Mexico’s Audacious Judicial Overhaul
Among the many concerns, the reforms endanger the renewal in 2026 of the USMCA trade pact.
By: Allison Fedirka
Just weeks away from leaving office, Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador ushered legacy-defining judicial reforms through Congress, sparking concern among opponents and international businesses.
Mexican governments have restructured the court system several times over the past 30 years, but institutional weaknesses have persisted.
Whether the latest reforms will do what they’re intended to do remains an open question, but the deep-rooted problems that undermine public confidence in the courts are likely to endure.
Mexico’s current judicial system took shape in the mid-1990s, when the longstanding political dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was waning.
The PRI government empowered the Supreme Court to act as a check on the other branches through judicial review and created the Federal Judiciary Council to ensure internal accountability.
Proponents said the changes institutionalized Mexico’s transition to a true multiparty democracy and dismantled PRI’s web of control, while critics argued they shielded PRI from its opponents’ growing use of judicial reviews to challenge its rule.
Another round of reform – this time focused on the criminal justice system – came in 2008, amid escalating violence driven by the government’s crackdown on drug cartels.
Intended to improve transparency and fairness, the changes gave defendants more rights, imposed stricter rules on evidence collection and presentation, curbed prosecutorial power, and equipped courtrooms with audio and visual recording equipment.
Government surveys of inmates show that the reforms improved judges’ behavior, with judges present and attentive 70 percent of the time, up from 24 percent before the changes.
Despite these modest improvements, the public remained deeply distrustful of the judicial system, citing insecurity and impunity as serious concerns.
The best-known measure introduces the direct election of judges: 11 Supreme Court justices, 1,635 federal judges and 5,700 more at the state and local levels.
Elections will be staggered; between a quarter and one-half of judges will be up for election in June 2025, with the rest decided in 2027.
The Mexican legislature, president and judicial officials will have equal say in nominating candidates, who need only a law degree and five years’ experience to qualify – down from 10 years (except for the Supreme Court, where a decade remains the minimum requirement).
Supporters argue that these reforms will restore public confidence in judges by reducing conflicts of interest and encouraging a more diverse judiciary.
They also argue that public elections will allow voters to scrutinize candidates, balancing power between the judiciary and the electorate.
Critics, however, warn that the reforms could lead to unqualified candidates winning office, politicize the judiciary, and invite political parties and organized crime to deploy funds to sway elections.
The reforms carry significant political and economic implications. AMLO’s Morena party already dominates Mexican politics, holding 24 of 31 state governorships and more than 40 percent of seats in both the lower house and Senate.
Add its allies from the Labor and Green parties and Morena commands a strong majority.
This dominance has sparked fears among opposition and business figures that Morena could extend its control into the judiciary, recalling PRI’s 70-year monopoly of Mexican politics.
The implications for the economy could be severe.
Critics worry that the new judiciary, reflecting the politics of Morena, could favor protectionist policies and adopt a more nationalistic regulatory approach.
The reforms pave the way for changes to regulatory bodies overseeing economic competition, telecommunications, and oil and gas, potentially undermining Mexico’s commitments under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement.
Other opponents say the reforms could undermine labor, environmental and trade standards required by the agreement or jeopardize dispute resolution procedures involving judges.
The timing is critical, as USMCA is up for review in July 2026.
The connection between insecurity, corruption and politics in Mexico is widely recognized.
Only about 10 percent of crimes are reported, and most go unresolved.
Extortion is common, accounting for some 16 percent of all crimes.
Roughly two-thirds of Mexicans believe their judges are corrupt, a level of distrust that contributes to the public’s underreporting of crime, and yet, critics point out, AMLO’s reforms fail to address the impunity plaguing the legal system.
International perceptions of Mexico’s judiciary are similarly poor.
By focusing on only one aspect of the judiciary without tackling systemic issues like corruption and impunity, the reforms are unlikely to improve the country's image or its judicial operations.
But they will strengthen fears over Mexico’s possible reversion to one-party rule.
And the widespread backlash will likely weaken the Mexican government’s negotiating position in future talks with the U.S., Canada and other foreign governments.
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