IS XI JINPING WORRIED ABOUT THE MILITARY? / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Is Xi Jinping Worried About the Military?

A variety of strange developments suggest Beijing has lost faith in parts of the army.

By Victoria Herczegh

Strange things are happening in China. 

Defense Minister Li Shangfu has disappeared from public view, only to be brought under investigation by Chinese authorities. 

Last July, Foreign Minister Qin Gang went missing and was later forced to resign from his position. 

That same month, Yi Gang was replaced with Pan Gongsheng as governor of the People’s Bank of China – another unexplained and unexpected move – and the two most senior leaders in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, which oversees conventional and nuclear arsenals, were abruptly removed from their posts.

As Li’s investigation continues, state media outlet the PLA Daily – which generally publishes articles on modernization, development, dynamic progress and the excellence of military leaders, highlighting and often exaggerating the positive while ignoring the negative – published two op-eds suggesting that there are major issues in China’s national defense sector. 

The first reported “shortcomings” that had been uncovered by the PLA Rocket Force during a drill, hinting that Beijing is dissatisfied with the way the army is functioning, and the second urged Chinese military personnel to “purify their social circle” to avoid socializing with the wrong people, implying there are members of the military who cannot be trusted.

A few months ago, it looked as if Chinese President Xi Jinping had successfully removed or sidelined any potential opponent from his inner circle. 

But these events suggest he sees a threat from his very own armed forces. 

Dissenting opinions in political circles is one thing; an antagonistic army is another. 

Xi appears to be cleaning house accordingly.

The PLA Daily op-eds seem to suggest as much. 

Though never explicitly stated, the articles were commentaries on the removal of the PLA Rocket Force leaders. 

They were ostensibly fired for corruption, but corruption is endemic in Chinese politics, and anti-corruption operations are generally tools used for removing enemies from power. 

There are rumors out of Beijing, however, that Li’s crimes and the ousted Rocket Force generals’ crimes are connected, both relating to illegal weapons acquisitions. 

If that is even remotely true, it would explain Beijing’s hostility to the PLA much more clearly: No military department has openly disobeyed the government like that (at least not publicly) in decades. 

But even if it isn’t true, their ouster clearly indicates something major happened. 

Shortly after their detention, eight other Rocket Force officials were also placed under investigation in connection with the same supposed crime. 

Second, the officials who replaced them – Wang Houbin, the former deputy commander of the navy, and Xu Xisheng, the former political commissar of the air force’s Southern Theater Command – have no experience whatsoever in the Rocket Force department.

Taken together, the detention of the two generals, the replacement with soldiers well outside the department, and the PLA Daily articles suggest that the central government suspects some kind of threat in the Rocket Force. 

Add to this a speech made recently by Xi, who reminded everyone the PLA is fully under the authority of the Communist Party of China and thus must follow all CPC rules, and it’s clear he may be making an example of the Rocket Force.

His paranoia isn’t entirely baseless. 

After the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s economic growth slowed dramatically, and the problems inherent in its real estate and banking systems became impossible to ignore. 

The CPC’s authority is predicated on prosperity for all, so when it falls short of its promises, Beijing tends to preemptively pay attention to usual hotbeds of anti-government activity. 

One such area is Western China, which is home to a high percentage of ethnic minorities living in relatively poor conditions. 

University campuses are also seen as potential sources of revolutionary behavior, especially as a college education is no longer a surefire way to secure a high-paying job. 

Hence why Beijing has enacted harsher restrictions on minorities and universities, with government-affiliated counselors visiting campuses every month and questioning students about their opinions of the leadership.

Since its establishment in 1966, the importance of the PLA Rocket Force has grown significantly. 

And now as China reportedly aims to build up its nuclear arsenal to deter potential U.S. intervention in a Taiwan contingency, the Rocket Force seems to matter more than ever. 

This makes the appointment of the two officials from outside its ranks not just peculiar – it’s potentially counterproductive to China’s nuclear objectives. 

Similarly, the “purification” of social circles is potentially damaging in an institution like the military, which depends on cooperation and comradery. 

That means that to make sure there is no anti-government sentiment taking root in the PLA, Beijing is willing to sacrifice the very military development it needs to counter the U.S.-led alliance taking shape in the Asia-Pacific. 

Of course, open power projection is something China tends to adhere to even amid dire internal problems: Incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone have recently become more frequent, and minor clashes with Philippine fishing vessels in the South China Sea have also occurred.

The possibility that a new Chinese revolution is underway is admittedly remote. 

And though it behooves Beijing to pay attention to restive regions, it could probably weather some dissent in Xinjiang and a few college campuses. 

What it cannot afford is to sit idly by as unrest takes hold in an experienced and well-trained military that has access to all kinds of modern weaponry. 

Beijing can’t “fix” its economy without fixing the problems in real estate, banking and unemployment, and so as long as there is economic discontent, there will be reason for the government to be unsure of its standing. 

Right now, the government is reining in the PLA, even if it’s cutting off its nose to spite its face. 

The good news is that this will likely make armed conflict with any other nation in the region highly unlikely.