U.S. Military Analyst on Ukraine
"Russia Doesn't Have a Good Strategy for Winning the War"
In an interview, American military analyst Michael Kofman says he believes Ukrainian troops have a realistic chance of a breakthrough in their counteroffensive, assuming they don't run out of ammunition.
Interview Conducted By Thore Schröder
Since the beginning of the war, American military analyst Michael Kofman , 41, of the Center for Naval Analyses, also known for his podcast "War on the Rocks ," has made several trips to Ukraine.
In May, ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Kofman, who was born in Kyiv, warned of the challenges posed by the massive Russian defense fortifications in the southeast of the country.
In an interview with DER SPIEGEL, he calls for a long-term strategy for supporting the invaded country.
DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Kofman, how far along is this Ukrainian counteroffensive
Kofman: I think it's fair to say that it is entering the most decisive phase.
It is difficult to estimate when the offensive operation might culminate or end, these things tend not to proceed in linear fashion, but it's clear that we are towards the latter stages of this operation.
DER SPIEGEL: How is that clear?
Kofman: It seems that at this point, both Ukrainian reserves and Russian strategic reserves have been deployed.
Hence this battle is coming down to the relative balance of attrition, who is better able to manage their forces, preserving combat strength and ammunition.
DER SPIEGEL: Will the Ukrainians manage to break through all three Russian defensive lines during the coming weeks?
Kofman: Right now, Ukrainian forces are making steady progress, widening a breach of the Russian defensive line and expanding the current salient.
There's a fair amount of debate as to the potential impact of fall weather and when that truly begins to affect combat operations.
The purpose of this offensive is not just to break through Russian defensive lines.
That is a means in the service of the broader strategic objective, to impose a decisive defeat on the Russian forces, liberating significant amounts of territory.
So, the question is: Will Ukrainian forces be able to break through Russian defensive lines while having enough combat power remaining to exploit that, and make significant gains in terms of territory?
DER SPIEGEL: What do you mean by "significant gains"?
Kofman: It depends – I don’t know how the Ukrainian government and Western countries will assess that.
But the original goals for the offensive seem to have been to get to Melitopol, disrupt the Russian ground lines of communication running near the coastline and ideally to get to the Sea of Azov.
These are likely maximal aims though.
DER SPIEGEL: How great are the chances of reaching those original goals?
Kofman: I think that there's a realistic possibility of Ukrainian forces breaking through Russian lines.
Certainly, the momentum has picked up and the dynamic has somewhat changed in the last couple of weeks.
Military operations, of course, can proceed in non-linear fashion.
If the Russian military is worn down and they have no additional reserves to throw into the fight, it could put the Russian forces in a precarious position.
I'm afraid this isn't a parlor game where one can gamble and easily predict outcomes.
DER SPIEGEL: Some U.S. officials have been quoted anonymously in the press recently with their criticism of the way the Ukrainians are fighting: That they are spreading their forces out too thinly over different axes and fighting in small infantry groups rather than using larger motorized units.
Kofman: A fair amount of the criticism comes from a lack of understanding of how Ukrainian forces operate or of the conditions on the battlefield, the reality of this war.
The operating conditions don't permit effective massing of forces, and the enablers aren't there to support it.
Some have wondered about the distribution of forces between the three axes, the decision to have the best and most experienced brigades fighting around Bakhmut, with newer and less experienced units fighting on the main axis in Orikhiv.
That's something that I have also observed and is a bit of a conundrum for analysts, but it's a different issue from the criticism that's been voiced in in the press by anonymous officials.
DER SPIEGEL: Which "enablers" are missing?
Kofman: Certain capabilities are often in short supply because they get lost early on.
When you look at, for example, mine breaching equipment, which one would need to advance through the dense and extensively layered minefields deployed in that region – these get targeted early on by enemy forces.
If you look at equipment to enable infantry to advance and de-mine mine areas, this, I think, wasn't especially prioritized.
Short-range air defense, there was significant deficiency of gear available to cover the force, which made it quite vulnerable to Russian combat helicopters.
To be clear, some of this equipment is in short supply because it is in short supply in the West.
The offensive didn’t suffer from a lack of armored fighting vehicles or tanks.
The deficits really were on the enabling technology side and, most importantly, on the training side.
As we discovered, the training was insufficient given the time available.
Western countries trained Ukrainian units fairly successfully in individual combat skills, but not necessarily in the way the Ukrainian military actually fights in this war.
The pieces that were underserved were collective training to develop unit cohesion and command staff training.
A wounded soldier in eastern Ukraine: Dense and layered minefields are proving to be a significant issue. Foto: Julia Kochetova / DER SPIEGEL
DER SPIEGEL: U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said in May that the Ukrainians had everything they needed to recapture substantial territory.
Kofman: Of course they did not have everything they needed.
I think the Ukrainian military had what the West could provide within the timeline for this offensive and the policy constraints at the time.
But, of course, as the offensive kept getting pushed back, the Russian military invested more and more in preparing their defense.
This military operation was telegraphed in advance such that it was fairly predictable what the main axis of advance would be, and the extent of the challenge grew over the course of the spring.
The Ukrainian military was trying to manage expectations and I think early on was trying to tamper down hopes that by the end of the summer it would end up outside of Crimea.
DER SPIEGEL: Was the main misconception the comparison with the successful counteroffensive in Kharkiv last year?
Kofman: The experts were all in agreement that it wasn't going to play out like Kharkiv.
But there was a class of commentators out there who consistently implied that the Ukrainians' offensive was going to exceed all expectations.
That they would punch through Russian defenses like a knife through butter.
This was deeply unhelpful to the cause because Ukrainians themselves were trying to not have this kind of conversation in the run-up to the events.
DER SPIEGEL: The U.S. is now debating whether to send long-range ATACMS missiles.
Meanwhile, German politicians are arguing over whether to provide Taurus cruise missiles.
How important could those be for the remaining weeks of the offensive?
Kofman: It would be a positive development, but the frank answer is that if you were going to provide ATACMS and Taurus, the time to do so would have been back in May and June.
On top of that, it really depends on which version of ATACMS to provide.
Taurus are significant in that Ukraine is going to need more cruise missiles.
They've already fired a very substantial number of Storm Shadows and Scalp EGs provided by Britain and France.
DER SPIEGEL: How will this war continue once the offensive is over?
Kofman: I suspect we're going to enter a prolonged attritional period heading into the winter, in which both sides will consolidate their positions while trying to pressure their opponent.
I think it's probably going to look similar to what the situation was last winter.
And part of the reason for that is, as best I can tell, Western governments have taken a wait-and-see approach to this offensive.
Decisions not taken in the summer already largely determine what the course of the fighting will be in the winter.
DER SPIEGEL: Will there then be another opportunity to recapture substantial territory?
Kofman: I think there certainly can be another opportunity next year, but it is up to the West to resource it.
Part of the challenge is coming up with enough artillery ammunition for another offensive.
This will be another test of Western political will.
In some cases, the resources, the material resources, are there.
But the will may not be there to provide them.
In other cases, they may find that some Western countries are tapped out.
But the big question remains: What is Ukraine's vision after this offensive?
It is clear from (Ukrainian President Volodymyr) Zelenskyy’s statements that it is to continue trying to liberate as much territory as possible.
But if there is to be another operation next year, then the train and equip part has to begin immediately so as not to have another rushed effort.
If we fail to learn the right lessons, making decisions in a manner similar to the way they were made in the past, then I’m not sure we’re going to create those opportunities.
DER SPIEGEL: Last year, there were neither extensive Russian minefields nor three lines of fortifications.
It would have been much easier to defeat the Russian army.
Will it get even more difficult now as time goes by?
Kofman: The way I would posit the situation heading into this winter is that Western countries are better positioned to sustain Ukraine's war effort.
That's the good news.
But I see challenges in the Western ability to provide Ukraine with a decisive advantage in another offensive operation.
Because that would require a substantial setting aside of artillery ammunition.
It's clear that liberating territory is going to become increasingly difficult.
DER SPIEGEL: What difference might the delivery of F-16 fighter jets make?
Kofman: The Ukrainian air force needs to switch to a Western platform.
It will allow them to integrate with a host of Western capabilities much better than Soviet platforms.
This transition phase takes years.
The sooner you start down that path, the better.
Western countries have made a number of commitments, but many are not going to be realized until the latter part of next year.
Just having F-16s and trained pilots is not necessarily going to confer air superiority.
It is going to allow the Ukrainian air force to do quite a bit.
It will help level the playing field between them and the Russian Aerospace Forces and help them push back the Russian air force from the forward line of troops.
A lot obviously depends on the systems upgrades and the missiles they receive.
These details matter quite a bit.
To become a military that employs aviation in coordination with ground power requires a lot of organizational adaptation.
I think the Ukrainian air force is thoroughly up to the challenge.
I just worry that expectations are being assigned to the introduction of F-16s like they had been to the introduction of certain Western tanks.
DER SPIEGEL: We have hardly seen the much-discussed Leopard II tanks in action during the offensive.
Kofman: It's not the capabilities that make a military.
They're important, but force employment is much, much more significant.
Those tanks have been employed, to good effect, but less frequently.
On the positive side, there have been relatively few losses.
So, if you're looking to future offensive operations next year, then equipment constraints may not be Ukraine's primary problem because they've been husbanding those resources fairly well.
SPIEGEL: What does Ukraine need most urgently now?
Kofman: The same as before.
It's artillery ammunition, air defense systems, along with an expansion and improvement of Western training to maintain force quality and to reconstitute the Ukrainian force.
These are the top three priorities.
We can add to the list protected mobility, light utility vehicles, drones, mine-clearing equipment, night vision and training to effectively employ it.
Most Ukrainian soldiers look for the basics, and this is what they often spend their money on.
SPIEGEL: Why have we seen a recent uptick of Ukrainian drone attacks on targets inside Russia?
Kofman: That campaign has been going on for a long time but has become a lot more successful in recent weeks.
It is run by Ukrainian military intelligence to make this a costly war for Russia to sustain.
They're trying to attack defense industrial capacity.
They are also trying to attack high-value targets, such as bombers or transport aircraft, that are in low availability in the Russian military.
A mortar unit at work: "I suspect we're going to enter a prolonged attritional period heading into the winter ... it's probably going to look similar to what the situation was last winter." Foto: Alex Babenko / dpa
A destroyed Leopard 2 tank: a significant deficiency of air defenses Foto: Julia Kochetova / DER SPIEGELDER SPIEGEL: What is the Russian strategy at this stage of the war?
Kofman: The Russian strategy is to extend the war.
To make it costly.
Going into next year, they'll try to focus on destroying Ukraine's viability as a state.
They hope that they can slowly deplete Western political will. Russia doesn't have a good strategy for winning the war.
Their forces truly lack offensive potential at this point.
The likelihood of taking more Ukrainian territory is very low, even to reach the most minimal war aims of capturing the Donbas.
But the Russian leadership has not given up on its goal to destroy Ukraine.
And it is going to spend a lot of resources to do that.
DER SPIEGEL: Do they have the means to sustain this war for a long period?
Kofman: It's clear that for the coming year or two, they'll be able to sustain this war.
And they're trying to get materiel and ammunition from other countries like Iran and North Korea.
The materiel situation on the Russian side isn't great, but it is sufficient for them to be able to sustain fighting in the near term.
About Michael Kofman
Michael Kofman, 41, was born in Ukraine and emigrated to the United States with his family in 1991. He is the director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), a government-funded research institution. Kofman’s areas of focus are the former Soviet Union and, especially, the Russian armed forces. He is also known as the host of the podcasts "War on the Rocks" and "The Russia Contingency" as well as for being the author of numerous expert articles.
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