CHINA´S PEACEMAKER IMAGE TAKES A HIT / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

China’s Peacemaker Image Takes a Hit

Alleged arms transfers to Tehran and rising energy risks reveal Beijing’s struggle to balance its interests.

By: Victoria Herczegh

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran has intensified global criticism of China’s strategic posture in the Middle East. 

During and after the conflict, several reports claimed that China supplied surface-to-air missile systems to Iran and facilitated the transfer of ballistic missile propellant precursors. 

According to the same reports, Tehran paid Beijing with oil.

China has built extensive economic and military ties with Iran over the past few decades. 

The relationship began with missile sales during the Iran-Iraq War and has since expanded to intense trade and defense cooperation. 

These moves reflect China’s broader regional interests: securing energy supplies, countering U.S. influence and leveraging Iran’s strategic location as a bridge linking Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

But despite Beijing’s attempts to broker peace, the region is still highly unstable. 

Israel does not seem close to concluding its military operations, and the U.S. shows no sign of disengaging from the Middle East. 

In this context, China’s alignment with Iran carries major risks. 

If the Israel-Iran conflict resumes, Beijing could lose both regional influence and access to critical energy resources.

China’s top concern related to the Middle East is energy security. 

Tehran’s threat to close the Strait of Hormuz – a key chokepoint through which roughly 20 percent of global oil flows – has alarmed Beijing. 

China sources about 35 percent of its crude oil from Middle East countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Iran. 

Any disruption would immediately hit Chinese manufacturers that rely on Persian Gulf energy. 

Even just the threat of blocked shipping routes could send oil prices soaring, increasing costs for Chinese industries.

In response, China’s Foreign Ministry has repeatedly called for immediate deescalation. 

Officials warn that any prolonged conflict could seriously undermine China’s energy security, adding stress to a domestic economy already strained by a real estate crisis, mounting debt and trade disputes with the United States. 

China also wants to shield its growing Middle East investments. 

Beijing has signed major oil and liquefied natural gas agreements with Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Qatar and the UAE. 

As of late 2024, China was Iraq’s top buyer of oil and gas, purchasing about 35 percent of the country’s exports.

Besides energy, Chinese companies such as Huawei, Alibaba and Tencent have launched research and development centers in Saudi Arabia, broadband services in Bahrain and cloud computing services in Egypt. 

Beijing has signed memorandums of understanding with Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi on artificial intelligence, surveillance and cybersecurity. 

It is also the region’s top supplier of weapons and aerospace systems, including fighter jets, drones and satellites. 

These efforts align with China’s Digital Silk Road strategy, aimed at promoting Chinese technological standards worldwide.

 

China has long sought to position itself as a global peacemaker, using diplomacy to protect its economic interests, expand strategic partnerships, promote a non-Western governance model and feed national pride. 

Its 2023 success in brokering a thaw between Saudi Arabia and Iran was a breakthrough. 

Before then, Riyadh and Tehran had no formal diplomatic relations, and both were distancing themselves from Washington. 

China was the only non-Middle East actor trusted to mediate. 

Following that success, Beijing established the International Organization for Mediation in Hong Kong to formalize its role in conflict resolution.

However, China’s credibility as a neutral mediator has been weakened by its alignment with Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine. 

And although Foreign Minister Wang Yi has expressed China’s willingness to play a “constructive role” in resolving the Israel-Iran conflict, Israeli officials remain skeptical. 

Israel’s close military alignment with the U.S., its suspicion of Chinese intentions and its anger over Beijing’s criticism of Israeli operations in Gaza (China has urged Israel to “immediately cease all military adventurism”) have undermined Chinese diplomacy. 

For Israel, Beijing’s Middle East strategy is driven less by benevolence and more by energy security and economic interests.

Nowhere is this clearer than in China’s relationship with Iran. 

China has played a significant part in Iran’s economic survival since the mid-2010s. 

Their Comprehensive Strategic Agreement, signed in 2016, laid the groundwork for a 25-year, $400 billion investment plan finalized in 2021. 

This deal spans energy, infrastructure, trade, military support and intelligence sharing. 

Beijing has also become the largest customer of Iranian oil, buying more than 90 percent of its crude exports in 2024 and 2025, largely through state-linked “teapot” refineries. 

This trade has shielded Tehran from the full effects of U.S. sanctions but has also triggered U.S. Treasury penalties on Chinese firms involved in these transactions.

China has further bolstered Iran’s diplomatic standing by supporting its membership in China-led organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which recently condemned Israel’s strikes on Iran. 

In the U.N. Security Council, Beijing has opposed Western-backed resolutions targeting Iran and blocked efforts to reimpose multilateral sanctions.

China’s strategic ties with Iran also extend to Iran-backed nonstate actors. 

The U.S. Defense Department has accused Chinese suppliers of aiding Yemen’s Houthi rebels with missile and drone components. 

Chinese firms with military connections, such as Chang Guang Satellite Technology, have reportedly provided satellite imagery to help the Houthis target U.S. interests. 

Chang Guang, already sanctioned for assisting Russia’s Wagner Group, denies these claims.

Supporting Iranian proxies, particularly the Houthis, aligns with China’s priority of securing energy and trade routes. 

A significant portion of China’s EU-bound trade passes through the Suez Canal, and Beijing has invested in Red Sea ports in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 

Officially, China says its naval exercises and frequent consultations with Iran (Russia often participates as well) promote “multilateral relation-building,” but its alleged material support for Iranian armed proxies engaged in asymmetric warfare suggests other intentions. 

It also raises concerns about advanced weapons proliferation, which could further destabilize the region.

One possibility is that Beijing views a limited Israel-Iran conflict as a useful strategic distraction for Washington. 

A contained war might divert U.S. focus from countering Chinese influence in East Asia, where U.S. allies Japan, the Philippines and Australia have deepened security cooperation. 

Yet such a conflict would likely harm China more than help. 

If Iran’s regime collapses or weakens, Beijing could lose a key regional partner and see its diplomatic gains, such as the 2023 Saudi-Iranian truce, unravel. 

If the war escalates, China will face a choice: defend Iran militarily and risk alienating Gulf partners like Saudi Arabia, or abandon Tehran and undermine its credibility as a reliable ally.

China will likely continue arming and financing Iran while criticizing Israeli actions, all while working to protect its energy supply chains – its overriding priority in the region. 

The recent conflict underscores Beijing’s limitations as a global peace broker. 

More than anything, China’s actions in the Middle East reflect its effort to safeguard economic interests and facilitate its own recovery, even if that undermines its global image and ambitions.