it is in that spirit that changes are coming to the economy.
In an article recently published in Qiushi, the CCP’s leading theoretical journal, Xi called for stronger efforts to develop a unified domestic market, listing key tasks and measures to deal with excessive competition and price wars.
Concerns about “disorderly competition” have already been raised at top meetings, including one in July of the Central Finance and Economic Affairs Commission, also chaired by Xi.
Beijing’s concerns aren’t unfounded.
In the past few months, companies have struggled with prolonged overcapacity (especially in crucial emerging industries such as electric vehicles and solar power) and persistently low demand due to economic uncertainties in a number of sectors.
Price wars broke out, causing consumer prices to slip back into deflation.
According to data recently published by the National Bureau of Statistics, China’s official consumer price index contracted 0.4 percent year over year last month, a bigger decline than the 0.2 percent predicted in polls, while its producer price index dropped 2.9 percent year over year in August.
These trends have prompted the government to renew its anti-competition campaign.
Xi himself has called on firms to focus on quality over quantity and on officials to deal with the “chaos” of government procurement processes.
A parallel series of measures hoping to goose spending and support consumer prices has also been introduced, though they have yet to have the desired effect.
Meanwhile, China’s property market, the downturn in which has caused real home prices to fall by 20 percent since 2021, continues to bedevil the government.
Although there was a slight pickup in 2025 after the government introduced stimulus packages, prices have begun to fall again.
Some projections suggest the crisis could continue well into 2027.
Beijing’s response may have been too little, too late, but it was too busy dealing with concurrent problems of general and local government debt and youth unemployment to do much more.
And there are only so many options available to Beijing to fix these problems.
Exports – once a reliable source of government revenue – have taken a hit.
In August, China's exports to the U.S. fell by 33.1 percent year over year, and there’s no reason to believe the trade dispute will end anytime soon.
Though China has tried to diversify its export markets toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, it will take time for its efforts to pay off – if they pay off at all.
After all, ASEAN nations have every reason to distrust China, and they know they are not immune to U.S. sanctions.
The only thing that will kickstart an economic recovery is a deal with the United States.
The best Beijing can do is keep the nation stable and unified, intensely monitoring the most vulnerable areas and tightening control over ordinary citizens.
The problem is that any deal will come with the kinds of concessions that could undermine the unity it is struggling so hard to forge.
In that sense, Beijing’s renewed push for control does not align with its true imperative to come out of the trade conflict with an agreement that would allow an economic rebound.
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