LOSING FAITH IN CHINA / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Losing Faith in China

New policies for religious control show how worried Beijing is over its grip on society.

By: Victoria Herczegh

At an ad hoc Politburo Study Session last week, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the acceleration of the Sinicization of religions. 

Sinicization refers to the modification of someone or something under Chinese influence, a concept widely used by the Chinese Communist Party to assimilate minorities or subordinate other entities to the party. 

In his opening speech, Xi said Sinicization was necessary for religious groups to adapt to socialist society, and he insisted that religious leaders should willingly participate in Chinese-style modernization. 

He also urged party committees to strengthen their leadership over religious work, to improve relevant laws and policies, and to carry out in-depth propaganda and education on the rule of law in religious environments.

Though the concept of religious Sinicization has been around as long as Xi has been president, it was largely symbolic at first, targeting some religions more than others. But these new policies appear to be more structural – a hardline approach to all five of China’s recognized religions. 

Along with other newly introduced restrictions, this new stance evinces the government’s growing fear of losing its position as the sole ideological benchmark for society.

It’s a fear that has shaken Chinese leaders throughout modern China’s history. 

After Mao Zedong established the People’s Republic, he immediately declared religious influence to be linked to “foreign cultural imperialism,” “feudalism” and “superstition.” 

He believed religious faith could rival the party’s control, so he ruthlessly persecuted religious groups, deported missionaries and confiscated religious establishments for secular use. 

Later, during the Cultural Revolution, he took steps to ban all religious activities and destroy religious shrines, churches and mosques. 

Things moderated somewhat under Deng Xiaoping, who acknowledged the “complexity” associated with religion. 

Under his rule, the party granted citizens freedom of religious belief, even though it continued to prohibit formal religious education in schools.

As China grew more prosperous in the 1980s, religious life prospered as well. 

Authorities came to view the free practice of religion not only as a stabilizing force that could contribute to social harmony but also as a source of economic opportunity, particularly through the development of religious tourism. 

Because of this, the government even funded the renovation of some of the establishments destroyed under Mao, and for more than a decade, Beijing tolerated all sorts of religious groups and activities, even those outside of the five main religions acknowledged and supervised by the party: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism.

After the Tiananmen Square protests, however, the party retightened its control over daily life in China. 

Leaders meant to purge the country of any group or activity that could threaten their influence. 

Groups such as Falun Gong, the Unification Church and the Children of God were therefore banned amid accusations of spreading anti-communist ideology. 

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, anything outside the five recognized religions were barely tolerated. 

Under President Hu Jintao, the State Council gave local leaders the power to exercise their authority over religious entities, but they were still generally lenient toward the five major religions.

Xi was harsher. 

When he first introduced his concept of religious Sinicization in 2015, he called on all the officially recognized religious groups to integrate their doctrines, customs and morality to Chinese culture. 

The concept, which was soon followed by a regulatory campaign, was aimed primarily at religions that were deemed “foreign,” including Christianity and Islam, which Xi said were susceptible to “Western values” and extremism. 

Put simply, he created a new gap between the treatment of religions that were born outside of East Asia and those already tied to traditional Chinese values. 

Islam and all branches of Christianity were strictly monitored and regulated, while symbols on churches and mosques were removed to make them look “more Chinese.” 

Pastors and imams have been asked to focus on religious teachings that reflect socialist values. 

At the same time, religions such as Taoism and Buddhism were not just spared this level of scrutiny; they often received financial support from the government.

But even this practice appears to be changing. 

Xi has said that all five main religions should adapt to Chinese-style modernization – that is, uphold and respect the party principles above all else. 

In September, for example, a new code of conduct was issued that prohibits priests and preachers from all faiths from using the internet to carry out religious activities. 

Indeed, the code states that it is illegal to promote religious ideas through the internet to Chinese youths. 

There had already been rules in place that prevent children from legally identifying with any religion, and formal religious education is taboo even at universities. 

This new restriction, however, essentially bans what is very likely the most popular and accessible means of religious education. 

It’s a calculated maneuver meant to discourage recent college graduates from turning to religion amid China’s economic downturn and their own joblessness – something they have increasingly been doing since the COVID-19 pandemic.

To be sure, educated twentysomethings are not the only group finding solace in religion. 

Interest in religious communities has grown among members of the urban middle class in general. 

Many intellectuals are also replacing their faith in the party with faith in religion. 

These people are introduced to the free practice of Christianity during their overseas travels – something that the Chinese government is working on restricting right now. 

In fact, the new code of conduct explicitly states that religious personnel “must not collude with foreign forces” through the internet.

Even “indigenous” religions, once deemed untouchable, are feeling the pinch. 

In recent months, for example, several influential Buddhist leaders were accused of amassing wealth by misappropriating donations. 

Two of them have since been stripped of their monkhood, and the communities that were built around them practically disappeared. 

This new persecution is largely political: As with so many other crackdowns under Xi, corruption (which is rampant and often tolerated throughout Chinese society) is used to stamp out threats to Xi’s power and to gain trust among the public.

Xi’s call for a renewed and intensified Sinicization signals a deeper insecurity within the leadership about the party’s ideological grip on society. 

What was once mostly a targeted policy against Christianity and Islam has become a sweeping effort to assert control over all faiths as citizens become disillusioned with the state. 

This is especially so for urban and educated youths – the most likely demographics to revolt. 

That’s not to say revolution is in any way imminent; there’s no proof that they are becoming more radical or even more organized than they were in their recent protests, which were put down without much fanfare. 

Rather, it demonstrates a slower, more gradual erosion of the party’s all-encompassing authority.