GAZA WAR WRECKS TURKEY´S MIDDLE EAST POLICY / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Gaza War Wrecks Turkey’s Middle East Policy

Ankara can no longer steer clear of regional entanglements. 

By: Kamran Bokhari

The Israel-Hamas war is a major conundrum for Turkey. 

Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel and the ensuing conflict have upset Ankara’s recent efforts to avoid entanglements in the Middle East and have forced the Turks back into the regional arena. 

Turkey’s options, however, are limited and will be constrained by the actions of its historic rival Iran, which has far greater influence over Hamas and thus the outcome of this conflict.

On Oct. 25, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, “Hamas is not a terrorist organization, it is a group of mujahideen defending their lands.” 

Addressing a gathering of lawmakers from his ruling Justice and Development Party, the Turkish leader announced that he was canceling plans to visit Israel because of its “inhumane” war. 

Meanwhile, during a joint press conference with his Qatari counterpart in Doha, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan accused Israel of committing “a crime against humanity” in its counteroffensive in Gaza. 

Earlier, Fidan was in Abu Dhabi to confer with the United Arab Emirates’ leadership on how humanitarian assistance could be delivered to Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip.

When Hamas launched its unprecedented attack on Israel, Turkey was focused on its northern flank. 

Ankara has been hoping to geopolitically benefit from its ally Azerbaijan’s major victory over rival Armenia in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. 

It has also been exploring opportunities to expand its influence in the Black Sea basin in light of Russia’s weakening due to the war in Ukraine. 

As far as the Middle East is concerned, Turkey’s policy had undergone a significant shift in recent years, with Ankara trying to improve relations with Israel as well as the Arab states.

This policy reversal followed several setbacks in Ankara’s previous approach. 

First, Turkish proxies, primarily Islamist forces of the Muslim Brotherhood type, were unable to benefit from the Arab Spring uprisings. 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE helped Arab states and anti-Islamist factions to reverse the initial rise of the Brotherhood. 

Second, Iran and Russia helped the Assad regime defeat largely Turkish-backed rebels and restrict Turkey’s push into Syria, confining Turkish forces to a limited presence in Syria’s north. 

Third, Washington’s support for Kurdish forces in northeast Syria served as another major obstacle for Ankara. 

Finally, a domestic political-economic crisis for Ankara amid the failed 2016 coup contributed to a financial crisis.

These factors forced a rethink in Turkey’s strategy in 2021. 

The Erdogan government moved to normalize ties with Israel after they soured in 2010 when a Turkish flotilla tried to break an Israeli blockade of Gaza, leading to a clash with the Israel Defense Forces in which 10 Turkish activists were killed and several others wounded. 

Similarly, Turkey, along with its lone Arab state ally Qatar, moved to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt after years of tensions over Turkish support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, especially during the 2009, 2012 and 2014 Gaza wars. 

For Turkey, better relations were necessary for its economic revival, and it realized that there were too many arrestors in its path toward becoming a leader in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, regional conditions also seemed to be stabilizing. 

Despite another Gaza war in 2021, the Israel-Hamas conflict was contained. 

Most significantly, Arab states led by the United Arab Emirates inked the Abraham Accords and established diplomatic relations with Israel. 

Iran was on the defensive because of the nixing of the nuclear deal coupled with additional sanctions, Israel’s targeting of its nuclear program, the elimination of the head of its Quds force, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, in a U.S. airstrike, and growing domestic unrest. 

In other words, the regional situation permitted the Turks to focus on rebuilding their political economy, which was particularly important given the decline in Erdogan’s popularity.

Iran and Hamas had a shared imperative to block this developing regional arrangement, especially with Saudi Arabia and Israel making rapid progress toward normalizing relations. 

The Oct. 7 attack was designed to jolt the region and force key stakeholders to alter their behavior, especially toward Israel, thereby undermining the American strategy to manage the region. 

Hamas, backed by Tehran, knew well the consequences of an attack of this magnitude. 

In fact, they sought massive Israeli retaliation, which would make it difficult for the Turks and the Arab states to normalize relations with Israel.

In many ways, Hamas and Iran likely achieved far greater success than they had hoped for. 

They have forced regional players not just to distance themselves from Israel but also to take a tough stance against it. 

Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan have been sharply critical of Israel while rebuffing Washington. 

But there are limits to how far the Arab states will re-position themselves. 

Turkey, on the other hand, could not afford moderation given its history and its stance under the Erdogan regime, which has sought a prominent role in the Arab and broader Muslim worlds.

Therefore, Turkey needed to take a tough stance to uphold its credentials as a champion of the Palestinian cause and maintain its standing within the Arab world, Islamist circles and global Muslim milieus. 

The conundrum it faces is that the scale of the crisis is likely beyond its diplomatic abilities. 

Turkey is unlikely to prevent Israel from conducting a military operation aimed at dislodging the Hamas regime from Gaza. 

It will therefore be forced to take an even tougher stance diplomatically against Israel and the United States. 

This will exacerbate matters for Ankara’s geopolitical position.

Such a scenario works to the advantage of Tehran, which, as a revisionist actor, aims to benefit from an aggravation of the current crisis. 

In contrast with Turkey, which is risk averse, Iran’s strategic disposition is quite forward-leaning. 

Through Hamas’ actions, the Iranians have already forced the Turks into a position that they were not planning on assuming. 

Turkey will struggle to disentangle itself from Iran’s trap.