The dangers of war in the grey zone
Russia’s resort to hybrid warfare is a sign of weakness. But it still requires a response
Gideon Rachman
© James FergusonThe warnings are coming thick and fast.
Over the past week, Friedrich Merz, the German chancellor, has said that, when it comes to Russia, “we are not at war, but we are no longer at peace either”.
Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen told the FT: “We are now in the most difficult situation in Europe since the end of the second world war.”
She warned “we are running out of time”.
And Eliza Manningham-Buller, a former British intelligence head, mused that it “may be right [in saying] we’re already at war with Russia”.
All three were responding to a wave of Russian “hybrid warfare”— aggressive acts that stop short of actually killing people.
As Frederiksen explained, it is “drones one day, cyber attacks the next day, sabotage on the third day.”
European concerns have risen sharply in recent weeks, following the incursion of Russian drones over Poland and a sustained violation of Estonian airspace by Moscow’s jets.
Both the Copenhagen and Munich airports were temporarily shut in response to drones.
The Danes seem pretty certain that Russia was the source of their problem.
But while hybrid warfare is making more headlines, it is not new.
Last year, Russia was linked to arson attacks across Europe, as well as to a plot to put parcel bombs on DHL cargo flights.
Nato also accused Russia of planning to murder the CEO of Rheinmetall, a German arms manufacturer.
There were several previous Russian incursions over Estonian airspace that did not make headlines.
The latest was simply longer and more provocative.
A crucial question about hybrid warfare is whether to regard it as an alternative to conventional “kinetic” warfare — or simply as a prelude to it?
That shapes the debate about how to respond.
One argument is that Russia’s resort to hybrid warfare reflects weakness and uncertainty rather than strength and determination.
The Russians are enraged by western aid for Ukraine and threatened by the success of Kyiv’s missile strikes on energy facilities, which imperil a key source of Russian export revenue.
Almost half of Russia’s oil refineries have been hit by Ukrainian drones or missiles.
The Kremlin argues that by providing Ukraine with long-range missiles and vital intelligence, the western alliance is waging a proxy war on Russia.
Western officials have long weighed the possibility that Moscow might respond by striking targets on Nato territory — such as the military bases that are used as a staging post for aid to Ukraine.
But, for now, Russia is using disruptive hybrid attacks that stop short of military action against Nato territory.
That relative restraint is evidence that western deterrence is working.
An alternative view is that Russia’s hybrid warfare measures are probing attacks aimed at testing western responses and dividing the Nato alliance.
If that is right, Putin’s current actions could simply be a prelude to actual kinetic warfare in Europe.
These two views point to different policy responses.
If the Kremlin has been successfully cowed into staying beneath the level of actual warfare, then it would be a mistake for Nato countries to respond too forcefully.
Shooting down Russian planes that violate Nato airspace — a threat made by Radosław Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister — would, in this view, be a needless and dangerous escalation.
One former US official argues that there remains a “bright red line” between aggressive Russian acts that kill people — and those that do not.
His view is that the argument that hybrid and conventional warfare are on a seamless continuum is a mistake.
As this former official puts it: “If it turns into a conventional war, people will soon notice the difference.”
The alternative view is that if Putin can keeping upping the ante, without provoking a forceful and united western response, he might be able to demonstrate that Nato’s collective defence provisions are empty.
The fact that last week’s EU discussions on setting up a drone wall to counter Russia were inconclusive and acrimonious was probably noted in the Kremlin.
If western unity dissolves, then smaller and weaker members of the alliance could eventually be isolated and attacked.
It is possible, of course, that neither theory is completely true — and that the biggest risk is an accidental conflict caused by Russia’s increasingly reckless use of “grey zone” tactics.
What if Russian sabotage of a cargo plane, or an arson attack, caused mass casualties? DHL parcels are carried not only on cargo planes but also on passenger flights.
If Russian sabotage had caused a plane to crash over Europe, killing hundreds on board, many would see that as an act of war.
Putin might believe that, even in those circumstances, Europe would be all too eager to accept the Kremlin’s assurances that it was all an unfortunate accident.
So Russia’s current actions do require a response that both makes it clear that there is a price to be paid for hybrid warfare — and avoids crossing the threshold into direct combat.
The best response to Russian hybrid warfare may be a western version of grey zone tactics.
By its nature, hybrid warfare is asymmetrical and relies on imagination.
The western alliance cannot emulate Russian recklessness.
Arson attacks are off the menu.
But the US, Britain and France all have offensive cyber capabilities.
Presumably, they are there for a reason.
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