TO KEEP RUSSIA OUT AND AMERICA IN, NATO MUST SPEND MORE / THE ECONOMIST

A new “Pug” test

To keep Russia out and America in, NATO must spend more

European members need a hard date to boost their defence budgets

The first head of NATO, Hastings “Pug” Ismay, reputedly said the alliance’s purpose was to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in and the Germans down”. 

Today, no one wants to keep the Germans down. 

But as NATO’s 32 members gather in The Hague on June 24th, most agree that the still-essential task of keeping the Russians out requires keeping the Americans in. 

And that is no longer straightforward.

At one point the summit was in danger of being scrapped. 

In February President Donald Trump, along with his vice-president, J.D. Vance, and his defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, launched a series of verbal attacks on America’s European allies, culminating in the humiliation of Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, whom Mr Trump threw out of the White House. 

Vladimir Putin was doubtless delighted. 

NATO suddenly looked more vulnerable than ever before in its 76-year history.

Relations have been mended since then. 

America has quietly continued intelligence-sharing and modest arms shipments to Ukraine. 

The rhetorical attacks on allies have dried up. 

Mr Trump, having given up on his campaign promise to end the war in Ukraine in a single day, is no longer pressing Mr Zelensky to accept terms that would amount to surrender. 

Mr Trump is still likely at some point to pull out some of the 80,000 American troops stationed in Europe; yet he has gone quiet about it.

The president is right that it makes no sense for 340m Americans to carry the main burden of defending 600m Europeans. 

Europe’s economy is about as large as America’s. 

The nation threatening it has only 140m people and a GDP smaller than Italy’s. 

Russia is Europe’s problem, and the surest way to ensure that America continues to help out with the things that only it can provide, such as heavy-lift aircraft and intelligence-gathering, is for Europe to be seen to be paying its fair share for its own defence.

At the summit, European governments will take a step in this direction. 

Mark Rutte, who now heads NATO, appears to have secured agreement from its members to raise their target for defence spending from 2% of GDP to an impressive 3.5%, which is even more than America spends. 

On top of that, there will be an agreement to commit an additional 1.5% of GDP to defence-related categories, such as infrastructure (strengthened bridges and roads for carrying heavy equipment, etc); better cyber-security; and support for defence industries. 

A headline figure of 5% will be something for Mr Trump to crow about, which matters.

Commitments are one thing; fulfilling them is another. 

The 2% target was agreed to in 2014, but it took pressure from Mr Trump in his first term—and the shock of Mr Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—for Europeans to take it seriously. 

Even now, France and Germany barely spend 2%; Italy and Spain spend far less.

Mr Rutte’s task is to secure a hard date for the new spending target of 3.5% of GDP. 

Early chatter suggests it may be as far off as 2035. 

Since Russia is already gearing up for the next conflict after Ukraine, this is rash; 2030 would be more prudent. 

Even better would be a series of interim targets, as with curbing carbon emissions. 

None of this will be easy. Gung-ho countries like France and Britain face huge budgetary constraints; Germany, which can afford to act, has a history of reluctance to rearm. 

Italy is both reluctant and broke.

Raw numbers, anyway, are only part of the puzzle. 

The money needs to be spent wisely, avoiding duplication and with a good portion allocated to innovative kit and training to give the alliance an edge over Russia’s mass armies (and extraordinary tolerance for casualties). 

But you can’t do anything without money. 

If it is to pass an updated version of Pug Ismay’s test, NATO needs to up its game—starting next week.