IS SOUTH KOREA THE NEXT BIG ARMS MAKER? / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Is South Korea the Next Big Arms Maker?

Seoul’s arsenal diplomacy could ultimately reinforce, not erode, U.S. primacy.

By: Geopolitical Futures

By Emmett Stern

South Korean arms manufacturers are having a moment, and their rise is years in the making. 

In 2022, for example, Poland signed contracts for 180 tanks and 219 howitzers; it started to receive them in less than four months – an unheard of timeline for legacy arms suppliers. 

This rapid fulfillment, and ability to leverage competitive production costs without sacrificing capacity, exemplifies why South Korea is rapidly emerging as a staple defense supplier to the world. 

Its emergence signals a strategic shift in how middle powers are using arms exports to reduce reliance on larger powers, embed themselves in global supply chains and give themselves a stake in the international system.

From 2010 to 2020, South Korea netted roughly $2 billion-$3 billion in annual arms sales. 

The value of these exports jumped to $7.3 billion in 2021, $17.3 billion in 2022 and $14 billion in 2023. 

They still cleared $9.5 billion in 2024, despite a cooling global market. 

During this time, the number of countries receiving Korean arms has more than tripled, climbing to 23 countries. 

Sales are expected to continue rising as South Korea continues pushing investments into its defense industrial base.

Seoul ranked as the world’s 10th largest defense exporter between 2020 and 2024, but it aspires to be the fourth largest by 2027, according to statements made by its Defense Ministry. 

Current trajectories and competitive advantages – timelines that bypass bureaucratic red tape, rapid scalability through advanced manufacturing capabilities, and relative geopolitical neutrality – suggest Seoul’s goals are achievable.

Some notable South Korean weapons being imported by other countries include:

The K2 Black Panther tank: Regarded as one of the most advanced of its kind, this tank costs around $8.5 million per unit. 

Poland’s 2022 order of 180 K2s marked the largest single tank deal in decades. 

(Poland ordered 180 more this year.) 

Because of the K2, Seoul has now surpassed the United States as Poland’s top arms provider.

The K9 Thunder howitzer: Through this model alone, South Korea controls more than 50 percent of global self propelled howitzer exports.

The FA 50 light fighter jet: This $45 million aircraft costs substantially less than the U.S.-made F 16 Block 70 ($70 million) and is compatible with most NATO systems. 

South Korea has exported more than 140 FA-50s to the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Iraq and Poland.

The KF 21 Boramae fighter: South Korea’s first domestically developed 4.5-generation fighter jet will be available for export soon, and it already has interested buyers.

South Korea’s recent surge in sales reflects a growing global demand for affordable yet modern weapons platforms. 

South Korean fighter jets are especially appealing for nations that need low-cost multirole aircraft, while the K9 howitzer and K2 tanks address Europe’s urgent needs for rearmament. 

Investors are also taking notice. 

The Korea Defense Industry Index has more than doubled in value since launching on the New York Stock Exchange in February.

South Korea’s export strategy is rooted in a centuries-long effort to escape the shadow of foreign domination of the Korean Peninsula. For much of its premodern history, Korea existed in the orbit of larger powers, first as a tributary to China, then as a colony of Japan. 

The nation recognized Chinese authority for centuries in exchange for security and trade access. 

It was annexed by Japan in 1910 and ruled as a colony until 1945. 

During Japanese rule, cultural suppression – the banning of Korean language education, the forced adoption of Japanese names, and so on – engendered distrust and resentment of foreign influence. 

And though it has been a sovereign nation for some time now, South Korea still faces immediate physical threats from North Korea and Chinese activity in nearby waters and airspace. 

A shorter response window means South Korea needs control over its own capabilities. 

Seoul’s efforts to develop an indigenous defense industry, then, is part of a deliberate plan to achieve self-reliance for its national security.

This dovetails with its larger imperative to establish independent economic and military capabilities so that it isn’t subordinate to a foreign power. 

When South Korea can produce its own advanced weapons systems, it not only gains the flexibility to tailor these systems to its specific operational requirements but also provides value to the U.S. defense industrial base in a way that a mere trade partner cannot. 

Just this past week, the U.S. Army announced South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace company would perform engine overhauls for U.S. Chinook helicopters.

But, crucially, Seoul is weaning itself off foreign powers without alienating them. 

In some cases, it fosters cooperation. 

South Korean equipment is now partly standard issue from Northern Europe to the Gulf. 

NATO has responded by launching the NATO–South Korean Defense Industry Consultative Group this month to standardize testing and coproduction. 

Once a country fields South Korean platforms, it ties its logistics, munitions and software updates to South Korean firms for decades, giving Seoul a form of long-tail leverage. 

And although logistics dependence does not dictate partners’ foreign policy, it does ensure that South Korean interests are on the table whenever procurement or basing choices arise. 

Warsaw and Abu Dhabi, for instance, have already signed service contracts that outlast current governments.

Strategically, the other purpose defense industry independence serves is to help secure South Korea’s place in the global supply chain – something it must do to offset its resource vulnerability. 

Seoul imports almost 98 percent of its fossil fuels, so it must export manufactured goods such as semiconductors, consumer electronics, cars and ships to build its economy. 

Strong defense exports will help cushion South Korea’s cyclical tech economy and slowing economic growth. 

By embedding South Korean technology and chips in foreign radars and weapons systems, Seoul locks its software and hardware manufacturing capabilities to global supply chains.

Defense exports thus represent the ultimate expression of South Korea’s survival strategy: turning manufacturing capability into mutual dependence with partners such that severing ties becomes too costly. 

This makes South Korea’s involvement in supply chains even more indispensable and secures access to critical resources, markets and innovation for the country.

In the coming decades, mid-sized countries such as Poland, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia could grab a greater market share of the global arms trade. 

If South Korea can keep (or build on) its brand loyalty, its rise as a manufacturer may well foreshadow its rise as a strategic actor. 

And if other countries choose it as their preferred armorer, it would move East Asia from a passive consumer of Western security goods to an active exporter of security governance. 

In short, South Korea’s arsenal diplomacy could ultimately reinforce, not erode, U.S. primacy, so long as Washington embraces rather than stifles it.

South Korea’s arms export boom is not just an economic story; it’s a force that’s reshaping global supply chains, alliance dynamics and military dependencies. 

With a $70 billion order backlog, Seoul is somewhat cushioned from the volatility of civilian technology sectors like semiconductors and smartphones, and it is in a position of strength to negotiate between Washington and Beijing. 

In an era where military dependence increasingly determines diplomatic leverage, South Korea has proved that middle powers can rewrite the rules of international influence, at least to some extent, one delivery at a time.

Emmett Stern is an intern at Geopolitical Futures and a master’s candidate in war studies at King’s College London. He holds a B.A. in politics and international affairs from Wake Forest University. He speaks fluent Chinese.