A European deterrence force is a prerequisite for peace in Ukraine
Security guarantees backed by American air support must precede any final deal or Russia will simply rest and re-arm
Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Sir Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron at the Élysée Palace. Europe must now ensure Ukraine’s security so Kyiv can negotiate from a position of strength © Ludovic Marin/Pool/AFP/Getty ImagesWhen US President Donald Trump declared that he would back a European deterrence force in Ukraine as part of his push for peace, he took a welcome step towards resolving the dilemma of Kyiv’s postwar security requirements.
Ukraine cannot accept any deal that fails to provide ironclad security guarantees to ward off a renewed Russian invasion.
Nato’s Article 5 mutual defence clause remains the most effective and least expensive security guarantee available.
However, if Trump does not agree to Nato membership for Ukraine, European allies must provide their own credible commitments.
The most important element of any such guarantees must be a well-armed European deterrence force on the ground in Ukraine.
It could be stationed behind the lines to provide rapid support to Ukrainian forces and serve as a clear signal to Russian President Vladimir Putin that any attack would be met with a military response from Ukraine’s allies.
Without this concrete guarantee of security, Moscow’s forces will simply use any future ceasefire as an opportunity to rest and re-arm.
Yet while a “coalition of the willing” led by the UK and France has been discussed for months, European security guarantees are being treated as something to be included in a final peace deal, rather than as a prerequisite to such an agreement.
This thinking must be turned on its head.
Europe’s security strategy must have three pillars to its deterrence force.
First, it must strengthen Ukraine’s own deterrence.
While the new agreement that will see Europe buying American weapons systems for Ukraine through Nato is a good start, it is not a sustainable long-term solution.
Europe should invest directly in Ukraine’s defence industry, which is already producing more weapons at a lower cost than traditional defence players.
This approach, championed by Denmark, would allow Ukraine to build up its own stockpiles as part of a “porcupine” strategy of warding off Russian aggression.
Europe’s own industry should also seek out new and extended partnerships with the countless Ukrainian firms on the leading edge of battlefield-tested technologies.
Second, the continent’s leaders must establish a European-centric command format for its essential deterrence force.
While Trump has vowed that Nato will not play a boots on the ground role, that should not exclude the use of Nato’s existing organisational structure.
The deputy supreme allied commander Europe, currently a British officer, can co-ordinate European deployments in place of the American supreme Allied commander.
Operationally, the model for a European deployment already exists in Nato’s enhanced forward presence in the Baltics and Poland.
These forces could include soldiers from the 30-plus countries that have already signed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine based on the Kyiv Security Compact that I authored with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s chief of staff in 2022.
Third, given Trump’s willingness to back a European-led deterrence force “by air”, there are three cost-effective roles for the US: transport, intelligence, and air defence.
Europe still lacks the sort of heavy transport and logistical aircraft the US has; securing American support will therefore be essential.
Similarly, Europe cannot replace the scale and quality of US intelligence collection.
With Washington unlikely to close its eyes and ears in the region following a peace deal, ensuring critical intelligence sharing would be a low-cost way for the US to back the European force.
Critically, Ukraine also requires long-term air defence capabilities — and a European force will need assistance to protect itself from a large Russian air force with significant drone capabilities.
Further agreements with the US on Patriot missile defence batteries would help to secure Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, and the threat of the combined air and long-range strike capabilities of the US would serve as a significant deterrent.
While US officials have recently expressed an openness to similar proposals, nothing with Trump is final until a White House signing ceremony.
European leaders must work quickly to secure one.
Putin is demanding that Russia play a role in “guaranteeing” Ukraine’s security — something that would be the equivalent of putting a nuclear-armed bear in charge of the henhouse.
A request from the Ukrainian government is the only mandate a force of willing European countries should require — and Kyiv has already asked.
Europe must now ensure Ukraine’s security so Kyiv can negotiate from a position of strength.
If the “coalition of the willing” becomes a coalition of the waiting, the repercussions will be lasting.
The writer is a former Nato secretary-general
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