Xi Adopts the ‘Putin Doctrine,’ at Russia’s Peril
China seeks to undo the ‘Century of Humiliation’ in which it ceded great territory to Moscow.
By Dan Quayle and Thomas J. Duesterberg
Vladimir Putin during a video conference meeting with members of the Security Council of Russia at his official Novo-Ogaryovo Residence in Russia, July 4. Photo: Gavriil Grigorov/Kremlin Pool/Zuma Press
With Vladimir Putin’s aggression in Georgia and Ukraine and his threats against the Baltic states, he has established that the Russian Republic believes it can reclaim any territories of the former Soviet Union.
This doctrine is on a collision course with Xi Jinping’s “China dream,” which aspires to undo the “Century of Humiliation” in the 1800s, when China had to cede vast territory and local sovereignty to both European and Russian imperialist regimes.
Territorial disputes between the two autocratic powers are likely to become one of the biggest threats to global stability as Mr. Xi in effect adopts the Putin doctrine.
The looming problem for Mr. Putin is the irredentist Chinese claims stemming most prominently from the Russian acquisition of eastern Manchuria and the Port of Vladivostok through the 1858 Treaty of Aigun and the 1860 Convention of Peking.
Siberia and Central Asia are as central as Hong Kong and Taiwan to Mr. Xi’s vision.
China now encroaches on Russian interests in Central Asia and Mongolia through its Belt and Road Initiative, its development of mining and energy interests, and its railroad connection across the old Silk Road from eastern China to the heart of Europe.
These mid-19th century treaties engendered, among other deprivations, the reopening opium trade.
The treaties also gave Russian citizens extraterritorial immunity in China, new treaty-port access and low fixed tariffs, and exclusive maritime rights on the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, which furthered China’s loss of sovereignty and influence.
Henry Kissinger noted that Russia saw the Qing Dynasty’s decline “as an opportunity to dismember the Chinese Empire and reattach its ‘central dominions’ with Russia.”
The final Russian-led settlements of the Opium War and China’s acceptance of the unequal treaties were skillfully exploited by the czar in 1860, securing Russia rights to lands larger than France in Manchuria and new rights in Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang.
Disputes over these territories resurfaced at the Yalta Conference, when Stalin demanded continued and expanded rights in Manchuria as compensation for entering the war against Japan.
In 1950 Stalin refused Mao Zedong’s demand that these concessions in eastern Manchuria be reversed, and apart from the return of the port, now in Dalian, most of the concessions remain part of the Russian Republic today.
Mr. Xi’s pursuit of his China Dream is in many ways a mirror of the Putin doctrine.
He has already won new influence in Central Asia and perfected control over Tibet, Macau, Xinjiang and Hong Kong.
Chinese doctrine even presses claims to the Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh, where China and India vie for control of the waters of Asia’s largest river, the Brahmaputra, which had been part of China since ancient times.
Mr. Putin should worry about the roughly 232,000 square miles of eastern Manchuria and Vladivostok that he still controls, as well as areas further west in Central Asia, which are important to the Russian economy and were part of the Soviet empire.
In June, a purported secret document of Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, was leaked to the New York Times and other outlets that forwarded an alarmist assessment of Chinese intentions toward Russia.
The Times reported that many Western intelligence agencies consider the document authentic.
The FSB report worries about China’s spying on Russia and technology acquisition.
It raises suspicions about China asserting claims on traditional territories now part of the Russian Republic.
The 1860 and later 19th-century Russian territorial gains and rights are prominent among the targeted actions suspected of China.
The FSB cites recent Chinese maps, which are required to carry the Chinese names of all large Siberian cities in the contested areas, such as Vladivostok.
Chinese expansion in the South China Sea and renewed claims on the Spratly Islands originally appeared on new maps showing these islands as part of China based on the “nine dash line” that Mao invented.
A name on a map can be a precursor to military action from Beijing.
Mr. Xi has clearly shown his intentions to retake lost parts of the old Qing Empire by retaking control of Macau and Hong Kong, and he has intensified control and destruction of local cultures in Tibet and Xinjiang.
The U.S. should oppose the Putin doctrine as a challenge to de facto international law and in its actual use in Ukraine and any independent part of the former Soviet Union.
Since the doctrine can embolden China’s expansionist claims in Russia, the Pacific Rim and potentially India, U.S. resistance can help preclude the destabilizing effects of Sino-Soviet and other Asian territorial disputes.
Unfortunately, President Trump has leaned toward helping Mr. Putin by denying previously promised weapons for Ukraine and easing sanctions on some Russian firms and individuals.
Russian forces are advancing on the battlefield, and Mr. Putin shows no sign of compromise.
The U.S. and its allies should contribute to undermining the Putin doctrine and its adoption by China by helping Ukraine in its battle against Russia.
Deploying muscular secondary sanctions on China, Hong Kong and other purchasers of Russian oil and suppliers of sensitive military technology is one important tool.
A good start would be Sen. Lindsey Graham’s sanctions bill on purchasers of Russian oil, which is pending in the Senate with 84 cosponsors.
Equipping Ukraine with tools for missile defense and offensive weapons such as Atacams and Himars is equally important. Helping Ukraine finance its efforts by using frozen Russian reserves sequestered in Europe is the third pillar of effective Western support.
Mr. Xi may hold off on irredentist Russian claims as his other allies such as Iran become less helpful to his great China project.
But as Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te wryly noted, while Mr. Xi targets Taiwan to restore territorial integrity and “Russia is at its weakest. . . . Why doesn’t he take back the lands occupied by Russia that were signed over in the Treaty of Aigun?”
Mr. Quayle served as vice president, 1989-93. Mr. Duesterberg is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.
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