jueves, 12 de octubre de 2023

jueves, octubre 12, 2023

The Demise of Francafrique

Francophone Africa is undergoing a reckoning that has been building for decades.

By: Ronan Wordsworth



France’s colonial empire in West and Central Africa dissolved in the 1950s and 1960s, but Paris’ dominance remained. 

Through the unofficial policy of “Francafrique,” put in place at the start of decolonization in 1959, France ensured its continued access to Africa’s resources and preserved French business and trade interests. 

This lopsided arrangement survived for generations but now is coming to an end. 

The series of military coups sweeping the region has categorically changed the dynamic between France and its former colonies. 

In a desperate bid to regain sovereignty and reconstruct their socio-economic models, more countries in the region could look to the military leadership to take control.

Then and Now

During decolonization, the French concentrated on retaining significant influence over the new institutions of their former colonies. 

Paris supported pro-French leaders, at times intervening directly to put down their critics. 

It shaped the region as well through the CFA franc, two regional currencies backed by the French treasury and pegged to the euro (and the French franc before that). 

This system of control, which came to be known as Francafrique, enabled French companies to continue operating in the former colonies. 

Strategically, it provided Paris with leverage over its former colonies’ trade and foreign policies. 

In the ex-colonies themselves, Francafrique contributed to persistent poverty despite significant resource wealth. 

Dictators could count on France’s support so long as they looked after French interests and maintained a vague semblance of democracy.

The recent coup in Gabon exemplifies how entrenched French influence is. 

For almost 56 years, the Francophile Bongo family ruled the country. 

To give a veneer of democratic legitimacy, Gabon held elections, which domestic and international groups condemned as unfair. 

When dissent emerged, as it did after the 2016 election, the regime’s crackdown was harsh and swift. 

Finally, on Aug. 30, following another disputed election result that kept Ali Bongo in power, the military overthrew him. 

Even now, however, questions remain over the country’s political future, since the general in charge of the transitional government has close ties to the Bongo family. 

It’s a similar story in Chad, where the Deby family has ruled for 33 years. 

When Mahamat Deby seized power without an election after the death of his father, President Idriss Deby, Paris tolerated the transition because of the military, strategic and economic benefits the Deby family provided to France.

For the price of supporting African dictators, France gets military bases for its counterinsurgency operations – designed to prevent terrorist groups from moving back into Europe and to curb the flow of migrants – and a stable enough environment for French companies to operate. 

French trade with the 14 countries that use the CFA franc totals about $8 billion across a host of industries, including mining, oil and gas, telecommunications and agriculture. 

France runs a nearly $4 billion trade surplus with the franc zone countries, largely due to the favorable position of French imports because of the currency relationship. 

French state-owned companies operate extensively throughout the region, while French banks dominate the banking sector. 

Overall, the exchange is extremely profitable for France. 

For example, French energy firm Total extracts crude oil from the region and ships it to France for refinement. 

Close to half of France’s imports of crude come from North and West Africa.

The Reckoning

France’s extensive presence on the continent has been fueling disillusionment. 

Officials from the CFA franc zone have for many years discussed transitioning away from the franc and toward a common currency, but disparities in their economies and policies and fear of inflation make such a move nonviable. 

Mali left the franc in 1962 but rejoined in 1984 because of economic instability, while Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea – which were Portuguese and Spanish colonies, respectively – elected to join.

Therefore, although the franc remains divisive, the region’s economies benefit greatly from the stability it provides. 

A rarity among African countries, the stable currency makes the CFA franc countries more attractive to investors. 

The French treasury sets the exchange rate, and the CFA franc is freely convertible between the monetary unions. 

Paris, which holds 50 percent of CFA franc deposits, also guarantees convertibility to the euro. 

Finally, France provides the CFA franc countries with financial assistance, development aid and technical cooperation.

For the CFA franc countries, their sovereignty is the cost of this support. 

Because the French treasury backs the franc, Paris dictates their monetary policy. 

The countries cannot adjust exchange rates to promote local industries, hence the privileged position of French imports. 

Instead, they remain confined to being exporters of raw and primary commodities.

Naturally, this dependency breeds resentment. 

In three years, the region has experienced nine coups. 

Though the root causes vary, each coup leader capitalized on the fact that large portions of the population believed France was at least partially responsible for their woes. 

Demonizing the current government for its relations with Paris, they argued for a reconstruction of their economies and foreign relations. 

Much of the Francafrique framework is based on Cold War-era global dynamics, raising doubts about its suitability for the present age, especially given the current prominence of the Global South.

More French-backed authoritarian regimes may yet succumb to the wave of anti-French sentiment. 

Recent evidence suggests that major powers are unlikely to intervene, and the new military dictatorships are allying to support one another. 

The regimes of longtime rulers are as fragile as ever: 90-year-old Cameroonian President Paul Biya has been in power for 41 years; Togolese President Faure Gnassingbe and his father have ruled for 56 years; Equatorial Guinea’s 81-year-old Teodoro Obiang has been in power for 44 years following his uncle’s term as president; and 79-year-old Denis Sassou Nguesso has led the Republic of Congo for 39 years (first coming to power in 1979 in a coup, then returning in 1997 after losing an election in 1992).

Since taking office in 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron has tried to reset relations with the continent and move away from the Francafrique way of business. 

He promoted private investment to develop the region’s infrastructure and reduce its reliance on foreign aid. 

He also removed French representatives from the CFA franc governing boards and expressed support for reforming the currency arrangements. 

Politically, he said France’s colonial period was a crime against humanity. 

But six decades of foreign interference, corruption, repression, dependence and poverty cannot be overcome in six years. 

France, too, has struggled to change its strategic approach to its former colonies, preferring to continue to prop up pro-French politicians.

Francophone Africa is undergoing a reckoning that has been building for decades. 

Paris has maintained a tight relationship with friendly regimes, ensuring favorable trade arrangements, access to resources and bases for military operations. 

This came at the cost of any real democratization or state-building. 

With a little help from Russian disinformation, the pushback has been immense. 

French private and state-owned businesses have billions of euros in trade at stake. 

In search of a new socio-economic model, the people of West and Central Africa are willing to support military coups if it allows for hope of the end of the Francafrique model and greater control over their own destiny.

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