SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN´S REPUTED RAPPROCHEMENT / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Saudi Arabia and Iran’s Reputed Rapprochement

The two countries have a long way to go before achieving genuine reconciliation.

By Hilal Khashan 

Last month, Iran and Saudi Arabia signed a landmark agreement brokered by China to restore their diplomatic ties and usher in a new era of regional cooperation and non-intervention in domestic affairs. 

The deal will launch discussions on building a new regional security framework under China’s supervision. 

It also calls for strengthening Iran’s economic and diplomatic relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council. 

The Saudi finance minister said the kingdom, which is working to diversify its economy away from fossil fuels, is ready to invest in Iran’s economy if all goes to plan. 

The agreement should create an economic outlet for sanctions-ridden Iran, which has long pressed Saudi Arabia to make a deal that guarantees their interests and frees the Saudis from American pressure. 

However, the two countries have a long way to go before achieving genuine reconciliation.

Saudi Shift

For the Saudis, one of the main motivations for making peace with Iran is to move toward extricating themselves from the quagmire in Yemen. 

On Sunday, a Saudi delegation went to Sanaa to discuss renewing a cease-fire that has been in place since April 2022, in preparation for a two-year transitional period to resolve the crisis. 

The Saudis are eager to end their involvement in the war against the Houthi rebels to focus instead on domestic development projects, which require peace and stability in the Arabian Peninsula. 

To achieve this stability, however, the Saudis have no option but to accede to the demands of the Houthis, who control northern Yemen. 

These demands include lifting the Saudi-imposed blockade, obtaining a fair share of Yemen’s oil wealth and, most critically, the adoption of a federalist system.

The detente between Riyadh and Tehran is part of a broader shift in the Saudis’ domestic and foreign policies that has been ongoing for years. 

Under the reign of King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Riyadh’s approach to governance has evolved beyond recognition from what Ibn Saud envisioned when he founded the Third Saudi State in 1932. 

The king and crown prince have transformed the Saudi political system dramatically, concentrating authority in their hands while undermining the clerical establishment’s traditional role as overseers of government policies. 

The kingdom has also set new criteria for conducting its foreign affairs, aspiring to become the leader of the Gulf region and redrawing its relations with major powers, particularly the United States.

Saudi Arabia began to express dissatisfaction with the U.S.’ Middle East policy two decades ago, though its concerns became public only when President Joe Biden entered the White House. 

Saudi Arabia was disappointed with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the dismantling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, which led to Iran’s hegemony over Iraq. 

It was also frustrated with Washington’s lack of support for Saudi interests in Syria and Yemen and its reluctance to defend the kingdom when Iran targeted its oil facilities in 2019. 

It also objected to the Iranian nuclear agreement in 2015.

Riyadh moved to curtail its close relations with the U.S. beginning in 2012 during the rule of King Abdullah, who had developed the impression that U.S. President Barack Obama lacked energy and sophistication in confronting Iran, their common adversary. 

The Saudis were annoyed with Obama after he reneged on his promise to intervene militarily in the Syrian war if the Assad regime crossed a “red line” and used chemical weapons against the opposition. 

The Saudis were also afraid of the American president’s desire to draw closer to Iran and urge the kingdom to resolve its problems with Tehran directly, without U.S. intervention. 

The head of Saudi intelligence at the time, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, told European diplomats that Riyadh was considering a radical change in its relations with the U.S. in protest of its abandonment of the Middle East and pivot to Asia. 

The Saudi king and crown prince also distrust the current administration and have emphasized that they have strong cards to play both internationally and economically.

China’s Role

The Middle East has become essential to China due to Beijing’s level of trade with the countries of the region and its desire to find an alternative trade route to the Strait of Malacca, which the U.S. Navy controls. 

The move toward China is part of MBS’ Vision 2030, a massive development project that requires forging strategic and industrial cooperation with multiple countries. 

Last month, the Saudi Council of Ministers approved a memorandum recognizing the kingdom as a “dialogue partner” in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an eight-member security grouping and counterweight to U.S.-led initiatives. 

Riyadh hopes its accession to the group will enable it to reach new markets in the East through its investments. 

The move confirms the depth of the Saudi economy’s focus on Asia since Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the kingdom last year.

Saudi Arabia’s joining of the SCO, as well as its rapprochement with Iran, further undermines Riyadh’s relationship with Washington. 

Riyadh understands the intentions of the Iranians and the Chinese in the rapprochement deal. 

The supreme commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps called it a setback for the United States. 

But MBS’ primary concern remains building Saudi Arabia’s economy, regardless of the long-term repercussions of its cooperation with Iran or China. 

MBS has come to the conclusion that Saudi Arabia can achieve economic development only if it is part of a global financial system.

The Iranians, meanwhile, see their relationship with China through a different prism. 

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s perspective of the world converges with that of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as they all view themselves as being at war with Western civilization. 

Khamenei aspires to establish an Islamic community led by Iran, while Putin desires a Slavic bloc controlled by Russia, and Xi strives for a Confucian-communist renaissance dominated by China. 

His desire for closer ties with Russia and China was revealed by his statement from a few months ago that the new world order he wishes to create aims to isolate the U.S., transfer power to Asia and weaken Western international influence. 

(Given the deep divisions among its members, the SCO must support the existing balance of power in international relations. 

It has therefore shifted its emphasis from security and politics to the economy.)

Expectations Versus Reality

The full fallout from the Saudi-Iran agreement remains unpredictable, despite some describing it as a historical event. 

Like every agreement between nations, it is liable to fail, especially given the absence of a rapport between the elites of the two countries. 

It will not lead to the immediate end of tensions, though it can help defuse the long-standing hostility between them. 

For Iran, one of the most important goals of the deal was to develop economic and trade cooperation with the Gulf states as it tries to overcome its economic stagnation and contain discontent with rising inflation, which exceeded 40 percent last year. 

Saudi Arabia’s hostility toward Iran was a result of Tehran’s interference in its allies’ affairs and its efforts to acquire a nuclear bomb. 

Despite Chinese assurances that it will ensure compliance with the terms of the agreement, the Saudis are fully aware that they cannot rely on the Iranian regime’s commitments to stick to the terms of the deal.

Iran is facing enormous internal and external pressures, and its agreement to stop arming its regional militias is nothing more than a tactical retreat, a product of its political and religious doctrine based on the concept of strategic patience. 

The preamble to the Iranian constitution speaks of exporting the Islamic revolution and calls for interference in the internal affairs of Iran’s neighbors. 

The U.S. has expressed annoyance with China’s mediation of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, which, in its opinion, goes beyond normalizing relations or promoting security in the Middle East. 

The Biden administration views the deal as a nucleus for a new world order that works in the interests of Moscow, Beijing and Tehran.

Iran hopes to reap diplomatic, security and economic benefits from the agreement. 

It will improve Iran’s relations with other Arab countries such as Egypt, Bahrain and the UAE, though its implications for Iraq, Syria and Lebanon remain to be seen. 

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi recently called his Syrian counterpart, Bashar Assad, to assure him that the changes taking place will benefit the so-called “axis of resistance.” 

He declared that the U.S.’ deployment of a nuclear submarine to the region was a sign of weakness. 

Assad, in turn, spoke of signs of collapse in Israeli society, attributing them to the resistance. 

When the Houthis took control of the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, the Iranians said it was the fourth Arab capital to fall to them. 

During Ayatollah Rullollah Khomeini’s return from France in February 1979, he said that the Islamic community was ruled for several centuries by the Arabs, and then by the Turks, and that now it was the Persians’ turn. 

Reconciliation with the Saudis, Tehran would argue, is a step in that direction.

Hilal Khashan

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/author/hkhashan/

Hilal Khashan is a Professor of political science at the American University of Beirut. He is a respected author and analyst of Middle Eastern affairs. He is the author of six books, including Hizbullah: A Mission to Nowhere. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019.) He is currently writing a book titled Saudi Arabia: The Dilemma of Political Reform and the Illusion of Economic Development. He is also the author of more than 110 articles that appeared in journals such as Orbis, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Middle East Quarterly, Third World Quarterly, Israel Affairs, Journal of Religion and Society, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, and The British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.