RUSSIA IS LOSING THE SOUTH CAUCASUS / PROJECT SYNDICATE

Russia Is Losing the South Caucasus

The recent peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan suggests that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to dominate the South Caucasus may be producing the opposite effect: a total loss of control. But ensuring such a positive outcome will require ongoing, active engagement by Western leaders.

Ali Karimli

BAKU – The peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, announced recently at the US White House, is perhaps the clearest sign yet that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s heavy-handed interventions in the South Caucasus have loosened, and in some cases eliminated, Russia’s stranglehold over the region. 

Given Putin’s zero-sum view of world affairs, this loss of influence may lead him to take an even harder line in the Ukraine-Russia peace talks that US President Donald Trump is trying to kick-start.

America’s role in facilitating the Armenia-Azerbaijan deal comes as a stunning surprise in the region. 

It was not so long ago that Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia all seemed to be returning to the Russian fold. 

But the Kremlin is not relinquishing control easily and assumes that the surest way to maintain influence among its neighbors is to have them at each other’s throats and reliant on Russia as a mediator.

In Armenia, where Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has sought to move toward integration with the European Union, the Kremlin is believed to have hatched a recent plot to install a pro-Russia puppet who would reignite the war with Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Putin and his circle seem to have believed that they had the wherewithal to affect the regime. 

The Armenian opposition is pro-Russian and revanchist toward Azerbaijan, and Russia also has the means to strengthen the anti-Pashinyan camp through pro-Russian Armenian religious leaders and Armenian-origin Russian billionaires. 

But their attempt at subterfuge failed.

The situation differed substantially in Azerbaijan, where it is the main opposition forces – the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan (PFPA, which I lead), and its ally, the National Council – that advocate integration into the Euro-Atlantic theater and reject cooperation with Russian authorities. 

The Kremlin, like the government, appears deeply afraid of the pro-Western opposition’s growing strength, and therefore likely supports the government’s repressive tactics.

Unlike Pashinyan, Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, opposes Euro-Atlantic integration and remains open to a continued alliance with the Kremlin, provided that it respects his personal interests and refrains from humiliating or undermining him domestically or internationally.

So, even after the peace deal with Armenia, Russia probably will not try to topple Aliyev, but rather to pressure him into renewed subordination.

Georgia presents another difficulty. 

The Kremlin is undoubtedly pleased with the current Georgian Dream government, given its repressive internal policies and anti-Western rhetoric. 

But since Russia has long occupied 20% of Georgia’s territory, the government must reckon with vehemently anti-Russian public opinion.

Prior to the Armenia-Azerbaijan agreement, dealing definitively with Georgia was likely to be Putin’s final act of revanchism in the South Caucasus. 

As long as Georgia’s government remained under the thumb of Bidzina Ivanishvili, an oligarch who made his fortune in Russia, it could be counted on to cooperate.

If the Kremlin could achieve unquestioned dominance over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, such a demonstration of regional hegemony would empower the Georgian government to present a stark choice to its citizens: submit to Russia (as Belarus has done) or risk further occupation.

But now that the Armenia/Azerbaijan domino has fallen, Putin will have to reassess his plans. 

There is strong evidence that the Kremlin had mobilized the leaders of the pro-Russian opposition in Armenia in the weeks before the deal with Azerbaijan was reached. 

This fifth column against Pashinyan – composed of pro-Kremlin religious figures, and supported by the Armenian-born Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan – even called on Armenia’s military to overthrow the government.

But Pashinyan proved more decisive and vigilant than many (including the Kremlin) expected. 

Not only did he thwart the coup attempt, but anti-Russian sentiment in Armenia intensified, helping to push the deal with Azerbaijan forward.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin had been pressuring Azerbaijanis within Russia with mass arrests, torture, and deportations. 

The likely goal was to threaten Aliyev with heightened social unrest from a flood of repatriations. 

But these machinations also failed to yield the desired outcome. 

Azerbaijan responded by detaining Russian citizens in Baku and elsewhere, and public opinion shifted sharply against Russia.

Kremlin strategists probably hoped that Aliyev’s ideological affinity to Putin – both oppose democracy and Western influence – would facilitate an agreement. 

But Aliyev recognized that Putin was seeking a lever that he could pull at any time to weaken Aliyev’s grip on power.

Aliyev has no intention of sharing control of Azerbaijan, even with Putin. 

Consequently, agreeing to a US-brokered peace deal with Armenia, and welcoming Washington’s influence in the region, looked like a far safer bet compared to relying more on Putin. 

Still, given Azerbaijan’s vast mineral and energy wealth, Russia is unlikely simply to accept these setbacks. 

It will look for new ways to apply pressure.

At this critical juncture, the US, NATO member states, the European Union, and the broader West must work to consolidate the inchoate peace that is emerging in the South Caucasus. 

That means extending substantial support to the region to ensure that Russia’s attempts at domination end.

Most importantly, the international community must unequivocally condemn Russia’s support for (and orchestration of) the attempted coup in Armenia, as well as its ongoing pressure campaign in Azerbaijan. 

Public statements from NATO and EU leaders in support of South Caucasian aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration would significantly bolster regional efforts to escape Russian influence.

There also should be greater international pressure on Georgia’s government, which needs to allow democratic reforms, and on Aliyev, who should be explicitly informed that releasing political prisoners and ensuring freedom of the press, assembly, and association are crucial for strengthening Azerbaijani independence.

In each case, ending domestic repression and fostering democracy are essential for securing meaningful Western support against Russian pressure. 

Ultimately, Putin’s desire to dominate the South Caucasus may produce the opposite effect: a total loss of influence.

To achieve this outcome, the region’s leaders must act responsibly, its populations must prepare to make the sacrifices needed for democracy and freedom, and Western officials must demonstrate foresight, prudence, and courage.

Ali Karimli, a former Azerbaijani secretary of state, is the leader of the country’s united political opposition.