Smoke on the Water: Maritime Tension in 2025
This year will likely see new security frameworks for the world’s oceans.
By: Antonia Colibasanu
For all the attention paid to the world’s many terrestrial conflicts – in Ukraine, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, Myanmar and elsewhere – tensions on the world’s oceans may be just as disconcerting.
That they have become increasingly important to the global economy means they are an increasingly likely theater of conflict.
The threats imposed on key trade corridors and chokepoints by state and non-state actors alike have put maritime trade under unprecedented strain, while regional conflict and escalated activity by shadow fleets put global trade systems – and the supply chains that undergird them – into even greater states of precarity.
New threats such as the targeting of undersea cables – essential for global internet connectivity and power transmission – have emerged, as has the routine bombardment of commercial cargo vessels.
These developments threaten to amplify transportation costs, delay the movement of goods and destabilize economies that depend on secure and efficient maritime infrastructure.
Naturally, they also raise urgent questions about the future of sea-borne security as the global economy continues to restructure.
2025 could thus be a year in which new security architectures are created and global debates on maritime infrastructure are raised.
Shadow Fleet
On Dec. 15, accidents involving Russian oil tankers Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239 took place on the Black Sea, near the Kerch Strait.
Both resulted in oil spills.
Both vessels, each over 50 years old, were transporting approximately 9,200 tons of mazut, a low-grade heavy fuel oil, when they encountered severe weather conditions and both ended up spilling significant amounts of oil into the sea.
The environmental impact of these (and many other) incidents aside, the use of outdated vessels like these is often associated with the “shadow fleet,” which refers to ships operating clandestinely to evade sanctions or engage in illicit trade.
This shadow fleet, initially estimated at around 600 vessels early in Russia's war, now numbers in the thousands and accounts for roughly a fifth of the global crude oil tanker fleet.
It has become a critical mechanism for bypassing Western sanctions on restricted Russian oil and other cargo.
These vessels, marked by opaque ownership structures and deceptive practices, play a central role in transporting sanctioned goods, employing tactics long used by countries like Iran and Venezuela, which continue to rely on the shadow fleet for their own sanctioned exports.
The introduction of price caps and oil bans has only fueled the growth of this illicit network.
Western buyers reduced their imports, countries like India, China and Turkey became better customers, and the shadow fleet adapted accordingly.
This growing industry disrupts the global commercial market by altering traditional dynamics.
When planning charters, operators must now account for vessels positioned for future trade, local competition and compliance fears.
The proliferation of shadow fleet activities has blurred the lines between legitimate and illicit operations, creating challenges for traders and operators wary of inadvertently engaging with sanctioned entities.
These dynamics have not only complicated compliance but also reshaped pricing and negotiations, introducing uncertainty and risk into the global shipping market.
Undersea Cables
Crucially, the shadow fleet has also begun to be associated with acts of sabotage, as evidenced by the December 2024 incident in the Baltic Sea.
Significant damage to the Estlink 2 power cable and four telecommunications lines between Finland and Estonia was attributed to the Eagle S, a Cook Islands-registered oil tanker carrying Russian crude and identified as part of the shadow fleet used to bypass sanctions on Russian oil exports.
Finnish authorities seized the vessel on Dec. 26, citing suspicions that it caused the damage by dragging its anchor.
Finnish telecom company Elisa has successfully repaired the damaged communication cables, but repairs to the power cables are expected to take around seven months, reflecting the significant complexity and extent of the damage.
To be sure, the shadow fleet isn’t the only issue here; the region has a history of sabotage and cable disruptions.
In October 2023, the Balticconnector gas pipeline was severed, and telecom cables were damaged, with suspicions pointing to a Chinese vessel's involvement.
In November 2024, two submarine telecommunication cables, the BCS East-West Interlink and the C-Lion1, were disrupted in the Baltic Sea.
These near-simultaneous incidents, occurring in close proximity, prompted accusations from European officials and NATO member states of hybrid warfare and sabotage.
(The damage has not been conclusively attributed to any specific party.)
These recurring incidents have prompted increased security measures and heightened vigilance among Baltic nations and NATO allies to safeguard critical underwater infrastructure.
Similarly, on Jan. 3, an undersea telecommunications cable near Taiwan's northern coast was severed, with Taiwanese authorities suspecting the Shunxing 39, a Cameroonian-registered cargo ship linked to Chinese interests, of causing the damage.
(Taiwan has experienced similar disruptions in the past. In February 2023, undersea cables connecting Taiwan to its Matsu Islands were severed; Chinese fishing vessels were identified as the likely culprits.)
In response, Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration attempted to investigate the Shunxing 39, but adverse weather conditions hindered boarding efforts, and the vessel subsequently left for Busan, South Korea. Taiwan has sought South Korea's assistance in the investigation to determine the exact cause of the damage and assess any potential Chinese implications.
The vandalism of undersea infrastructure not only disrupts normal business operations but also is dangerous for maritime shipping.
Navigation, communication and the coordination of maritime operations often depend on information transmitted through undersea cables.
When they are damaged, it can interrupt communication networks that vessels rely on, increasing the likelihood of collisions, groundings and other maritime accidents, especially in congested waterways.
Furthermore, heightened sabotage risks lead to costly protective measures, such as rerouting or increased surveillance.
The broader implications include delays, increased operating costs and strains on maritime logistics.
Attacks on Cargo
Finally, the threat of direct attacks on maritime shipping is rising.
These include conflict-related strikes on commercial vessels, such as in the Suez Canal, piracy in hot spots like the Gulf of Guinea, and the growing threat of attacks on the movement of military cargo.
The Suez Canal was once a cornerstone of global shipping, but major shipping companies now avoid it because of security concerns, particularly in the Red Sea.
Throughout 2024, Yemen’s Houthi rebels attacked dozens of oil tankers and container ships in the Bab el-Mandeb strait.
The rebels have targeted military vessels as well, including two recent attempts in less than a week to strike the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier.
Even if the attacks subsided, carriers would likely resume normal operations through the Suez Canal only gradually, preferring the security of alternate routes like the Cape of Good Hope despite their higher costs and longer transit times.
Meanwhile, in some places piracy remains a serious threat, even though globally the number of piracy incidents is at its lowest since 1994.
Pirates in the Gulf of Guinea accounted for all 11 crew kidnapped around the globe during the first half of 2024, even though the number of incidents in the area decreased to 10 from 14 in the first half of 2023.
Another 13 piracy incidents occurred in the Singapore Strait during the first half of 2024, down from 20 a year earlier.
Piracy is also resurgent off the Somali coast, where in March 2024 a Chinese-owned fishing vessel was hijacked.
The assailants, who are also holding the ship’s 18 crewmembers captive, are demanding $10 million in ransom.
Perhaps most concerning is the recent incident involving the Russian cargo ship Ursa Major, which sank in the Mediterranean Sea between Spain and Algeria on Dec. 23 after an explosion in its engine room.
The ship’s ultimate owner, Oboronlogistika, called the incident a terrorist attack, saying three blasts above the waterline breached the hull and filled the engine room with smoke, impeding efforts to save the ship.
(These claims are unverified.)
Officially, the ship was en route to Vladivostok from St. Petersburg, though Ukraine’s military intelligence alleged that it had been sent to move Russian weapons and equipment out of Syria.
To make matters worse, Russia accused the Norwegian-flagged Oslo Carrier 3 of failing to assist the crew – a charge that the Norwegian owner rejected, saying the ship followed the instructions of Spanish maritime rescue authorities.
Fourteen of the Ursa Major’s 16 crewmembers were rescued and taken to Spain.
An investigation into the incident is ongoing, but the possibility of an intentional attack introduces new security risks for global shipping.
Under the weight of Western sanctions and labor shortages, Russia’s domestic weapons production is struggling to keep pace with the Russian military’s losses in its war with Ukraine, leading Moscow to rely increasingly on foreign arms.
For example, North Korea is supplying Russia with approximately 300,000 artillery shells per month via seaborne routes through the Sea of Japan, and reports suggest these shipments now also include missiles and armored vehicles.
Similarly, Iran has been delivering drones and ammunition through the Caspian Sea.
Ukraine has previously demonstrated the capability to strike Russian assets beyond its borders, including maritime targets.
If it is now broadening the theater of war, it would significantly heighten risks for civilian maritime shipping, particularly in areas where Russia’s military moves cargo.
Implications for the Global System
Rising conflicts in regions like the Middle East and Ukraine have made shipping routes such as the Red Sea and the Black Sea increasingly dangerous, driving up demand for war risk insurance to protect vessels carrying essential commodities like oil, coal and grains.
Recent disruptions and suspected sabotage in the Baltic Sea suggest it may become the next hotspot for war risk coverage.
This instability in critical waterways is pushing maritime insurance premiums higher, directly increasing costs for shippers.
Shadow fleet operations, marked by opaque ownership and risky practices, exacerbate these challenges.
Their activities drive up insurance premiums and force legitimate shipping companies and regulators to invest heavily in surveillance, enforcement and compliance technologies.
These additional expenses divert resources from fleet modernization and trade route diversification, compounding operational costs.
The global shipping industry now confronts unprecedented challenges: shadow fleets, sabotage of undersea infrastructure, piracy and shifting trade patterns driven by sanctions, new alliances and war.
These disruptions are inflating transportation costs, extending delivery times and fueling global inflation by increasing production expenses across industries.
Beyond the economic consequences, these dynamics raise urgent questions about naval security in an era of retreating globalization.
Trade routes are becoming more contested, less cooperative and increasingly fragile.
As the global system fragments and trade patterns realign, securing maritime commerce will demand new strategies, potentially redefining the roles of naval powers, regional coalitions and international governance.
These changes in maritime commerce will become more obvious in 2025.
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